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This thesis seeks to explore the linkages between the networks which facilitate the exchange of 
information and assistance regarding internal Cambodian labour migration, and the physical assets 
and social systems within which, it is held here, they are embedded. In doing so, it revisits the area 
of enquiry recently associated with the social capital literature, with a new set of methodologies 
designed to circumvent some of the shortcomings associated with that theory. This is undertaken 
first, through recourse to the quantitative methodologies associated with network theory, and 
second, to the literature on endogenous systems of risk mitigation in response to natural disasters 
and climate pressures. In order that these local responses are framed fully within their multi-scalar 
context, structural violence theory is utilised in a linking role. 
Thus, labour migration is viewed herein as a lens through which to view the dynamic evolution of 
traditional Cambodian social systems. In particular, it is effective as a means of understanding 
resilience and response to the Kingdom’s contemporary environment, both in terms of its persistent 
vulnerability to natural disasters and climate shocks, and the rapid, but highly unequal, economic 
growth which has characterised the “economic miracle” of the previous decade. Indeed, the nature 
of the inequality which has characterised this period of rapid growth will be one of the primary foci 
of this study, which offers to the literature an account of how uneven distributions of social and 











Chapter One  
Introduction 
In spite of the famous images of black-clad peasants toiling over communal farms and work projects 
having become firmly embedded in the foreign perception of Cambodia, ‘the tragedy of [its] modern 
history’ (Derks, 2008: 1) has tended to be downplayed in scale. The four hellish years of the 
Democratic Kampuchea period did not occur in historical isolation, but represented the culmination 
of years of radicalism and conflict. Moreover, although, ‘the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 
marked the end of three decades of warfare in Cambodia’ (Baromey et al., 2012: 14), peace 
remained far from forthcoming. Rather, the subsequent decade of Vietnamese control came to be 
characterised by civil war and insurgency deriving from the Khmer Rouge controlled West, where 
‘armed opposition to the government’ (Blunt and Turner, 2005: 76) was to persist throughout the 
three year period of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia and beyond. Indeed, it is an irony in 
keeping with the period that stability would only be achieved following a ‘violent coup’ (Ibid.) by the 
Cambodian People’s Party in 1997. 
 
Some commentators have argued that this sustained period of conflict was merely the latest 
manifestation of ‘a heritage of violence’ built upon an emotionally restrictive culture in which 
‘shouting is frowned upon and anger is swallowed’ (Prasso, 1994: 73). Prasso, for instance, has 
drawn parallels between the atrocities committed during Cambodia’s several decades of strife, and 
the abundant folk tales, dating from the Angkor “golden age” and before ‘in which Cambodians 
allow violent passions to overrule common sense’ (Prasso, 1994: 73). Whilst any analysis which 
traces an unbroken cultural thread through a millennium of national history must be viewed with a 
good degree of scepticism (Springer, 2009), she is far from alone in the attempt, with many writers 
on Cambodia appearing bound by an almost inescapable tendency to infer parallels, continuities and 
stases, and to apply labels of ‘tradition, conservatism, timelessness and changelessness’ wherever 
possible (Derks, 2008: 1).  
 
As such, ‘history…is a central theme in the way the country is portrayed’ (Derks, 2008: 1), and has 
been bound up tightly with the national narrative of recovery in recent years. During that time, 
debates over whether the travails of the seventies and eighties had cut so deep as to leave 
Cambodian society permanently drained of trust have, in general, given way to a widening viewpoint 
that years of warfare have not in fact destroyed the numerous village-level organisations which are 
the historical lifeblood of the country’s social structure (Pellini, 2004; Baromey et al., 2012). 
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Community organisations, pagoda associations and, conversely, deep-rooted systems of patriarchy 
have emerged, under the searchlight of recent research, as broadly distributed and thriving.  
However, whilst it is increasingly apparent that Cambodian society is neither 
‘mad…destroyed…[nor]…returning to a nostalgic past’ (Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002: 109), the 
nation’s contemporary social organisations, though similar in appearance to their predecessors, 
nevertheless reflect having emerged into a much more dynamic and open environment than that of 
pre-war Cambodia. As a result, the persistent discourse of the static and ‘gentle land’ (Vickery, 
1984), which was arguably never appropriate for a country characterised by alternating and often 
burdensome vassalage to its neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand, must be finally abandoned in favour 
of a discourse befitting a nation beset by, and increasingly responsive to, economic dynamism and 
social change.   
 
Indeed, a fresh conception is all the more necessary given the unrelenting series of climate shocks 
which, since the turn of the millennium, has led households to rely increasingly on alternative 
sources of income to the paddy staple. Where available, fisheries and NTFP collection represented a 
traditional recourse, but increasing integration into the market economy has seen migration emerge 
as a livelihoods strategy of great importance. As a result, not only the volume, but the character of 
labour movement began to shift, so that ‘while migrant labour had previously supplied temporary, 
short-term income, it now became a central strategy for many households’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 80). 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of a generalised acceptance of the expanding volume of migration and its 
increasing importance as a rural livelihoods strategy (e.g. Oeur, 2012; Lim, 2007; Maltoni, 2006), 
research into population movement in Cambodia has tended to be characterised by foreclosure 
along the lines of the rural-urban dyad. Those studies which have been undertaken – and given the 
scale and importance of the phenomenon there are mystifyingly few – inevitably possess either a 
rural or an urban focus, usually incorporating an addendum which concedes the importance of the 
corollary, but which either presents no data generated in the migratory destination (as in Oeur et al., 
2012) or conducts secondary research with a merely corroborative function in sender villages (i.e. 
Lim, 2007).  
 
Anthropological studies undertaken in recent years have proved similarly imbalanced. Derks’ (2008) 
investigation of Khmer women migrants to Phnom Penh, for instance, whilst insightfully probing the 
cultural implications of urban work, fails to expand upon her nuanced analysis with any significant 
investigation of the rural aspect of migratory culture, although she frequently alludes to it via 
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informants’ accounts. Conversely, Uk (2006) and Hinton (1998a; 1998b) base their analyses squarely 
in the rural sphere, as does Pellini (2004) in his work on the re-emergence of social capital in 
Cambodia. Whilst such limitation of scope is to some extent understandable given the time and 
budget constraints of research, it is argued here that the continuing tendency to prioritise either the 
rural or the urban is also symptomatic of a failure to fully recognise the linkages between the two. 
Change in the rural sector has simply not been conceived of as running in parallel to the ostentatious 
dynamism of Phnom Penh, and has therefore been viewed as typologically incompatible in research 
terms. 
 
This Ph.D. aims to redress this obfuscatory division via the application of an analysis focussed not 
upon the factors which promulgate labour migration, or the specifics of migrant livelihoods, but 
rather, as Resurreccion (2005: 34) describes it, the space ‘in-between’ urban and rural: migratory 
linkages themselves. As such, it will seek to move beyond an acceptance that these linkages are 
important conveyers of information and opportunity, as noted by numerous authors (e.g. Potts, 
2010; Derks, 2008; Ressureccion, 2005; Gugler, 1991), towards an in-depth analysis of their 
relationship to non-migratory social networks; their heterogeneity in relation to physical resources 
and inequality; and their role in generating social change and discordance at both the rural and 
urban ends of the migrant continuum. 
 
As such, whereas previous studies (e.g. Scott, 1972, 1985; Brocheaux, 1983; Platteau, 1995a, 1995b; 
Fafchamps, 1992; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) have investigated the formation of rural social 
systems, and others have investigated the functionality of social networks both generally (e.g. 
Putnam, 2000; 1993; Burt, 2001; Granovetter, 1977) and in the context of migration (Potts, 2010; 
Derks, 2008; Ressureccion, 2005; Gugler, 1991), the novelty of this study lies in its attempt to 
cohesively integrate rural, urban, and migratory social networks. Moreover, it has sought also, in a 
manner rarely attempted within the aforementioned literature, to generate further insights into the 
dynamic relationship between social networks, economy and ecology via the application of a 
network mapping methodology created for the purpose of this study.   
 
In the pursuit of these goals, then, this thesis will seek to answer three core questions about social 
and migratory linkages in Cambodia. First, why do social networks operate as they do in Cambodia 
and to what extent are they related to the functional requirements of the household, such as the 
need to mitigate environmental risk or share labour? Second, how do migratory linkages differ in 
response to differing volumes and distributions of assets on the part of the rural household and 
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what role does this play in the translocation of inequality? Third, how does the migratory and non-
migratory social structure elucidated by questions one and two feed back into itself from the point 
of view of social norms: how, otherwise put, does the social structure which facilitates migration 
impact upon the norms which underpin its operation?     
 
In answering these questions, a theoretical framework capable of integrating the environmental, 
economic, and cultural dimensions of labour migration as far as possible into a single, systematic, 
conception will be outlined in chapter two. Therein, a tripartite theoretical framework will be 
delineated which argues first for a re-launch of Mabogunje’s (1970) migration systems theory, in the 
manner called for also by Bakewell (2013) and De Haas (2010), before proceeding to outline the 
theoretical addenda necessary to reformulate it for the aims of this Ph.D. Ergo, section two of the 
framework will introduce an approach to social capital recast in the light of network theory, as well 
as Bourdieu’s (1984) and Galtung’s (1969; 1991) work, in order to render it applicable to the multi-
scalar nature of labour migration. Having done so, the final section of the framework will address the 
relationship between social systems and the physical and economic environment in which they arise.   
 
As such, in view of the aims of this Ph.D., the theoretical framework set out in chapter two seeks to 
frame the networks which underpin labour migration firmly within the socio-cultural and 
environmental context from which they emerge. In doing so, this thesis’ framework will emphasise 
that “traditional” social systems exist to constrain as much as to facilitate and that the ability to 
participate in labour migration – as well as the manner in which that participation takes place – is 
itself a function of initial asset distribution, as well as the dynamic systems which migratory 
networks become once migration has begun to take hold.  In this way, the conceptual basis laid out 
here is ultimately directed towards the exposition of labour migration as a phenomenon which 
occurs at the nexus of society, ecology, and economy.     
 
Following on from this theoretical framework, chapter three will present the research methodology 
used during the course of this study. In doing so, it will examine a variety of relevant philosophical 
perspectives, before identifying a critical realist standpoint as the most appropriate for the 
investigation of the causal structures which influence action in the communities in question. In this 
respect, it will be predicated not only on Bhaskar’s (2008) and Yeung’s (1997) expositions of critical 
realist methodology, but also upon the methodologies of those authors deemed theoretically central 
to this study. In addition to Bourdieu’s (e.g. 1984) work, the importance of which has already been 
noted, the methodology presented here seeks to incorporate the influence of Watts (1983), 
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Fafchamps (2005), Scott (1985; 1972), and Galtung (1969; 1990) among others in order to align the 
practical aspect of this thesis with the theoretical dimensions outlined in chapter two. 
 
Having arrived, via the analysis of these and other key authors, at a mixed methodology capable of 
incorporating the diverse theoretical elements which underpin this thesis, chapter three will 
subsequently provide a detailed account of the research process. It describes a method split into 
four phases, the first of which comprised preliminary fieldwork, during which site selection and 
background data collection took place. Thereafter, a two part questionnaire survey, investigating 
physical and social assets respectively, occupied the second and third phases. A final phase of 
research, examining migrants’ urban livelihoods and networks via primarily qualitative fieldwork, 
brought the field-based investigation to a close. 
 
With the methodology having been detailed in this way, chapter four provides the economic and 
historical background necessary to contextualise the development of the local social systems under 
investigation. It begins by explaining the origins of the Cambodian state in relation to its neighbours, 
before proceeding to sketch the economic conditions which came to generate and define the 
“golden period” of the Angkor Empire, and which subsequently contributed to both the Kingdom’s 
acquiescence to the French Empire, and the unprecedented population movement and upheaval of 
the 20th century. As such, this historical overview is intended to provide the context necessary to 
understand contemporary events in Cambodia and to assist in the elucidation of contemporary 
structures of power relations through recourse to the events which helped shape them.  
 
As such, it will be argued in chapter four that the events of the past several centuries have 
generated a national history of dislocation from the land, creating what Kalab, in the late sixties 
called the ‘great mobility of the Cambodian peasant’ (Kalab, 1968: 525), even before such 
movement reached an unforeseeable pinnacle during the Democratic Kampuchea period of 1975 - 
1979. It will also be shown that population movement in Cambodia is now entering a third phase, in 
which the future of rural Cambodians is becoming increasingly bound up with ability to extend social 
networks across long national and transnational distances in order to capture some of the fruits of 
modern sector growth. 
 
Data relating to this premise will be explored across the three subsequent chapters, the first of 
which, chapter five, will explore the linkages between farming and social structure which are the 
subject of research question one. In so doing, this chapter seeks to demonstrate the dynamic and 
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practical aspects of rural social systems which, it will later be shown, also underscore rural-urban 
migration systems. The chapter begins with a detailed analysis of income and asset distribution 
within the research site – three neighbouring villages within Krang Youv commune, Kandal province 
– including land, livestock, and remittances amongst others, after which this survey of asset 
distribution is analysed in tandem with various social network maps and data relating to the social 
structure of the village system. Via this dualistic approach, chapter five seeks to demonstrate both 
quantitatively – through the use of graphical and statistical methodologies – and qualitatively, via 
informant accounts and focus groups, the embeddedness of specific social networks within the 
physical environment of the village. 
 
Chapter six will then proceed to investigate research question two, in the course of which it will 
explore the manner in which migratory networks interact with patterns of rural asset distribution 
and urban income sources. This aim here is to present a picture of urban social activity as embedded 
not only in the local, urban environment, but also as firmly tied to the assets and liabilities of the 
rural household. As such, this chapter will explore the extent to which rural inequalities are 
transmitted across hundreds of miles to the city, and perhaps even enhanced by the divergent urban 
opportunities available to migrants from differing backgrounds.  
 
Having investigated linkages between rural asset distributions and social structure in chapter five, 
and the implications of these structural inequalities for migrant livelihoods in chapter six, the final 
empirical chapter of this Ph.D. will address the third research question of this thesis. Ergo, it will 
extend the analysis of migrant networks to the realm of cultural norms, attitudes and social practice, 
in order to elucidate the bi-directional relationship between these phenomena and the migratory 
and non-migratory networks delineated up to this point. In particular, this chapter will investigate 
how the structures and processes outlined previously are not only rooted in “traditional” norms, but 
also feed back to them, changing the way in which assets are valued and cooperative action is 
viewed. As such, this chapter builds on the previous chapter’s empirical analysis by outlining the 
manner in which modern sector labour migration is serving to expand the distance between rich and 
poor culturally as well as economically by shifting norms to reflect the new distributions of 
opportunity and capital. Finally, the study’s main findings across chapters five to seven will be 
concluded upon in chapter eight, which will also briefly consider future research possibilities in light 
of the insights generated by this Ph.D.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
The movement of labour is, in almost all cases, an extremely complex process which produces 
winners, losers and myriad influential feedbacks. The logistics of migration alone, comprising 
transport, networks of information, household power dynamics, and savings behaviour (amongst 
numerous other factors) is itself a cross-disciplinary topic, even before cultural feedbacks, social 
change and demography are incorporated into a somewhat more holistic analysis. Migration is, 
simply put, a phenomenon which draws upon and feeds into all aspects of people’s lives.  
With this in mind, any attempt to construct a totalizing theoretical framework of labour migration, 
even one tailored specifically to the conditions and realities of Cambodia, is bound to fail: a process 
with its roots as sited equally comfortably in both global economic forces and household scale 
“socio-ecology” (Nevins, 2003) cannot be holistically theorized a whole. Nevertheless, a heuristic 
framework, capable of elucidating some of the linkages and processes which inhere between these 
scales is an achievable target. This shall be the aim herein. 
In pursuit of this aim, the theoretical framework of this Ph.D. shall be divided into three parts. The 
first of these will be concerned with the migration literature itself, tracing an analysis via the early 
development theoretic literature of the 1950s and 1960s to the recently renascent migration 
systems literature.  Having argued for the relevance of a theory of migration rooted in Mabogunje’s 
(1970) classic systems framework, the remainder of this chapter will set about the task of 
reformulating that model in the light of the four subsequent decades of academic research into the 
migration process. 
 In this regard, it will be argued that the key shortcoming of Mabogunje’s original framework lies in 
its failure to engage fully with either the local specifics of labour movement, or the multi-scalar 
processes which drive migration. In seeking to remedy these limitations, section two will begin to 
elucidate a hybrid framework, which combines element of the contemporary social capital literature 
with Bourdieu’s (1984) and Galtung’s (1969; 1991) symbolic capital and structural violence theories 
respectively, as a means of contextualizing the social behaviour upon which migration depends at a 
variety of scales.  
For reasons which will be discussed below, the selected theoretical addenda are well suited to 
ameliorate some of the shortcomings of the original systems literature. However, the advantages of 
these theoretical addenda are also their shortcoming in that the introduction of localizing lenses  has 
the potential to inhibit some of the inherent advantages of a systems framework. Moreover, neither 
Bourdieu nor Galtung deals in the requisite level of depth with environmental factors, which lie at 
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the core of the aims of this Ph.D. In view of this issue, the chapter will close with a third section 
wherein a case shall be made for a renewed focus upon functionality, as a means of reconciling 
























2.1 Migration  
Research into population movement has a lengthy history, but it is nevertheless a field frequently 
characterised as secondary to the economic forces upon which, it has long been assumed, the 
movement of peoples is directly dependent. Classic studies devoted specifically to human mobility, 
in particular Zelinski (1971) and Lee (1966) have relied heavily on paradigmatic economic models 
such as Thompson’s Demographic Transition (1929), Rostow’s Stages of Growth (1960) and Lewis’s 
Dual Sector (1954), and it is only relatively recently that the study of migration has been freed from 
'economic conceptualisations that make no explicit references to development' (Brown, 2002: 42). 
This change in attitude has closely mirrored the shifting economic paradigms of development, with 
the modernisation (e.g. Rostow, 1960), dependency (e.g. Frank, 1967) and neoclassical models all 
having contributed means and attitudes by which to view peoples’ movements, which still persist in 
the migration literature. In recognition of their importance in this respect, the following sections will 
briefly explore migratory frameworks according to their association with these models, before 
turning to alternative conceptualisations, and finally to an exposition of the integrated framework 
which will inform this Ph.D. 
2.1.1 Neoclassical Equilibrium and the Todaro Model 
It may be viewed as something of a curiosity that the migratory models associated with the earliest 
economic paradigms of development, in particular the Lewis dual-sector model, have required only 
relatively minor adjustment to maintain a continued relevance in academic and policy thinking to 
this day. Indeed, perhaps most notably, neoclassical interpretations of migration tend to retain the 
assumption made by Lewis that labour will move from areas of low income to high income and that 
it does so “costlessly”, resulting eventually in what the classic Hecksher-Ohlin model terms 'factor 
price equalisation', or the homogenisation of wages and population across a given country. 
Of the numerous pieces of evidence to undermine these propositions, that which arguably caused 
academics and policy-makers the most concern in the twentieth century was the problem of urban 
unemployment in the developing world, where by the mid-sixties it had come to be noticed that 
migration did not respond directly to income signals and that people continued to move in search of 
urban work even when unemployment was extremely high (De Haas, 2008). The Todaro model of 
migration (Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970) purported to explain this apparently illogical 
behaviour by introducing a time-based analysis, wherein migrants are viewed as rational economic 
agents who migrate in the expectation of higher wages in the long term. 
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The Todaro model came to be highly influential for a number of years and arguably remains one of 
the bases of the persistent neoclassical equilibrium perspective (De Haas, 2008), but it has 
nevertheless attracted significant criticism in the intervening decades. In particular, it has been 
dismissed as ahistorical and eurocentric, and as sharing neoclassicism’s persistent inability 'to deal 
with constraining factors such as government restrictions on migration' (De Haas, 2008: 7). In 
addition, anthropological and geographical fieldwork in the developing world, some of which 
predates Todaro's model, (e.g. Potts, 2010; Shah, 2006; Kuhn, 2003; Rigg, 2002; Mabogunje, 1970) 
has revealed an enormous variety of migratory patterns and practices, many of which  are distinctly 
circular in nature, and which therefore refute one of Todaro's fundamental assertions: that 'material 
progress usually has been associated with the gradual but continuous transfer of economic agents 
from rural based agriculture to urban oriented industry' (Todaro, 1969: 139) 
Indeed, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the linear labour movement proposed by 
orthodox economic models may be the exception rather than the rule, with Skeldon (1990), for 
instance, having compiled an extensive body of information on labour movement during the period 
preceding European industrialisation, demonstrating that the peasantry, often supposed to have 
been tightly bound to feudal landlords, was anything but immobile. As he argues, despite the fact 
that ‘compared with the static landowning elites, the mobile poor 'may have left less of a trace on 
history…population mobility clearly played as great a role in the spread of people and ideas and in 
the transformation of society in the pre-industrial period as it is considered to have done during the 
industrial period and into our own era' (Skeldon, 1990: 44). This insight fundamentally undermines 
mobility models based on multi-stage and dual-sector conceptions, demonstrating as it does that 
'high levels of mobility are not a product of the industrial revolution' (Skeldon, 1990: 45) and hence 
that any conception of development inducing a change in migration patterns cannot be couched 'in 
terms of a simple shift from lower to higher mobility' (Ibid.).  
In addition, evidence suggest that the even where the linear in-migration described by neoclassical 
equilibrium models does take place on a large scale, it does not necessarily supersede other forms of 
mobility entirely. Indeed, the various migratory streams may operate quite independently of each 
other and respond to external signals in a variety of ways. A fall in real incomes, for example, may 
significantly decrease the numbers of long term migrants, but leave numbers of short-term, circular, 
migration unchanged (Potts, 2010). The implication, that migration is a multifaceted and complex 
phenomenon composed of discrete popular movements, undermines the above models further, to 
the extent that, as Potts (2010: 1) concludes, 'the experiences of the last three decades have entirely 
undermined the utility of conceptualizing [migratory] processes in relation to unilinear models'. 
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A further criticism of such models relates not to their specific conceptions of migration but to their 
underlying methodological individualism, or, as Skeldon notes, 'the basic assumption…that people 
are income maximisers who migrate to achieve this objective' (Skeldon, 1990: 128). Whilst it is 
widely accepted, following numerous studies and surveys, that some degree of economic rationality 
figures in many mobility decisions (e.g. Rigg, 2002; Parnwell, 1993; Brown, 1991; Skeldon, 1990; 
Chambers, 1983), the fallacious inference drawn by Neoclassical models: that migration is 
consequently atomistic, or independent of the social environment, holds very little currency. At the 
very least, and as Parnwell (1993: 72) highlights, 'migration decisions are seldom taken without due 
consideration of broader implications for the migrant's family, household, or community at large'.  
Furthermore, in addition to their abrogation of the finer points of migratory motivation, the asocial, 
individualistic approach of such models ignores the mechanisms which facilitate population 
movement. In this regard, the pervasive influence of the invisible hand mentality has created a 
situation in which orthodox conceptions of migration not only fail to note the ways in which people 
move, but even ideologically dismiss them. It is, after all, only the response to market forces which is 
important, not the details of that response: the neoliberal economist cares little whether an 
individual walks, cycles or drives to obtain a lower price or a higher wage. As such, one of the 
principle weaknesses of models such as Todaro's is that they fail to note that 'entry into the labour 
force, rather than being the result of individual calculus, is tightly constrained by the social networks 
which have been created by previous mobility and by social responsibilities' (Skeldon, 1990: 144). 
These networks, and their significance, will be discussed in detail below. 
2.1.2 Historical-Structuralist Views 
Running counter to the methodological individualist viewpoint is what may broadly be termed the 
historical-structuralist perspective on migration. This view, first popularised by Frank (1967) and 
later forming the basis of world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1980) and more specifically migration 
systems theory (Mabogunje, 1970), takes issue with the idea of migration as the result of 
individualistic economic agency. Instead, historical structuralists argue that 'rural-urban migration 
may appear to be the result of free choice, but the circumstances which faced the migrant may in 
reality have left little option but to move' (Parnwell, 1993: 24) – a viewpoint borne out by several 
decades of literature which highlights the long-term structural factors, such as the disparity in rural 
and urban investment (Parnwell, 1993: 75), as well as underlying apparently “voluntary” decisions 
such as land or asset sale (e.g. Chambers, 1983).  
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Nevertheless, whilst this perspective is instructive, to view migration purely through the prism of 
world systems is insufficient. The continued existence of differential sectors and “traditional” 
agrarian regions in any form demonstrates, after all, that 'the penetration of capitalism is not 
generally an all-powerful juggernaut that destroys pre-existing societies and economies in a single 
irresistible sweep' (Skeldon, 1990: 134). Indeed, in many ways, this view is just as much an 
obfuscation as the neoclassical models discussed earlier, ignoring as it does that in many cases, 
'migration serves to reinforce the existing social structures rather than change them' (Stark in 
Portes, 2008: 16; Gugler, 1968; 1991).  
Whilst such evidence does not necessarily undermine the historical-structuralist perspective, it 
nevertheless demonstrates that reality requires more nuanced systems of thinking. In this respect, 
historical-structuralism has been challenged in recent decades by the successful economic 
development of a number of countries, in particular the Southern European and Asian Tiger states, 
'despite – or perhaps thanks to – their firm connections to global capitalism' (De Haas, 2008: 8). 
Whilst it may be justifiably argued that their success, especially in Asia, has been constructed 
according to a state-led model which has managed exposure to the free market, to argue that their 
recent relationship to capitalism has been adversarial would invite justified criticism.  
Indeed, just as an atomistic preoccupation with individuals’ motivations and behaviour leaves much 
of relevance unexamined, 'a shortcoming of the macro-level structural approach is that it tends to 
view migrants as an amorphous, homogeneous entity who appear to have little choice but to 
migrate', thereby neglecting the complex detail of the migration process (Parnwell, 1993: 75). As 
such, overly structuralist conceptions of migration risk the same elisionary failings as neoclassical 
models in that much as ‘the individualists ignore the constraints under which movers have to 
operate...the structuralist, in focussing on more macro-level variables, belittles the experience of the 
individual migrant' (Skeldon, 1990: 130). Given the mirrored shortcomings of each paradigm, the 
examination of “integrative” models will occupy the subsequent pages. 
2.1.3 Transitional and Universalist Mobility Frameworks 
The push-pull model, formalised and popularised by Everett Lee in 1966, remains one of the simplest 
and most enduring conceptions of migration. In outline, Lee argues that migration takes place when 
positives in the destination (such as higher wages and access to services) and negatives at the origin 
(such as landlessness, livelihoods shocks, enduring poverty) are sufficient to outweigh the financial 
and utility costs of moving, assuming that the specific obstacles to movement can be overcome. This 
framework remains highly influential, with the push-pull dichotomy having taken root in the 
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migration lexicon to the extent that the theory from which it derives arguably remains the 
conceptual default. Furthermore, its usage in a nuanced or specific manner remains popular, with 
Potts (2010: 9), for example, arguing that it 'still has considerable value as an organising framework 
for evaluating changing patterns of circulation'. 
However, in spite of its intuitive simplicity, the push-pull model continues to divide opinion as to 
whether its underlying logic is either sparsely contingent or merely tautological. Skeldon, for 
instance, like De Haas (2008), places little stock in the framework, stating that 'it is but a platitude at 
best' (1990: 128) and that, in common with the neoclassical conception of migration, it lacks ‘any 
explanatory power as to why there should be a difference between areas of push and pull in the first 
place' (1990: 126; De Haas, 2008). As such, although it functions successfully within its own 
somewhat shallow remit, the model is unable to process the subtleties of locality, the historical 
background to this socio-economic topography, or the mechanisms by which people migrate.  
Thus, the argument over the validity of the push-pull model returns to some extent to the debate 
over individualism versus historical-structuralism, with proponents of Lee’s framework almost 
necessarily favouring the former to some extent. Indeed, whilst it is not impossible, as Potts has, to 
utilise the push-pull model as a tool within a wider, historically grounded conception of migration, it 
nevertheless remains at its core 'a functionalist gravity model' (De Haas, 2008: 11) which views 
individuals as atomistic, ahistorical and bereft of personal and cultural preference. As a result, the 
push-pull model, though not without utility as a basic conceptual tool, retains major shortcomings in 
terms of its explanatory power, not least in terms of its failure to note that the character of 
migration differs markedly between nations and regions, and that the nature of migration tends to 
evolve over time – a phenomenon first formalised into a practical model by Zelinski in 1971.  
Zelinksi argued that 'not only has there been a general and spectacular expansion of individual 
mobility in modernising societies, but also that the specific character of migration processes tends to 
change over the course of this vital transition' (De Haas, 2008: 12). He therefore hypothesised that 
'there are definite patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time 
during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernisation 
process' (Zelinski, 1971: 221). Zelinksi consequently linked mobility to a Modernisation Theory 
conception of national economic development, allowing him to avoid some of the universalist 
inaccuracies of the push-pull model because his model need ‘not naively assume an inversely 
proportional relationship between development and migration levels' (De Haas, 2008: 13) and is 
therefore able to account for at least some of the heterogeneity evidenced by empirical data on 
migratory trends.  
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Nevertheless, the Zelinski framework has been widely attacked for overreaching itself in attempting 
to account for all forms of historical and contemporary migration, with its historical model having 
been shown to be flawed in a number of studies (e.g. Potts, 2010; Kuhn, 2003; Skeldon, 1990). In this 
respect, much of the criticism levelled against it derives from the inaccuracies carried over from its 
“parent” theorem, the Rostow stages model, whose various fallacies, not least the myth of the pre-
industrial “immobile peasant”, as debunked by Skeldon (1990), have been outlined above. As such, 
'its universalist pretensions are not only its strength but also its main weakness' (De Haas, 2008: 13), 
with theorists on migration having made numerous attempts in the wake of Zelinksi's work to 
eliminate its obvious shortcomings whilst retaining at least some of its universality. 
This goal has been pursued both by a consolidation, via the empirical literature, of those aspects of 
migration which appear to be at least generally true, and a widening appreciation of the variety of 
factors which precipitate, influence and facilitate migration beyond the purely economic, which has 
become necessary following evidence that even countries with ostensibly similar economic and 
demographic characteristics ‘tend to show highly diverging migration characteristics' (De Haas, 2008: 
18). To this end, De Haas (2008: 16) offers the following interpretation of the mobility transition, 
reduced in the scope of its universalism, but expanded in its appreciation of the factors involved: 
'In the early stages of development, an increase in wealth tends to lead to a rise in migration, 
 since a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to enable people to assume the costs and 
risks of migrating...With increasing wealth and the establishment of migrant networks, an 
increasing proportion of the population is able to migrate, selectivity of migration tends to 
decrease, and this process of development initially tends to lead to an increasing diffusion of 
migration across communities' 
This conception follows Brown (1991: 50), who argues that this decrease in selectivity is reinforced 
by an institutional and technological transition from an initial period, when 'interpersonal contacts 
between family and friends are the primary source of information', to a later stage in which the 
information required to migrate is disseminated through modern media and institutional structures. 
However, whilst it is difficult to refute the tenet, as taken up by Brown and others, that there 
'appear to be basic long term structural shifts which orchestrate the mass of individual [migratory] 
events', (Skeldon, 1990: 46), Brown’s conception arguably remains an essentialism too far to reflect 
the breadth of experience in reality. Skeldon, for instance, contests the proposition that migration is 
necessarily associated with a capitalist rationalisation of mobility and labour markets in the manner 
described above, positing instead that ‘the nature of the society being incorporated' (Ibid.:133) is a 
significant factor in generating heterogeneous outcomes of modernisation. 
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The idea of capitalist development and traditional practice interacting is not a new one, having been 
expounded in the form of Migration Systems Theory by Mabogunje in 1970. As Mabogunje explains, 
'within the systems framework, attention is focussed not only on the migrant but also on the various 
institutions (sub systems) and the social, economic and other relationships (adjustment 
mechanisms) which are an integral part of the migrant's transformation’ (Mabogunje, 1970: 5).  
These subsystems and adjustment mechanisms signify, in the former case, the family, household, 
community etc., and in the latter, the means by which livelihoods strategies can be adjusted to suit 
changing circumstances, for instance with respect to agricultural land usage -  a conception which 
facilitates the investigation of the inception and effects of migration concurrently.  
This holistic approach is concordant with the aims of this Ph.D. from both a theoretical and practical 
point of view, and serves, in particular, to underline the failings of a number of the models outlined 
above. Indeed, none of those previously explored takes account of feedbacks by migration to the 
environment in which migration takes place, resulting in their coming to reflect reality less and less 
over time because 'the state of a system at any given time is not determined so much by its initial 
conditions as by the nature of the process...since open systems are basically independent of their 
initial conditions' (Mabogunje, 1970: 13). Viewed thus, any model which fails to account for this 
dynamism is guilty of a fundamental logical oversight by 'drawing on the erroneous, sedentary 
notion that migration and development are substitutes, rather than complements' (Mabogunje, 
1970: 9). 
Furthermore, of particular relevance herein is Mabogunje's emphasis on the practical linkages 
between origin and destination areas. As he notes, and as numerous authors have done 
subsequently (e.g. Potts, 2010; Derks, 2008; Ressureccion, 2005; Gugler, 1991), these linkages tend 
to remain in place over time, being reinforced by cumulative migration flows and 'yielding an 
identifiable geographical structure that persists across space and time' (Mabogunje, 1970: 12). 
Furthermore, this ‘clustered morphology of migration flows...typically cannot be explained by 
employment...income and other opportunity differentials’ (De Haas, 2008: 22), indicating that the 
social connections between migrants may come to form a persistent and self-reinforcing edifice, 
with major ramifications for the manner in which migration takes place, and the outcomes derived 
from it, even 'over several generations' (Parnwell, 1993: 91). 
As such, 'the often coincidental choices made by pioneer migrants or labour recruiting employers 
tend to have a great influence on subsequent migration patterns' (De Haas, 2008: 18), essentially 
representing a filter through which price signals and employment information are passed in the 
sense that migrants and potential migrants are less likely to be able to take advantage (or even 
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become aware) of modern sector opportunities to which they are not already socially linked in some 
way. Indeed, these networks are so important that their absence has been shown to represents a 
barrier to mobility in a number of studies (e.g. Resurreccion, 2005; Parnwell, 1993: 94; Kuhn, 2003; 
Mabojune, 1970). 
Networks, then, are a constraining as well as a facilitating factor in migration, so that, as Kuhn 
argues, ‘urban-rural networks of social capital act as a form of credit, not merely as a resource that 
we can generally ascribe to all those who live in its midst’ (Kuhn, 2003: 25). The extent of this 
exclusivity remains open to debate, however, with it having been variously argued that they are 
characterised by 'the promotion of mobility among certain demographic and ethnic groups and 
exclusion of others’ (Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler, 2003: 11), and on the other hand, that they 
have a tendency to spread through a community over time as a result of ‘falling costs and risks’ (De 
Haas, 2008: 20; Massey et al., 1990). 
In accordance with Skeldon's (1990) conception of migration as a resource which bolsters, rather 
than undermines, traditional social practice, an approach which admits the possibility of exclusion is 
adopted herein. Indeed, there is ample evidence to support this, with empirical research (e.g. Kuhn, 
2003; Rogaly, 2003), having noted that rather than becoming 'bridgeheads facilitating subsequent 
migration...[migrants]...may also become restrictive gatekeepers, being hesitant or unwilling to 
assist other migrants' (De Haas, 2008: 20) – a phenomenon detailed at length in the Indian context 
by Kuhn who argues that migration has 'not just added a new actor (the gatekeeper) in a new 
gravitational field...[but has]...added an entirely new form of gravity (modernity)’ (Kuhn, 2003: 11). 
In spite of such evidence, there is an incomplete body of literature regarding the exclusionary role of 
migratory linkages.  As De Haas (2008: 20) argues, this may be because 'much empirical research on 
migrant networks tends to focus on the dependent (network) variable and is therefore potentially 
biased towards instances where such networks do play their ascribed migration facilitating and 
diffusionist role'. Furthermore, in addition to neglecting those who do not belong to the relevant 
network type, research of this sort often fails to link the incidence and development of networks to 
wider economic, political and social processes, an oversight which tends to obfuscate the nature of 
their distribution, as well as offering few clues as to the factors which might underwrite such 
exclusivity. 
For instance, according to world systems theory, 'regions that are dominated by a few industries 
may undergo a simple, single wave process of development, while a region such as Southeast Asia – 
‘one of the most dynamic in the world (Resurreccion, 2005) – is likely to show much more complex 
25 
 
interrelated patterns with no clear overall phases of growth or stagnation' (Skeldon, 1990: 146). It 
follows, then, that we should anticipate ‘the relationship between business and product cycles and 
migration [being] complex and difficult to decipher; particularly so given the importance of chain 
migration and the fact that there are likely to be lag effects in information diffusing down the urban 
and social hierarchies' (Ibid.). As such, a greater degree of conceptual integration is necessary 
between local processes, such as social network behaviour, and world systems, in order that either 
be satisfactorily understood. Since no one framework is able to achieve this, the potential efficacy of 
an integrated portfolio of models must be explored below. 
2.1.4 Towards an Integrative Theoretical Framework 
The preceding selective analysis of migration theory has demonstrated the failure of any one 
theoretical model to adequately explain the highly complex and heterogeneous process of labour 
migration in the developing world. It has also shown, however, that the majority of those theoretical 
conceptions explored retain some explanatory value, even if it is a partial one. As such, the 
construction of an integrative framework would appear prudent, with it having already been noted 
by Potts (2010: 4), for instance, that 'a combination of approaches yields the most satisfying results'. 
Indeed, it is the basis of this framework that results of some generalised significance are best 
attained using a combination of the approaches outlined above. 
With respect to this aim, atomistic conceptions such as the Lee (1966) and Todaro (1969) models are 
generally too ahistorical and too shallow in terms of their examination of the mechanics of migration 
to be considered a viable addition to an integrated framework. Mabogunje's migratory systems 
theory, by contrast, though superannuated to almost the same degree, retains significant promise in 
this respect, especially given its focus on the dynamic interaction between the migration process 
itself and the environment in which it takes place. Whilst the assertion that 'open systems are 
basically independent of their initial conditions' (Mabogunje, 1970: 13) requires some mitigation, 
given that migratory experience is not so heterogeneous as to make it impossible to find parallels in 
regions with similar initial conditions, this may be satisfactorily achieved through recourse to 
Skeldon (1990) and De Haas's (2008) revisions of Zelinki's (1971) mobility framework. 
Finally, for the reasons outlined above, it is held here that the role of social networks is key to an 
effective understanding of the migration process, in which regard they function both as a ‘means of 
finding and maintaining a foothold in the urban location [and as] a fallback mechanism’ (Agergaard 
and Thao, 2011: 409). Nevertheless, it is not sufficient merely to accept their significance in the 
manner that Lee (1966), for instance, does; as part of a package of factors which may facilitate or 
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impede the natural working of wider economic forces. Rather, if these networks are to be placed at 
the core of our understanding of migration, then their proper contextualisation within the wider 
social environment is essential. To this end, the following subsection will outline a social capital 
framework which is receptive both to the social institutions which influence migration, and the 


























2.2 Reformulating Social Capital 
2.2.1 Conceptual Difficulties with Aggregability and Reductionism 
Following a rapid rise to theoretical prominence from the 1980s onwards, recent years have seen 
widespread criticism that social capital theory has become a false panacea, whose breadth of 
influence and lack of an accepted definition has led to its becoming ‘all things to all people and 
hence nothing to anyone’ (Woolcock, 2001: 69). In response, social capital theorists have made 
various attempts to codify more precisely its inputs and outputs, with perhaps the most influential 
example of such clarificatory, or reductionist, work being Robert Putnam’s (1995) model, wherein 
the more nebulous elements – networks of trust, and social and moral obligations – are viewed as 
functions of the third component: institutions and associations. According to this conception, the 
level of benefit a community (or individual) may expect to receive from social capital may be 
accurately predicted by the numbers of institutions, from PTAs to ten pin bowling clubs, which are 
actively participated in.  
This method has been used by Putnam to explain, for instance, why Northern Italy was able to 
pursue orderly and stable democracy while chaos reigned in the South following the 1976 
governmental reforms (Putnam, 1993), as well as to suggest that social capital, thus conceived, may 
be two to three times more influential a schooling input than more traditional concerns such as 
educational budget or teacher-pupil ratios (Putnam, 2000). In practice, however, Putnam's civil 
society has been criticised as being somewhat mono-dimensional (Siisiäinen, 2000), with major 
concerns remaining regarding the logical circularity of Putnam's methodology, wherein 'evidence of 
[social capital's] existence leads to noting positive outcomes which, in turn, are proof that it exists' 
(Bankoff, 2007: 338; Fine, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2010; Tarrow, 1996). 
Dissatisfaction with this tautology underlies much of the criticism levelled against Putnam, who is 
widely seen as having failed to 'offer an appropriate economic analysis...[to explain]...the 
mechanisms by which such measures of social capital lead to discernible differences at the economic 
level' (Fine, 2001: 98). In this respect, Portes highlights two fundamental conceptual errors. 'First: 
starting from the effect (success/ wealth) and working retroactively' and second: failing to 
adequately note exceptions to his findings, such as the increase in associational activity in Southern 
Italy which was not associated with growth (Tarrow, 1996), and thereby reducing 'the logical space 
between cause and effect so that the final predictive statement is either a truism or circular' 
(Tarrow, 1996: 20). 
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Furthermore, in addition to the weaknesses in his economic model, 'definitional issues have become 
a cause of much concern, with definitions frequently being tailored to anticipate outcomes, 
demeaning their usage' (Fine, 2001: 101). Particularly problematic is the failure to distinguish 
between individualised social capital and social capital belonging to a community, with Putnam 
viewing the latter as the simple aggregate of the former in spite of the fact that, not only is such  a 
methodology theoretically dubious in principle (Lin, 1999), but in practice the two may in fact be 
inversely correlated, for instance where 'social capital  in the form of social 
control...[undermines]...social capital in the form of network mediated benefits...[because]...the 
latter consists precisely in the ability to bypass existing norms' (Portes, 2000: 15). 
In this regard, Putnam’s reductionism has been shown to be somewhat problematic in a variety of 
real world contexts and whilst some authors, such as Pellini (2004) have identified a number of 
traditional associations which, as a composite, may be indicative of a generally higher level of social 
well-being than exists in their absence, it would be illogical to attribute all of the benefits of mutual 
cooperation to such bodies, or, indeed, to take their apparent presence or otherwise at face value. 
As Bankoff (2007) notes, the Putnamian tendency to seek out formal, single purpose civil society 
organisations in developing countries may potentially lead to the oversight of traditional, multi-
purpose community organisations which exist, wholly or partially, in the form of norms rather than 
institutions and which, as he demonstrates in the case of community natural disaster responses in 
the Philippines, may become apparent only sporadically. As will be demonstrated below, however, 
such shortcomings are not inherent to the quantitative analysis of social systems, if applied with 
sufficient contextual care. What follows will examine and present those elements of social capital 
best suited to the analysis of this environment. 
2.2.2 Migration and Social Capital in the Cambodian Context 
It is already well established that 'migration is selective and provides greater returns to those better 
able to take advantage of the opportunity...[as a result of the]...costs and barriers associated with 
migration, which steer gains towards the better off' (De Haan, 1999: 103). However, whether such 
networks could become consolidated to the extent of developing Cambodia into ‘a country of 
insiders and outsiders’ (Hughes, 2001: 19), remains open to debate. Whilst migration theory has 
traditionally suggested otherwise, adopting a broad consensus being that ‘once the number of 
network connections in an origin area reaches a critical level, migration becomes self-perpetuating 
because migration itself creates the social structure to sustain it’ (Massey, 1990: 20),   more recent 
ethnographic studies have emphasised the manner in which  access to migration becomes a capital 
resource, to the extent that  'an individual or family’s resource base and identity depend less on the 
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security of land ownership and more on the security afforded by rural urban social support 
relationships' (Kuhn, 2003: 3). 
Furthermore, the situation in Cambodia is unusual. Given the damage inflicted in the twentieth 
century to ‘the social foundations that traditionally serve as the girders for state building and 
cohesion’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000), numerous authors (e.g. Pellini, 2004; Colleta and Cullen, 2000) 
have noted that the social capital stocks which would usually facilitate an inclusive cumulative 
causation of migratory linkages were damaged during conflict. Nevertheless, as Ledgerwood and 
Vijghen note, Cambodian traditional society is not ‘mad, destroyed or returning to a nostalgic past’ 
(Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002: 109) and the re-emergence of traditional civil society organisations 
from the 1980s onwards, albeit with Khmer Rouge power structures having retained a foothold in 
some cases (Uk, 2006), is testament to this (see e.g. Pellini, 2004a).  
In attempting to investigate migration in this environment, the roughly thirty years of social capital 
theory represent an invaluable corollary to an ethnographic approach which, although undoubtedly 
illuminating, is unable to fully capture the generalised and repeatable trends which are an essential 
means of understanding development (Fine, 2001). Whilst the perspective as a whole, or its various 
strands, have not proved to be the world changing paradigms they once promised to become, they 
have nevertheless contributed to an advancement in our understanding of the power of social 
networks and norms to influence societies and developmental outcomes in the Global South. 
Indeed, 'one of the achievements of the social capital literature is to demonstrate that there are 
resources out there in society that are not recognised as such because they do not directly take up 
some sort of commercial form' (Fine, 2001: 27). Access to migration, and the ability to exchange 
information about it, is exactly one such resource. 
Nevertheless, in utilising the theory, it is essential to understand the flaws carried forward from its 
inception by Coleman as the study of 'expectations and trustworthiness, information channels, and 
norms and effective sanctions' (Bounds, 2004: 109), in which respect Coleman's work has been 
subject to considerable criticism, not least by Fine, who reproaches him for a 'hopelessly ill informed' 
(Fine, 2001:74) economic outlook based on a perfect market model expounded by Gary Becker, his 
colleague at Columbia, as well as a model whose elision of socio-historical factors leaves it 'ridden 
with crudity and falsehoods' (Fine, 2001:75). Furthermore, as Fine argues, the key underlying 
concept of social capital as expounded by Coleman – its fungibility with other forms of capital – is 
conceptually misinformed by this same perfect market assumption, which renders an otherwise 
crucial tenet of social capital theory manifestly unsuitable as a tool for understanding the 
idiosyncrasies of developing world socio-economic interactions. 
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Since its inauguration by Coleman, however, social capital theory has grown to encompass an 
enormous variety of additional approaches, with Pierre Bourdieu's conceptual model providing a 
particularly thoughtful and well developed theoretical starting point. Whilst Bourdieu rarely claimed 
any direct association with social capital theory in general (although he does utilise the term), he is 
frequently cited as a major contributor to the field as a result of a sociology which appears to share 
many of its aims. Indeed, as Bounds (2004: 109) explains, 'for Bourdieu, social capital is both the 
social relationships that enable access to the resources of a group or network and the volume and 
quality of resources possessed by network members of the group' – a conception which appears to 
mirror that of a number of social capital's other luminaries. 
However, whilst some of the fundamental aims and premises are similar, Bourdieu's work in fact 
differs greatly from his peers in the social capital field, due not least to its roots being primarily in 
sociology and philosophy (and in the European tradition at that), as opposed to the more 
economically based oeuvre of Coleman, Putnam and Becker, for example. This alternative heritage 
manifests in numerous ways, but is primarily cited as being the basis for a much more complex and 
complete theoretical model of social capital which stands in contrast to those authors cited above, 
all of whom derive from 'the more empirically minded Anglo-Saxon tradition' (Fine, 2001: 53). 
Indeed, Bourdieu's theoretical retention of the social field, as opposed to the economically rational 
individual, as the fundamental driver of action is, as argued by Fine (2001) and Ray and Sayer (1999), 
one of the reasons the Frenchman has until recently been somewhat abandoned in the evolving 
social capital literature. 
In this respect, rejecting the rational actor model of conduct espoused elsewhere as further 
evidence of the ‘ruinous’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 25) distinction between subjectivism and objectivism in 
social science, Bourdieu sees action as 'patterned and interest orientated at a tacit, pre-reflective 
level of awareness that occurs through time' (Schwartz, 1997: 67). This break with subjectivism led 
him to cast doubt on the validity of informant accounts which 'assume too much and are too general 
for the kinds of details needed by researchers to uncover the underlying principles of practices' 
(Schwartz, 1997: 57). As he argues, the structuring nature of society infuses subjective opinions and 
independent perspectives, rendering them merely (somewhat unreliable) reflections of the wider 
field:  
‘The social order is progressively inscribed in people’s minds. Social divisions become 
principles of division, organizing the image of the social world. Objective limits become a 
sense of limits, a practical anticipation of objective limits acquired by experience of objective 
limits’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 471) 
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Rather than relying upon qualitative data then, he espouses the marriage of “actor perspectives” 
with a form of 'positivist social science...[which]...gives priority to macro structures, often in the 
form of statistical regularities, which are rarely visible to the engaged actors and must be 
constructed by the social scientist' (Ibid.). In this respect, Bourdieu outlines a specific conception of 
what constitutes an appropriate form of quantitative sociological data collection. Therein: 
He 'maintains that the social sciences should deal with cultural and social relations just as 
 modern geometry treats its subject matter. Just as points and lines in geometrical figures 
derive their significance from the relations that link them rather than from the intrinsic 
features of individual elements, so also the model of social life should be constructed' 
(Swartz, 1997: 62). 
As such, Bourdieu's quantitative methodology 'has more in common with the growing use of 
network analysis than with regression techniques employed in status attainment research' (Ibid.), a 
point on which he has been criticised by Fine (2001), who argues that his approach is in many ways 
just as reductive as that employed in mainstream economic usage of social capital, for which he has 
an avowed distaste. Nevertheless, Fine concedes that Bourdieu's historical and contextual attention 
to detail set his work apart from simpler incarnations of network analysis and that his chaining of 
quantitative data to a richly explored qualitative context via the principle that 'the various 
correlations...[produced through quantitative analysis]...are meaningless in the absence of an 
understanding of the correlates themselves' as well as his use of a 'methodology...[which]...involves 
the use of categories that are investigative in intent and only become systematic with use' (Fine, 
2001: 62), largely protect him from accusations of hypocrisy in this respect. 
In view of its commitment to the contextualised examination of networks, Bourdieu's methodology 
appears particularly well suited both to the investigation of migratory information flows themselves 
(e.g. Wong and Salaff, 1998), and their relation to the wider social environment (e.g. Erel, 2010). 
Indeed, the quality and density of social networks, both in migrant enclaves and their sender 
villages, has been found to be a major factor in livelihoods outcomes and varies markedly between 
cases (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014; RUPP-IDRC, 2009; Kuhn, 2003), suggesting that the 
study of linkages, nodes and connections in the manner Bourdieu describes, together with a detailed 
qualitative investigation of the context in which they take place appears to likely to produce 
instructive results. The theoretical implications of such an endeavour will be discussed below. 
2.2.3 Network Theory and the Fungibility of Advantageous Positioning 
Although network analysis, of the sort described above, has its roots in the early twentieth century 
sociography sub-discipline of sociology, the modern history of the field is bound tightly to 
Granovetter (1973: 1360), who viewed the discipline primarily as a solution to contemporary 
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sociology’s failure to ‘relate micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns in any convincing way’. 
In addressing this problem, he viewed ‘the analysis of processes in interpersonal networks…[as]…the 
most fruitful macro-micro bridge’ (Granovetter, 1973: 1360) and one which could provide key 
insights into ‘social power as a social structural phenomenon’ (Cook and Emerson, 1978: 721) by 
explaining how certain groups and individuals within society possess informational advantages which 
may translate into cumulative gains in the long term.  
 
Granovetter’s counterintuitive finding was that weak ties, defined as those relationships further 
down a linear scale of time invested, emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocal exchanges 
(Granovetter, 1973: 1361) are the more efficient components of a social system in terms of their 
ability to transmit information, because they are associated with less wastage, or repeated 
information exchange, than stronger ties to family or close friends. Otherwise put, the relationships 
which cost the most time, effort and (often) money to maintain, are less useful in terms of 
information exchange, and therefore less advantageous, than those which exist amongst 
acquaintances who communicate only occasionally. 
 
In essence, then, although Granovetter tends to present his expositions of the theory at the level of 
small groups, ‘the theory is one of individual social capital, where people with more weak ties (i.e., 
more social capital) are more successful’ (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011: 4). What he fails to attempt, 
however, is an explanation as to how individuals so endowed may have arrived at this 
‘serendipitous’ (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011: 4) situation, thereby casting the “nodes” who comprise 
social structure as essentially without agency in its generation. This perspective is disputed by Burt 
(1992; 2001), whose “structural holes” theorem promotes ‘a more strategic and instrumentalist 
view’ (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011: 4), wherein the focus is shifted to the gaps between social sub-
groups, rather than the weak ties between them. 
 
The consequence of Burt’s focal adjustment is to present the advantageous positions within social 
structures as opportunities, rather than endowments, which actors are able to become aware of and 
utilise for their personal benefit. As he argues, a structural hole is ‘like an insulator in an electric 
circuit’, halting the flow of information between two sub-groups in a manner which can be bridged 
by an interested agent (Burt, 2001: 35). Thus, because ‘individuals with contact networks rich in 
structural holes are the individuals who know about, have a hand in, and exercise control over more 
rewarding opportunities’ (Burt, 2001: 36), the structural holes theorem is essentially ‘the contextual 
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complement to human capital’ (Burt, 2001: 32) in that networks of this sort are an acquirable, and in 
some respects fungible, capital resource.  
 
Indeed, the relation of network advantage to other forms of capital is a key tenet of Burt’s theorem, 
which is one of the few to satisfactorily advocate the embeddedness of social networks within wider 
structures of physical, financial and cultural wealth. As Salancik (1995: 346) explains, ‘Burt’s work 
puts network analysis squarely into the realm of resource dependence by recognising that…a 
network position can be a source of constraint as well as a source of goods and information’. 
Nevertheless, despite this recognition, the structural holes thesis retains some of the methodological 
shortcomings characteristic of other forms of network analysis in that, by focussing primarily on 
network positioning, it may often fail to note relationships which, though significant, are ‘idle’ and, 
to an even greater degree, may fail to note the significance of ‘relationships which don’t exist’ 
(Salancik, 1995: 346-7) between key individuals or groups.  
 
As Lin (1999: 36) argues, this failing inheres, ‘either explicitly or implicitly’, in any network theory 
which views network positioning as the primary source of gain in a social system. For this reason, it 
emerges as necessary to adopt an alternative approach, which views social capital not as ‘mere 
social relations’ but as resources which are both ‘embedded and accessed’ (Lin, 1999: 37 [Emphasis 
added]). Thus, whilst ‘network locations are necessary conditions of embedded 
resources…[they]…should be treated as exogenous, rather than endogenous variables of social 
capital itself’ (Lin, 1999: 37), or, otherwise put, they are a resource which may be advantageous in 
the pursuit of other forms of capital, but which can often only be mobilised in the presence of other 
complementary assets. 
As such, with respect to the aims of this Ph.D., the question of greatest significance is that of the 
relationship between migratory information networks, social capital and other forms of capital, 
physical and economic in particular. Like Burt (1992; 2001), Bourdieu (e.g, 1986) writes at some 
length regarding the fungibility of social capital, which he describes as a pragmatically utilised 
‘“credential” entitling [the bearer] to credit, in the various senses of the word’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 86).   
Nevertheless, concerns do exist regarding Bourdieu's conception of such “assets”, many of which 
derive from the microcosmic structure/ agency debate within social capital, with which, as the most 
notable proponent of structure, he is frequently associated. 
Indeed, 'for Bourdieu, social action is determined primarily by deeply sedimented dispositions and 
semi-conscious instrumental action' (Ray and Sayer, 1999: 60), a position which allows him to 
34 
 
attribute a high degree of rationality and intelligibility to informal, social, transactions which might 
otherwise be classed as purely incidental. This is important because, as Portes (1998: 4) notes, 
'transactions involving social capital tend to be characterised by unspecified obligations, uncertain 
time horizons, and the possible violations of reciprocal expectations', characteristics which in 
practice make them hard for the outsider to see, and even harder to quantify or analyse. 
This uncertainty creates ample space for theoretical debate. Sayer (1999: 60), for instance, first takes 
issue with Bourdieu's conception of fungibility, stating that 'whilst under certain conditions, these 
forms of capital may be converted to economic capital (and back), they can also function somewhat 
independently of money and wealth'. As he goes on to state secondly, 'Bourdieu's concept of 
capital...fails to distinguish between investment in goods – such as education, culture, social 
relations – from the point of view of their use value...and investments from the point of view of their 
exchange value’ (Ibid.), thereby accusing the former of failing to create not only an accurate 
framework for quantification, but even an appropriate classificatory basis from which to begin such 
a task. 
In answering the second of these concerns, it is useful to invoke what Kane describes as 'the 
venerable distinction between wealth and capital...[wherein]...wealth may be loved for itself, used 
for consumption or hoarded against some future calamity, but only when it is invested in some 
profitable enterprise for the sake of profitable returns does it become capital' (2001: 7). In terms of 
their flexibility, then, many of the social “capital” investments people make are in fact closer to 
Kane’s definition of wealth. For instance, the provision of free labour to a neighbour during harvest 
time may be redeemed in several ways: directly (through the reciprocal provision of labour at 
another time, or part of the harvest yield), indirectly (through the religious or social prestige 
associated with helping those in need, or the sharing of employment information for example) or in 
a manner unforseen by the investor (such as the provision of oxen following the unexpected death 
of the lending households' livestock). In each of these cases, just as when a television purchased for 
consumption must be sold in an emergency, the ultimate outcome does not change the fundamental 
character of the investment.  
Returning to the first of Sayer's concerns, however, rather than attempting to reject methodological 
individualism via the generalised sociological literature, it would appear prudent to appeal to 
fieldwork rooted in the empirical context in question. Geographical investigations of developing 
world livelihoods and migration have frequently identified the household as a crucial manager of 
resources (e.g. Potts, 2010; Rigg, 2002; Chambers, 1983), with both contemporary and historical 
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research confirming this to be the case in Cambodia (e.g. Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014, 
Diepart, 2009; RUPP-IDRC, 2009; Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002; Ebihara, 1968).  
This body of work indicates that the more economically based social capital frameworks promoted 
by Coleman, Becker and Putnam has neglected to take full account of the obligation which inheres 
alongside opportunity within social networks. Consequently, social capital frameworks constructed 
according to this schema have generally failed also to note that familial and patronage networks, 
and those norms of association which allow them to function, may impede, as well as facilitate 
interaction.  
Indeed, until relatively recently, the field of social capital has been overwhelmingly limited to a 
discussion of its benefits, actual and potential, with respect to civil society and development 
(Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000). Although some important work has emerged to counter this 
(e.g. Rubio, 1997; Portes and Landolt, 1996), its volume is still diminutive compared to the 
mainstream preoccupation with social capital as a constructive resource. As a result, considerations 
of violence through a social capital lens have tended to typify aggression and exploitation as taking 
place in ‘zones of social capital deficiency’ (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000: 390), rather than in 
spaces where the mechanics of social interaction have been utilised in a harmful manner. 
That ‘there is little empirical evidence…either to prove or refute this assumption’ (Goodhand, Hulme 
and Lewer, 2000: 391) is reflective, according to Fine (2001: 172), of the non-contextual manner in 
which the theory is utilised, so that the potential for violence and conflict is recognised only in 
‘abstract definitional discussion’ and often ‘as a policy objective to be tempered’. This mainstream 
social capital framework is able to pay ‘scant attention to issues of power, inequality and social 
differentiation’ (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000: 392) primarily because it removes itself from 
the context in which social interaction takes place. 
What follows shall seek to alleviate these shortcomings in two linked ways. First, it will utilise 
Bourdieu’s (e.g. 1984) work on the institutional production of field, before turning, secondly, to 
Galtung (1969; 1990), whose structural and cultural violence frameworks provide a useful means to 
conceptualize the multi-scalarity of both facilitating and restrictive social systems. Whilst each of 
these frameworks may be argued to have shortcomings (by e.g. MacGregor and Rubio-Correa, 1994 
in the case of Galtung’s work in particular), their limitations are to a large extent mirrored: 
Bourdieu’s work has been accused of being overly rooted in the context of 20th century France 
(Shusterman, 1999), whilst Galtung’s framework stands accused of an ahistorical, global, and overly 
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conceptual approach. Their use in combination therefore constitutes an ideal theoretical buttress to 
the social capital literature. 
 
2.4.2 Symbolic Violence and the Concept of ‘Field’ 
 
With respect to the aims of this Ph.D., which are dominated by a drive towards greater context in 
the analysis of Cambodia’s social relations, Bourdieu’s concept of field emerges as a logical means of 
interrogating the local socio-economic environment because of the manner in which it succeeds in 
navigating many of the contradictory universalisms of sociology through its firm basis in locality and 
specificity. Indeed, Bourdieu (e.g. 1984) views social relations as “violent” oppositions, which take 
place on a ‘field’ of social competition (Bourdieu, 1984: 244). The sides take in this conflict derive 
from ‘hierarchical “status”… [which]…is a function of its proximity to, or distance from, the 
“legitimate culture”…[which]… is permanently in play [and] is the object of a perpetual struggle’ 
(Weininger, 2005: 13).  
 
As he goes on to argue, this uneven conflict is mediated primarily through two devices: the 
educational establishment and the realm of cultural communication, both of which conspire to 
‘perpetuate the existing social pattern’ (Bourdieu, 1974: 32)  via their interaction within the school 
system, where ‘they promote those students who enter equipped with cultural privileges and 
progressively eliminate others whose cultural capital differs significantly from that of the dominant 
group’ (Lakomski, 1984: 152-3). In this way, the educational establishment teaches pupils to 
‘internalize the hierarchically organised patterns of norms, behaviours and values characteristic of 
the workplace’ (Ibid.: 151), mirroring the structure already adopted by their parents, in order to 
make ‘arbitrary power relations appear as legitimate authority’ (Ibid.: 153) and thereby make ‘a 
social gift’ appear to be ‘a natural one’ (Bourdieu, 1974: 32).  
 
As such, in its exploration of the role of norms and (formal and informal) institutions in propagating 
social structure, Bourdieu’s work is highly relevant to this thesis. However, a limitation nevertheless 
remains in that whilst Bourdieu’s symbolic violence theory is instructive in its elucidation of objects, 
norms and inculcation as major drivers of action at the local level, it fails to fully appreciate the 
wider global-historical landscape in which such local responses take place. In view of the holistic and 
multi-scalar designs of this thesis, this shortcoming is a significant one. However, it is also one which 
has been mitigated effectively elsewhere by Galtung, whose theory of structural violence, proposed 
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initially by in 1969, provides a number of tools with which to adapt Bourdieu’s work to the aims 
herein.  
 
In this regard, one of the key complementary advantages of Galtung’s work is his emphasis on 
interests of various parties, rather than the largely reproductive interpretation offered by Bourdieu. 
Indeed, the theory itself is an attempt to broaden the definition of violence from what he views as 
the limitingly ‘somatic’ conception descriptive only of ‘the deprivation of health…at the hands of an 
actor who intends this to be the consequence’ (Galtung, 1969: 168) to include harm done by 
interested actors in the pursuit of their goals. Within this broad conceptualization, Galtung retains a 
number of sub-classifications, most significantly between violence which is negative and positive, 
and violence which is direct - ‘the type of violence where there is an actor who commits a crime’ - 
and indirect - ‘that violence where there is no such actor’. As such, the inclusion of negative violence 
aids the author in developing one of his primary propositions: that ‘structural violence is silent, it 
does not show…[and]…may be seen as about as natural as the air around us’ (Galtung, 1969: 173),  
Despite the wide ranging influence of this position, opponents of Galtung’s framework have argued, 
in a notably similar vein to the accusations levelled at Mabogunje’s systems framework, discussed 
above, that his concept is devised outside of time and space’, rather than being ‘rooted within each 
concrete reality’ (MacGregor and Rubio-Correa, 1994: 45). However, unlike Mabogunje, Galtung has 
responded in an adaptive manner to his critics via the development of the ‘cultural violence’ 
concept, published some twenty years after his initial theorem. As he would argue therein, ‘those 
aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence, exemplified by religion and ideology, 
language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to 
justify or legitimate direct or structural violence’ (Galtung, 1990: 291).  
Viewed thus, the cultural bedrock which underpins structural violence need, in fact, have little to do 
with culture in the received sense. Rather, it is that set of paradigms which determine the 
longitudinal development of structure and which, in the twenty first century, owe more to Adam 
Smith than the idiosyncrasies of national culture. Indeed, Galtung sees the theory of comparative 
advantages, as postulated by Ricardo, and Hecksher and Ohlin, as a major component of structural 
violence, the consequences of which ‘in terms of today’s vertical division of labour in the world are 
visible for all to see’ (Galtung, 1990: 300).  
In this respect, he is supported by Springer (2009: 309), who, whilst conceding that ‘violence is 
clearly not reducible to the simple suggestion that neoliberalism is exclusively to blame, 
nevertheless urges that we ‘at least open ourselves to the possibility that neoliberalism may foster 
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conditions that are conducive to the further manifestation of violence’. Thereafter, in accordance 
with the framework set out herein, Springer goes on to attack the notion that ‘market reforms can 
be implemented with equal efficacy regardless of history, culture and environment as ‘a spatio-
temporal fiction’ in which ‘inherited structures either yield to, or resist the new, but can never 
produce it themselves’ (Ibid.). 
The critical implication of this perspective is that, as both Bourdieu’s and Galtung’s work hold, quite 
the opposite is true. Institutions never simply overlay the environment in which they reside, but are 
shaped by the conditions in which they arise. Given, though, that in much of the developing world 
these conditions are determined in large part by the local natural environment (Cote and 
Nightingale, 2012; Constanza et al. 2007; Berkes and Folke, 2000) it emerges as vital to incorporate 
this additional dimension into the analysis of multi-scalar institutions, interests and inequality 
undertaken thus far.   
Indeed, the natural environment and its resources must not be conceived of as existing outside the 
social systems they support, but as continually re-imagined cultural and material goods. 
Consequently, what is necessary is a ‘more broadly conceived violence…[viewed]…on multiple 
geographical scales’ in order to draw attention towards ‘the dialectical relationship between the 
socio-physical environment of victimised populations and how such violence weaves itself into the 
global political-economic fabric and its various expressions  - such as the profoundly unequal power 
relations between rich and poor’ (Nevins, 2003: 697). Beginning with a small scale analysis of 












2.3 Environmental Risk, Traditional Insurance, and Inequality 
2.3.3 Overview of the Literature on “Traditional” Social Security Systems and Risk 
Given the extent to which the livelihoods of the rural poor in the developing world are laid bare to 
the effects of climate shocks and environmental hazards, their very persistence is predicated on at 
least a basic means of social support.  Especially for those whose living centres around farming or 
fishing, ‘income tends to fluctuate widely’ (Okamoto, 2011: 89) on a long and short term basis as the 
proceeds derived  from them ‘can easily be affected by changes in the natural environment as well 
as by frequent fluctuations of prices’ (Ibid.). Nevertheless, ‘It is now widely agreed that even without 
any formal insurance mechanism, average consumption is smoother than income even after certain 
shocks, suggesting that there are certain risk-coping mechanisms at work behind the scenes’ (Ibid.: 
90). 
 
The nature of these risk-coping mechanisms has long been the subject of debate and although their 
existence is borne out by a large body of empirical literature (e.g. Scott, 1972, 1985; Brocheaux, 
1983; Platteau, 1995a, 1995b; Fafchamps, 1992; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007), so too is their 
heterogeneity. As will be discussed below, traditional insurance mechanisms have been variously 
characterised as pragmatic, altruistic, egalitarian, class-enforcing, anti-economic and economically 
rational, although in recent decades, the discussion has become to some extent polarised between 
those who argue that such social structures are exploitative, and those who view them as structural 
guarantors of minimum subsistence. This debate has become synonymous with James C. Scott and 
Karl Popkin, the skeleton of whose arguments will be addressed here. 
In adapting E.P. Thompson’s (1971) ‘moral economy’ concept to the developing world, Scott sought 
to demonstrate how ‘the solidarity mechanisms of Southeast Asian peasants are reflected in their 
ethical values: the right to subsistence and the principle of reciprocity’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 147). 
According to this conception, intra-village economic affairs, such as they exist, are managed entirely 
according to a moral code of practice which has ‘been especially designed to cope with the threat of 
hunger and other kinds of contingencies’ (Platteau, 1991: 2). The cornerstone of this approach, then, 
is that each member of a community has the right to avoid starvation, but it is important to note 
that it is subsistence, not comfort, which is demanded: ‘village egalitarianism in this sense is 
conservative, not radical; it claims that all should have a place, a living, not that all should be equal’ 
(Scott, 1976: 40). 
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This fundamental tenet of Scott’s work was diametrically opposed by Karl Popkin, whose conception 
of a rational, income maximising peasantry, published some three years later, attacked the idea of 
mutual insurance both experientially and conceptually, highlighting first that individual strategies for 
risk avoidance, such as personal grain stores and savings, appeared far more common than the 
communal alternative, before proceeding to claim that because village-wide insurance is 
economically more efficient, its generalised absence must indicate its impossibility. In this regard, 
however, his analysis is ‘no less partial than Scott’s’ in that whilst ‘it is certainly correct to insist that 
traditional systems of social security and hunger insurance were imperfect and lacking in some 
respects…they were far from being simply absent’ (Platteau, 1991: 6-7), especially at the familial and 
sub-community level, where they are ‘well documented’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 147).  
Furthermore, ‘the prevalence of household over village granaries or food stores cannot be taken, as 
Popkin has done, as decisive evidence that peasants are too opportunistic to make insurance 
schemes viable’ (Platteau, 1991: 27), but should instead be viewed merely as a reflection of the 
prevailing ecological conditions, in that ‘farmers living in an ecologically uniform area and carrying 
out activities which are similar from a risk point of view have little to gain by sharing or pooling their 
risks’ (Ibid.). As such, explicit risk-pooling arrangements are more likely to emerge in areas 
characterised by a low co-variance of risks, or, put another way, a high variance in agricultural 
conditions, such as might be found in more diffuse settlements, or ones in which several types of 
farming take place simultaneously. In the absence of such circumstances, ‘a technical reason alone – 
the high covariance of yields – accounts for the difficulty of providing insurance against collective 
risks’ (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, in spite of such weaknesses, it would be unwise to reject Popkin completely. Market 
activity does increasingly occur within villages, even if it is not necessarily to the benefit of the 
poorest members, as he appears to suggest. Rather, what must be recognised it that ‘there is no 
inherent opposition between a moral economy and a political economy approach, except on an 
intellectual plane’ and that a combination of both approaches is necessary in order to ‘produce an 
analysis that conforms with history’ (Brocheaux, 1983: 802). Moreover, as rural society is becoming 
more commoditized and ‘rural livelihoods increasingly integrated into wider systems of exchange’ 
(Rigg, 2001: 42), there are inevitable consequences for the system of social and economic relations 
therein, with numerous authors highlighting the manner in which changes to the realm of 
production have altered the structure of power relations in the developing world (e.g. Kuhn, 2003; 
Platteau and Abraham, 2002, Rigg, 2001).  
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As a result of this progressive incursion, the poorer members of many recently marketised 
communities find themselves disadvantaged in accessing the fruits of market expansion by a system 
of reciprocity which has ceased to hold any significant benefit for them, but upon which, in the 
absence of an alternative, they must continue to rely (Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Scott, 1985, 
1972). This inequality does not, however, exist solely between, but also within the households, the 
dynamics of which also adjust in response to the opportunities and liabilities presented by changes 
within the social, physical and economic environment. 
2.3.4 Changes within the Household: Function and its Externalities 
Given the attention thus far afforded to the structure and meaning of inter-household social systems 
it remains necessary, before proceeding to outline a model of the functionality of such systems, to 
consider also the dynamism of intra-household social systems in response to the external 
environmental stimuli outlined above. Indeed, in addition to elucidating the mechanics of labour 
distribution and social organisation on a smaller scale than those which has thus far been the subject 
of investigation, this additional perspective holds the additional advantage of highlighting, from an 
alternative viewpoint, one of the key elements necessary with regard to the analysis of function: the 
unintended and subsidiary consequences of the pursuit of functionality.  
By way of example, one of the major developments impacting on rural livelihoods in Cambodia, and 
the developing world more generally, in recent years has been the advent of mechanised farming – a 
change which, as Rindfuss et al. (2012: 100) highlight, ‘has dramatically reduced the need for labour 
during the rice harvest’. The consequences of this single technological development upon the value 
of that labour have been dramatic, rendering migration to the modern sector immediately more 
attractive as the value of seasonal wage labour declines. However, though widespread, the impact of 
this “progress” in agriculture has not been uniform, with individuals, even those from the same 
household experiencing ‘the “growth miracle” in uneven ways’ (Resurreccion, 2005: 32).  Indeed, the 
simple recognition that not all labour is equal highlights the heterogeneity of impacts generated by 
what for many in possession of little capital has necessitated a major alteration in livelihoods, and 
especially in their distribution within the household. 
 
In this regard, although age is an important factor in labour “quality”, the key ‘axis of differentiation’ 
tends to run along gender lines (Radcliffe, 1991: 130), contributing to a situation in which ‘women's 
status in the labour market is usually of a very inferior nature’ (Chant, 1991: 63). This differentiation  
(which becomes relevant not only in response to long term technological change, but also 
sporadically, due to shocks at village or local level) means that it tends to be women, rather than  
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men, who are the first (or only) members of the household to migrate, or seek alternative earning 
strategies. As Kilkey and Perrons (2010: 240) have argued, under such shifting conditions, two 
processes are concurrently at play. First, the ‘economic and time efficiencies derived from the 
division of labour’; and secondly the re-evaluation of these different activities within the culture and 
socio-economy of the village (Ibid.). 
 
In this way, ‘economic change intersects with sociocultural transformations’ (Tacoli and Mabala, 
2010: 392) not only between, but also within households, as new conditions challenge the validity of 
old norms. However, how such change manifests is rarely predictable. Just as new economic 
opportunities such as those offered by labour ‘migration may challenge traditional gender roles’ 
(Jolly and Reeves, 2005: 19), they may serve also ‘to entrench traditional gender roles’ (Jolly and 
Reeves, 2005: 20), as different cultural norms emerge or change in importance to support the same 
values. For instance, as Derks has noted in Cambodian context, the ancient cultural practice of a 
bride to be “going into the shade” [joel mlup] for six months prior to their wedding has acquired a 
new relevance, as an increasing number of unmarried girls swap the fields for the factories before 
returning to their villages to marry.  
As such, in addition to the emergence of ‘newer norms, that are more supportive of women’s 
migration’ (Locke et al., 2012: 13), older ones may be revived or changed in character in order to 
maintain the relevance of relationships within or outside the household. However, this is not to 
argue that economic and technological development leaves dynamics of power in households and 
communities unaffected. Rather, what is necessary is a recognition that they ‘are shaped by a great 
diversity of desires and expectations among their members and related power struggles’ (Tacoli and 
Mabala, 2010: 393). Consequently, norms and networks do not experience the economy directly, 
but via the prism of various interests, which are themselves determined in large part by culture 
viewed over a longer timeframe. 
Indeed, ‘perhaps more important… [as regards the nexus of economic and cultural change]…are the 
socio-cultural transformations that underpin the changing aspirations of both young men and 
women’ (Tacoli and Mabala, 2010: 391). However, aspirational change of this sort is neither 
unilinear, nor appropriately conceived en masse: even on an individual basis the drivers of any such 
shifts are multifarious and rooted in more than one place. As Jolly and Reeves (2005: 20) argue, for 
instance, ‘migration entails a complex, often contradictory class positioning, whereby a migrant 
might experience social upward mobility vis-à-vis the place of origin but social downward mobility 
vis-à-vis the host environment’. 
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As such, in high migration countries such as Cambodia, the development of new cultural norms in 
response to economic stimuli is mediated by rural and urban environs which are dislocated but for 
the social networks which link them. Moreover, rather than being rooted primarily in the institutions 
and environment of either locale, ‘the socio-spatial context within which migrants re-work their 
gender identities is a linked rural-urban network’ (Silvey, 2001: 43). Consequently, many migrants 
come to experience what Samuels (2001) has called “stretched lifeworlds”, as they absorb influences 
and compete with interests originating in rural and urban areas concurrently.  
This recognition lies at the core of the literature on multi-local livelihoods, which has sought to move 
beyond ‘one or two dimensional’ (Thieme, 2008: 326) conceptions of migration – comprising only 
remittances and urban working conditions – to an analysis which incorporates power relations 
within the community and household. As various authors within this field (e.g. Elmhirst, 2008; 
Thieme, 2008; Truong, 2008; De Haan and Zoomas, 2003) have noted, the economic and physical 
geography which determines the flows of people and remittances in a certain locality serve also to 
‘re-inscribe’ social relations via ‘discursive and material struggles around livelihoods and natural 
resources’ (Elmhirst, 2008: 69).     
 
From the point of view of this thesis, the key point to emerge from the multi-local and household 
literature more widely is that although the household operates as a manager of resources, it carries 
out this function according to a set of norms which are not fixed, but rather are malleable according 
to the interests of actors within and outside the household. Moreover, this focus on interests not 
only accords well with the structural violence element of this framework, but also helps to link the 
various scales of enquiry herein in an effective manner. Social networks viewed in this way are the 
predictable product of interest and opportunity; functionality and power, both at the macro-scale 
and at the level of the individual, whose choices need not be conceptually subsumed by economic 
forces.  
Indeed, like much about the migrant experience, the manner in which the interests and influences 
which underpin the process of labour movement are experienced is unique to each migrant, being a 
product not only of shifting norms but also of household specific differentiation related to the 
activities in which the various members engage (Radcliffe, 1991). This uniqueness, however, does 
not obfuscate the matter, but renders the linkages between culture and economy intelligible. 
Indeed, as a result of the need to maximise the efficiency of livelihoods, ‘structured and predictable 
relations exist between household members which determine and shape the specific activities into 




Thus, as key mechanisms underpinning the distributions of household labour, social norms and 
household relations are both determined by culture and help to determine shifts in its course. 
Otherwise put, then, and as will be detailed throughout the empirical chapters of this Ph.D., the 
pursuit of functionality has unintended, but to some extent predictable consequences in the realm 
of culture. However, merely to elucidate the concept is of itself insufficient. Having already begun to 
outline the importance of inter- and intra- household norms and organisational mechanisms with 
respect to social and migratory networks, what follows will seek to integrate this perspective first 
into a model of community functionality capable of explaining the mutual interaction between local 
communities and global economic forces; and second, into a historically grounded framework.  
2.3.5 Towards a Functionalist Interpretation of Rural Inequality 
The speed and depth of Structural Functionalism’s collapse around the middle of the previous 
century may be deemed in no small part a reaction to the prior scale and impenetrability of the 
‘Parsonian edifice’ (Alexander and Colomy, 1990: 33). Indeed, for decades, the breadth of Structural 
Functionalism’s influence was almost as totalizing as the theory itself. As Kincaid (1990) notes, for 
instance, the twentieth century apex of the theory was merely the culmination of a lengthy 
ascendancy. Prior to this, ‘mainstream sociological and anthropological theory for most of this 
century was dominated by functionalist theory. Not only Malinowski and Parsons but also Radcliffe-
Brown, Durkheim and Merton were functionalists’ (Kincaid, 1990: 341). 
Resultantly, as chinks appeared in the functionalist consensus, the universalistic pretensions of the 
theory began to work against it. The former total theory of society could not remain in a supporting 
role, once the previous ‘obstreperous challengers’ had become ‘the dominant theories in a new, if 
internally divided, establishment’ (Kincaid, 1990: 341). As such, Structural Functionalism was not 
only marginalized by the rise of Post-Structuralism, but obliterated, taking with it much of the 
interest in function and functionality from the social sciences at large. 
In this respect, it may reasonably be argued that an awareness, if not an assumption, of functionality 
may have been something of a loss to social science in recent decades, during which time a 
hermeneutic appreciation of social systems has generally predominated. The key issue, perhaps, is 
that an overbearing concern with perspective and subjectivity is often at odds with that of 
respondents, whose world views are frequently constructed on a community basis and shared across 
social strata in many cases. Preferably then, ‘shifting our empirical focus away from the context of 
knowledge and towards the context of its production’ (Cote and Nightingale, 2011: 484) may help to 
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ameliorate this disjuncture and, in doing so, help to clarify ‘the role of power imbalances in adaptive 
systems’ (Cote and Nightingale, 2011: 484). Otherwise put, reintroducing a concern with the 
functionality of social practice may serve to elucidate the manner in which it contributes to the 
distribution of community power, inequality and exclusion.  
For instance, throughout several decades of development interventions, ‘it has frequently been 
found that when offered the responsibility of village level resource distribution, elites tend to 
appropriate for themselves ‘whatever portion of the resources that they need and let the poor have 
the leftovers only’ (Galloso and Ravenstein in Platteau and Abraham, 2002: 105). Such ‘community 
imperfections’, as Platteau and Abraham (2002: 106) term them, are a pervasive feature of 
traditional, lineage-based, societies and represent a problem not only in such set-piece projects as 
participatory development efforts, but in terms of economic growth in general, with external gains 
derived from marketisation, technological modernisation and the state being almost inexorably 
redirected towards the top by local agents (Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Scott, 1985). 
Rather than viewing this phenomenon purely as exploitation, an explanation may be sought in a 
similar mode of analysis to that which describes the formation of mutual insurance systems, i.e. that 
the existence of wealthy individuals in a community ‘offers a form of protection that mutual 
insurance cannot substitute for’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 160). Viewed thus, their engagement ‘in the 
mutual insurance system enables it to operate as a mechanism of intertemporal consumption 
smoothing’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 160), with the patron-client relationships being viewed as ‘a formal 
way of organising the compensation of wealthy individuals for their continued participation in the 
solidarity system’ (Ibid.). 
According to this conception, clients seek patrons because their wealth acts a form of insurance 
against village wide production shocks, which only accumulated wealth can satisfactorily mitigate; 
and patrons seek clients because ‘such relationships act, in one respect, as a form of labour 
insurance’ wherein not only is the local labour supply alive and in reasonable health, but at the 
‘patron’s beck and call’ if need be (Fafchamps, 1992: 160). This last point is of particular relevance 
because it ensures that the patrons’ needs will always be prioritised, which over time may be 
expected to lead to the entrenchment of inequality. Thus, ‘the ability of wealthier individuals to turn 
the mutual insurance system into an instrument of exploitation - that is, of extraction of surplus – is 
the compensation they receive for continued participation in the system’ (Ibid.: 161). 
In return for subsistence security, then, poorer villagers cede some agency to the elites, who create 
‘an authority structure which imposes its rule, or its interpretation of the tradition’ on them 
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(Platteau and Abraham, 2002: 113). However, as Scott (1972: 7) points out, ‘in aggregate terms, the 
balance of reciprocity seems to depend largely on the relative bargaining position of the two parties; 
how much more does the client need the patron than the patron needs the client?’ As such, where 
labour is relatively scarce, the political balance between elites and non-elites is likely to be 
significantly more equitable, even where productive resources are distributed very unevenly, 
meaning that ‘concern is not with whether the exchange is lopsided, but rather with how lopsided it 
is’ (Scott, 1972: 10). 
Scott’s recognition of the mutability of reciprocal systems under the influence of external (and 
internal) pressures allows Fafchamps’s explicitly functionalist approach to be reconciled quite 
effectively with the historical structuralist and dependency literature, as exemplified by Frank (1967) 
and Wallerstein (1980), for example. Indeed, Fafchamps’ interpretation not only survives the 
scrutiny of historical analysis, but adds an additional dimension to our understanding of the manner 
in which global political and economic machinations have impacted on peasant livelihoods. As will be 
discussed in the subsequent section, the successive incursions into village life made by colonialist, 
post-colonialist and contemporary economies and governments have directly impacted on peasant 
livelihoods by repeatedly shifting the balance of exchange between richer and poorer peasants, 
almost always to the detriment of the latter. 
2.3.5 An Historical Account of Peasant Reciprocity 
It is often claimed that in contrast to the contemporary reality, pre-colonial Southeast Asia 
possessed certain structural features which ‘tended to limit the extent of personal dependence and 
to prevent the balance of exchange from moving radically in favour of the patron’ (Scott, 1972: 7). In 
particular, the comparative lack of external backing for local patrons allowed non-elites to establish 
‘longstanding defence mechanisms…to buffer elite demands on village production and manpower’ 
(Adas, 1981: 219) with the availability of unclaimed land also representing a safety valve, through 
which disgruntled labourers could, at least in principle, escape exploitation if necessary. As such, in 
spite of Rigg’s contention that ‘the traditional village was less harmonious and more differentiated 
than previously imagined’ (Rigg, 2001: 83), it emerges as an issue of the utmost importance that in 
those communities most affected by the influx of modernity, ‘the traditional economic connection 
between rich and poor - that is, wage labour and tenancy – has been all but surrendered’ (Scott, 
1985: 124). 
Nevertheless, the role of risk and reciprocity in shaping Cambodia’s social relations extends back in 
time far beyond the ‘advanced modernity’ to which Beck (1992: 19), for instance, traces a 
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connection.  Rather, the ‘drastically unbalanced’ nature of contemporary patronage ties 
(Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002: 115) has arisen only following centuries of incursion by external 
forces and with ‘market penetration and the gradual rise of a modern state system [being] equally 
powerful factors in undermining traditional cooperative systems’ (Platteau, 1991: 45). In his analysis 
of this process, Scott (1972: 7-8) describes a generalised pattern, wherein an initial ‘process of social 
differentiation’ was followed by increasing pressure on peasant livelihoods through taxation and 
market fluctuations, and a concomitant diminution in the efficacy of mutual insurance as ‘the 
concentration of land ownership and the growing population made it possible for landholders to 
demand more and provide less to tenants and labourers’. 
In the post-colonial era, the relative bargaining positions of rich and poor has been skewed yet 
further, as democratisation and modernisation have rendered the local populace increasingly 
irrelevant to the maintenance of local power bases. This is because, whereas previously power and 
prestige depended on the support of the largest possible retinue of clients (Platteau, 1995), 
‘westernization and a greater shift towards urban ways of life place greater emphasis on material 
possessions and consumption luxuries’ (Scott, 1985: 658). It follows logically thereafter that ‘when 
the value attached to retinues of servants and political clientele decreases while that associated with 
tangible wealth increases, landlords reduce the number of their hereditary labourers and patron-
client relationships become more exclusive’ (Scott, 1985: 658; Peek and Standing, 1979). 
This, then, exemplifies Platteau’s assertion that ‘human institutions are determined by material 
constraints as well as by behavioural constraints’ (Platteau, 1991: 43) and that norms, as Popkin 
(1979) suggests, are malleable according to economic and environmental circumstances, so that the 
poorest lose much of their protective benefit during times of change, as patrons alter the rules of 
exchange to position themselves more favourably in light of local developments. For instance, while 
some new technologies, such as land augmentation, have the potential to benefit clients more than 
their patrons, ‘rather than opposing these changes (by preventing technical progress, or by expelling 
labourer households from the village) patrons will try their best to modify the distribution rules’ 
(Platteau, 1995: 659). In doing so, however, they succeed not only in capturing the marginal benefits 
of change, but, as Scott (1985) describes, affect this change  in such a way that the livelihoods of the 
poorest – who have little choice but to continue to participate in  this unbalanced system of 
reciprocity – are undermined (Brocheaux, 1983). 
What Popkin and Platteau have failed to sufficiently note, then, is that that while ‘deeper and 
deeper penetration of market values’ may have the effect of ‘loosening the web of traditional social 
relations’ (Platteau, 1991: 47), not everybody is disentangled to the same extent. ‘Bargaining power 
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is not equally distributed’ (Kabeer, 1997: 263), so that whereas elites may be ‘freed’ from their 
obligations to their clients, those with the least assets are subject to the same pressures and risks as 
they have always been. With the relative bargaining positions of peasant clients having been 
‘systematically undermined’ (Scott, 1972: 5), however, they are no longer able to call upon 
reciprocal exchange mechanisms to overcome these difficulties. Indeed, Scott argues that it is 
possible to examine this breakdown in a relatively quantitative manner, with ‘changes in the 
legitimacy of the elites, both collectively and individually [being] directly related both to changes in 
the balance of all goods and services transferred – the terms of trade – between them and the 
comprehensiveness of the exchange’ (Scott, 1972: 7; See also Fafchamps and Gubert, 2005). 
As such, the increasingly unequal terms of exchange between patron and client may be not only 
observable in a general sense, but quantifiable in a specific manner using the tools of social capital 
analysis because, as Fafchamps notes, ‘in practice, solidarity does not really operate as a group 
insurance….[but rather]…operates as a network in which individuals are connected to a small 
number of other people, who, in turn, are connected to other people’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 158). These 
‘interpersonal networks founded on geography, ethnicity, kinship, friendship, membership, 
patronage and clientage mould the human landscape’ (Rigg, 2002: 212) and understanding them is 
crucial in order to shed light on the manner in which economic and political processes may be 
filtered by traditional networks of reciprocity, mutual insurance systems and patron-client 
relationships. 
That such social factors may be significant mediators of the direction of economic growth has not 
thrust them to the fore in economic thinking, however, and whilst ‘neo-classical economists have 
emphasised the deterrent effects of high levels of urban unemployment, the psychic costs of moving 
and the apparent lack of information…what they have signally failed to do is incorporate in their 
models of migration the prevailing social relations of production in rural areas’ (Peek and Standing, 
1979: 747).  
It is the aim of this thesis to contribute to rectifying this failure by combining the flexible and holistic 
social capital conception – the synthesis of which was outlined in section 2.2 – with a systems 
approach to migration. These two theoretical pillars, in conjunction with the historical-functionalist 
conception of social systems outlined in this section, will form the mainstay of the conceptual 
backdrop to this study. What remains in this respect, however, is to frame this localised model more 




2.4.5 A Brief Exposition of the Model in the Cambodian Context 
Thus far, the theoretical framework of this Ph.D. has outlined three addenda necessary to assuage 
the limitations of social capital theory with regard to the aims set out herein. First, it has argued that 
social capital theory has generally failed to sufficiently note the normative neutrality of social 
relations, focussing unduly on their positive role. Second, it has contended that social capital, 
according to the formulation expounded by its major proponents (e.g. Putnam 2000, 1995, 1993, 
Woolcock, 2000, Coleman, 1989) has tended to direct insufficient attention towards either the local 
or multi-scalar context. Finally, it has argued for an explicit reprisal of the role of function in social 
relations, not least as a means to better understands the meaning of social networks from the point 
of view of those who participate in them.  
With respect to the first of these propositions, Cambodia provides a rich vein of supportive evidence, 
not least of which derives from the descent into, and emergence from, the genocidal Democratic 
Kampuchea regime beginning in the 1970s. In this regard, Hinton (1998a) has argued that the 
atrocities of that period were facilitated in large part by the ability of their orchestrators to ‘draw on 
pre-existing cultural models to motivate their minions to kill’ (Hinton, 1998a: 96), with ‘the desire for 
honour and power’ being utilised to devastating effect by Khmer Rouge ideologists and cadres 
(Hinton, 1998a: 101). 
As such, those cultural norms which, in respect of their ability to maintain the integrity of a stable 
social structure, might legitimately be referred to as social capital, have proved demonstrably 
malleable to highly anti-social purposes. As argued above, however, if our definition of violence is 
broadened, it is not only in extreme situations that an apparently stable socio-cultural milieu may 
result in negative outcomes for at least some of those involved. Indeed, ‘practice theorists have 
shown that because such social structures both constrain and constitute human action, they are 
frequently used to serve the interests of dominant political groups by legitimating their power, 
goals, and desired forms of social inequality’ (Hinton, 1998a: 96).  
Hinton goes on to argue that ‘like other Southeast Asian cultures, Cambodian society is extremely 
hierarchical…[with]…relationships in Cambodia [tending to be] structured vertically in terms of 
power, status and patronage’ (Hinton, 1998a: 98). This perspective invokes the necessity of the 
second proposition outlined above: the necessity of combining the symbolic and structural violence 
models which form an integral part of the theoretical framework of this Ph.D., in order to capture 
the nature of a highly structured, multi-scalar hierarchy.  
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Indeed, Galtung’s conception of hierarchy is a useful one here, arguing as it does that any norms 
which support structural inequality must necessarily be culturally violent components of a 
structurally violent system. Moreover, in this respect, there is ample room, also, to attach the 
specific features of Bourdieu’s symbolic violence thesis: the manner in which Cambodian children 
are ‘enculturated’ into a system of hierarchical relations ‘through a variety of socialization practices’ 
begun by parents in infanthood and intensified during formal education holds great relevance for 
example. During schooling, explicit ritual shaming and praise gives way to more subtle practices into 
adolescence (Hinton, 1998a: 105), many of which are mediated in much the sort of structural 
linguistic manner highlighted by both Bourdieu (1984; 1990) and Galtung (1969;1991). For instance, 
passing an exam is referred to as defeating [chneah] both it and those who didn’t (Hinton, 1998a), 
whilst failing is termed a loss [chan]: the same term used to denote the loss of a fight or a war. 
Some authors, most notably Prasso (1994), have argued that inculcation in this manner has 
contributed to a ‘heritage of violence’ with respect to which the Democratic Kampuchea period is 
merely the latest manifestation. As she notes: ‘unlike in the West, or even in East Asian cultures, 
where there are emotional pressure valves to let off tension...to raise one’s voice in Cambodia is to 
be called “crazy”, and to call someone crazy is to use a provocation equal to the ugliest epithet 
imaginable in the English language’ (Prasso, 1994: 74). Prasso later posits that this tight socio-
cultural constraint and lack of emotional outlet has led to a culture in which ‘anger seems to lurk just 
below the surface’ (Ibid.: 73), and in which ‘the deaths of strangers are met with what appears to be 
complete dispassion’ (Ibid.: 74). 
Whilst it would be unfair to dismiss Prasso’s analysis as wholly baseless, sketching as it does some of 
the same cultural themes which are treated in a far more nuanced manner by Hinton, her ‘attempt 
to sew together violence throughout the ages by entangling its threads in a Gordian knot is tenuous 
at best’ (Springer, 2009: 312). Nevertheless, the perspective she expounds holds an unmerited level 
of influence over policy thinking in particular. Indeed, as Springer has noted, the ‘neoliberalisation’ 
process begun in Cambodia following its delivery to UN mandate by the Vietnamese government 
was based in no small part on ‘the notion that marketisation would bring rationality to “anomalous” 
Cambodian actors, quelling their supposed penchant for irrational violence’ (Ibid.:305). This ‘culture 
of violence thesis’ is, he argues, a fallacy built upon a misrepresentation of culture generally – and 
violence specifically – as being a product of a dislocated, endogenous, locality which does not exist 
except as a theoretical space into which the market can usefully expand. 
This ‘problematic discourse that underwrites the process of neoliberalisation’ (Springer, 2009: 306) 
is conceptually invalid in that whilst ‘certainly violence can be a cultural phenomenon that is shaped 
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by its specific context…the culture of violence thesis simplistically reduces this to a linear 
relationship where “culture” alone is viewed as the basis for violence in Cambodian society’  (Ibid.). 
This is a highly dubious proposition and one which overlooks the fact that ‘Cambodian culture 
underwent profound changes through the processes and associated violences of French 
colonization…[so that]…regardless of the upheaval of the Khmer Rouge period, it is absurd to 
suggest that Cambodian political culture has passed through 1200 years of history virtually 
unchanged’ (Springer, 2009: 314).   
Indeed, the ‘adaptive’ dynamism of the structures which generate violence cannot be understated 
(Watts, 1983: 85) and this is nowhere more evident, or more important, than in the structural 
response to environmental risk, which, as contended by the third proposition of this Ph.D.’s 
theoretical framework, constitutes a dynamically functional element in social systems. However, as 
various authors have noted (e.g. Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Fafchamps, 1992; Scott, 1985) and as 
outlined also in the discussion of social functionality above, the nature of these village systems tends 
to direct any benefits derived from external economic or technological development towards social 
and economic elites.  
This contention, alongside the two others outlined herein, have been directed towards 
demonstrating that such local social systems are not discrete but, rather, are linked into a wider 
socio-economic context, which may be analysed by investigating local responses to external forces. 
Furthermore, as has been discussed throughout this chapter, these social systems are not unified 
structures, but must instead be recognised as comprising numerous interconnected sub-systems, in 
the manner described by Mabogunje (1970), Bourdieu (1984), Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992). 
Thus, the tendency, associated in particular with social capital, to foreclose the analysis of social 
relations at either the individual or wider community level is an incorrect one. Just as each social 
system contains subsystems, so each community is, itself, situated within a wider socio-economic 
and environmental context. 
Ultimately, then, the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter has been directed towards the 
effective elucidation of these nested and multi-scalar structures. Towards this end, the first part, 
concerning migration, sought to demonstrate the effectiveness of migration systems theory at 
bringing a concern with networks into the study of labour movement. Having established this 
conceptual foundation, the second section, which sought out necessary conceptual addenda to 
social capital theory, highlighted both the continued relevance of a focus upon the nexus of physical 
capital and social relations, and the need for any such investigation to be conducted in the holistic 
manner exemplified in particular by Bourdieu (e.g. 1984; 1990) and Galtung (1969; 1990). Finally, 
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section three highlighted the crucial role of the local socio-ecological environment in mediating the 
social relations which are the subject of this Ph.D.  
Having established this conceptual framework, it is necessary, in turn, to consider in detail the 
nature of the methodology employed for this Ph.D. In so doing, it has been recognised that just as 
policy is, all research methodology is underpinned by concrete concepts, theories and assumptions, 
so that great care must be taken in paring the practice of research to theory. In view of this 
recognition, what follows will demonstrate that the methodologies employed for the purposes of 
this Ph.D. are at once practically appropriate, ethically sound, and theoretically concordant with this 






















Whilst geographical practice has arguably always reflected prevailing philosophical paradigms, 
contemporary ‘doubt over the acceptability of previous research practices’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 3) 
has contributed to a high water mark of critical reflexivity in the twenty first century wherein 
research methodology in geography is increasingly bound up with ontological and epistemological 
debates regarding what it is possible to investigate, and how. This is a feature of a methodological 
environment in which, notwithstanding the continuing influence of cultural turn positionality, 
quantitative techniques have been far from abandoned in spite of the “positivist” philosophy which 
underpinned their rise during the quantitative revolution of the 1950s having ‘acquired a derogatory 
character amongst social scientists to such an extent that to declare an adherence to positivism 
carries overtones similar to a member of the general public openly declaring that he or she is racist 
or sexist’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 4). 
It is argued here that the discrediting of positivism as a viable philosophical basis for methodology 
has led to the isolation of quantitative and mixed methodologies from philosophy. Since only 
qualitative techniques are completely compatible with the dominant post-structural philosophies of 
the cultural turn, this leaves quantitative approaches necessarily incomplete. Philosophy is the 
conceptual foundation which allows research output to productively interlink and its absence leaves 
non-qualitative studies deleteriously atomised. As such, the determination of a suitable 
philosophical  foundation for the proposed study is presented here as a primary objective, in which 
regard critical realism has emerged as a suitable candidate. 
Indeed, a realist approach is particularly attractive as a result of its application as the basis for two of 
the studies utilised in the theoretical framework in chapter two – Watt’s (1983) study of structural 
violence in Nigeria, and Bourdieu’s various sociological investigations of class structure (esp. 1979). 
Moreover, as a philosophy primarily concerned with the elucidation of hidden structures which 
influence action, it represents the ideal conceptual foil for the research objectives proposed herein, 
not least due to the pragmatism with which the realist is free to engage with multiple methods 
which ‘enhance capacities for interpreting meaning and behaviour…because the insight gained can 
strengthen confidence in conclusions by providing multiple routes to the same result’ (Hoggart et al., 
2002: 67). What follows shall further justify this theoretical basis, firstly through an examination of 
realism in philosophical context, and subsequently through a critical engagement with the usage of 
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both multiple methods and realist methodology in practice. The final section will outline the 
methodology arrived at in this way. 
3.1 Methodology in Philosophical Context 
Whilst scores of philosophical bases have been invoked during the previous century in order to 
justify, explain, or propose new attitudes to fieldwork and interpretation in geography, the broad 
sweep of the shifting methodological landscape roughly mirrors the rise and fall of positivism as a 
dominant theoretical ideology across the social sciences. Originally proposed by Auguste Compte in 
response to what he viewed as the mysticism and ontological hegemony of the church, early 
proponents of positivism ‘used the term “positive” to refer to the actual, the certain, the exact, the 
useful and the relative, rather than the imaginary, the undecided, the imprecise, the vain and the 
absolute’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 7). Further, positivist philosophy held that even the apparently 
intangible could be codified so that ‘in addition to providing laws of nature, Compte believed that 
there were laws of society and social relationships which, although more complex, could be 
discovered using the same principles’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 8). 
Positivist philosophy came to be widely adopted in human geographical practice around the middle 
of the twentieth century and whereas ‘until the 1950s geographical studies had been largely 
descriptive and regional in nature…it was at this point that geographers…started to argue that 
research needed to become more scientific’  (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 8). Where this “quantitative 
revolution” differed from longstanding regionalist geographical practice was in its ‘normothetic ideal 
of building universal scientific laws from empirically observed particulars’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 5), 
the key implication of which is that ‘observation is the necessary starting point for research, because 
it lays the groundwork both for formulating hypotheses and for testing them’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 
7). As such, positivist research practice, in its ideal form, is one in which the fieldworker derives all 
he or she shall subsequently find from the field, bringing with him or her only a selection of refined 
and universal methodologies. 
This characteristic has been widely problematised by critics of the quantitative revolution and its 
associated methodologies because it fails to account for a researcher’s preconceptions, not least in 
that ‘it leaves unexamined the manner in which a researcher arrives at a research problem’ (Hoggart 
et al., 2002: 7) or the manner in which he or she approaches its interpretation. Furthermore, 
positivist objectivism is conceptually extremely limited in that ‘strictly speaking [positivist] 
empiricists do not believe in unobservable entities or structures like, say, class or quarks, because 
they are not directly observable’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 19). Whilst positivist social scientists have 
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long attempted to circumnavigate this contradiction by arguing that the empirical observation and 
categorisation of action is sufficient to uncover any such structures which are substantial enough to 
matter, the philosophy nevertheless remains explicitly ill-suited to the investigation of the subjective 
and the intangible, making much of the work undertaken under its influence necessarily incomplete.  
Such critiques gained an unassailable momentum during the 1970s and 80s – a period when 
geography is generally described as having taken a “cultural turn” towards an ‘ontological 
understanding of the world as meaningful and therefore textlike in the sense that its meanings must 
always be interpreted’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 22). As such, while ‘past generations of geographers 
have tended to regard the interpretation of data as… unproblematic…a broader span of attention is 
now required’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 32). Otherwise put, the geographer can no longer abstract him or 
herself from the research process. Any assertion of objectivity is moot given that the drive to ‘finally 
sever human geography from the supposedly baleful influence of positivism’ depends upon the 
undermining of any such claims to objectivity (Barnett, 1998: 387). The geographer sympathetic to 
the cultural turn must therefore evaluate his or her own interpretation with exactly as much regard 
for positionality as those of his or her research subjects.  
A major implication of this is that there can be no true aggregation of geographical readings. One 
account may inform another but it cannot refine it because both are inherently subjective. Thus, 
‘models of “progress” premised upon the refinement of theoretical understandings in relation to 
empirical work [have been] replaced by a new dynamic…[in which]… “theory” is a seemingly endless, 
expanding and self-referential field’ (Barnett, 1998: 387).  As such, post-modern geography ‘abjures 
almost anything transcendental… so much so that fragmentation of both thought and theory has 
become excessively glorified’ (Rose, 1993: 162). This conceptual departure from the construction of 
a knowledge edifice towards an academic field in which ‘distinctive, individualised modes of 
authority are predominant’ (Barnett, 1998: 388) reifies the researcher in much the same manner as 
did early ethnographic geography; even more so, indeed, because his or her self-elision (as contrived 
as that process may have been) is prohibited. 
 
The logical conclusion of this position is the proscription of constructive understanding. The 
researcher may not build upon his or her own work or that of others because each building block 
carries with it a set of relativistic baggage which makes it incompatible with the next one. As such, 
one of the features of the cultural turn has been a movement by certain geographers towards a 
postmodern interpretation of reality in which ‘there is no one absolute truth and…there is no truth 
outside of interpretation’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 16) – a proposition, it is argued here, which 
renders methodologies associated with those strands of geographical practice thus influenced 
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inappropriate for this study. What is necessary, then, is a philosophical foundation which avoids 
both the objectivistic fallacies of positivism and the radical subjectivism associated with some of the 
post-structuralist and hermeneutic philosophy which underpins a proportion of post-cultural turn 
geography. As will be discussed below, realism appears well suited in this regard. 
 As Kitchin and Tate (2000: 24) summarize, ‘realists argue that a “real” world exists regardless of our 
conceptions of it [and] that the people living in it have a material existence beyond what we think 
about the world’. However, ‘realists reject the positivist ideal of value neutral or theory-free 
observation’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 18), instead placing a particular ‘premium on the theoretical work 
of conceptualization’ (Ibid.), especially with regard to the categories into which objects, people and 
processes are placed. Otherwise put, the realist researcher accepts the value-laden nature of 
knowledge, both existent and nascent, but nevertheless holds that a rigorous approach to its 
interpretation allows this subjectivity to be minimised, in order to discern something approaching 
objectivity. 
The realist position is particularly appealing with respect to this research due to its explicit concern 
with the disclosure of ‘ontologically necessary structures of causation’ - the social frameworks which 
influence, generate and sustain social action in the real world (Hoggart et al., 2002: 19). 
Methodologically, this manifests in ‘a combination of intensive research, designed to measure how 
widespread a phenomenon is, and extensive research, designed to identify through conceptual 
abstraction underlying causes for why and how it happens’ (Ibid.). As such, because, being ‘fully 
wedded to the notion of context’ (Rose, 1993: 163), it views the investigation of a given subject in 
both quantitative and qualitative terms as necessary for the holistic exposition of phenomena, 
realist research possesses a core commitment to mixed methodology, which inevitably leads to a 
degree of eclecticism in its interpretation.  
 
This has proved problematic in terms of generating a critical understanding of realism in practice, 
with much of the criticism levelled against it tending to ‘rely largely upon cursory readings of 
different versions of “realism” presented in the geographical literature’ (Yeung, 1997: 54) and being 
consequently specific to particular methodological constructs. Indeed, whilst ‘perhaps the most 
vigorous and sustained attack has been on the unobservable character of entities postulated to exist 
in realist theory’ (Rose, 1993: 169), the veracity of this critique is heavily contingent on the subject of 
study, and the manner in which this is undertaken. As such, following Rose’s (1990) exemplification, 
the “invisible” mechanisms which determine a landlord’s level of rent extraction must be 
understood according to a variety of stimuli. In certain contexts, legislation and market pricing may 
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be sufficient, but in others, a more qualitative approach incorporating cultural and individualistic 
factors may be necessary.  
 
Viewed thus, the extent to which a theoretical objection to the action-generating structures which 
are the subject of realist research can be sustained depends upon the specifics of the methodology 
employed to elucidate them. Whilst this had historically tended to leave realism as a somewhat 
diffuse methodological position, Roy Bhaskar’s interpretation of Critical Realism has helped to lay 
down some unifying principles in this respect, delineating, for instance, a clearer distinction between 
epistemology and ontology than has been in general use in the social sciences. Indeed, it is one of 
Bhaskar’s central tenets that ‘critical realism is an argument about the ontology of reality, not just 
another epistemological prescription’ (Yeung, 1997: 54) and that any philosophy which cannot be 
traced seamlessly to its own basis in ontology is doomed to failure for ‘precisely the reason [that] 
positivism and empiricism have [been]’ (Yeung, 1997: 55). 
 
In this respect, Critical Realism is a philosophy which insists upon a concrete ontological reality but 
nevertheless accepts that this must be perceived through a value-laden epistemological position 
which must be satisfactorily accounted for at all times. As such, it is ‘as much against totalization as 
relativism…[in that]…to a critical realist all knowledge is fallible, but not equally fallible’ (Yeung, 
1997: 54 [italics in original]). This places specific methodological concerns at the core of Critical 
Realist research practice in that whereas proponents of other philosophical positions have tended to 
elect particular types of research practice as the most appropriate in all or most cases, the Critical 
Realist researcher views it as his primary task to discern what method is most appropriate in a given 
context. What follows shall attend to this concern, turning first to a critical examination of the usage 
of multiple methods, before undertaking an analysis of two realist methodologies deemed especially 
pertinent to the study proposed herein.  
 
3.2 The Application of Mixed Methodologies 
In spite of the theoretical objections to the objectivism of quantitative research and the proliferation 
of qualitative work following the cultural turn, quantitative methodologies have retained a notably 
consistent presence in geography, to the extent that ‘at bottom, a continuity can be detected from 
the quantitative impulse in [late nineteenth century] survey work and the rise of geography as 
spatial science from the late 1950s onwards’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 19). Indeed, rather than the 
methods themselves, what has changed is ‘the idea that quantification would lead to the generation 
of universal laws (as in the natural sciences)’ – a proposition now generally recognised as impossible 
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due to the complex and ephemeral nature of social systems (Marshall, 2006: 6). Thus, ‘[quantitative] 
techniques are now used to provide sufficient evidence that makes acceptance of a line of thought 
compelling’ (Ibid.). Moreover, this epistemological development has been associated with a shift in 
preoccupation from refinement to triangulation, often using a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, so that ‘when faced with weaknesses in existing data resources and 
approaches, multi-method research may be deployed in preference to modification’ (Mckendrick, 
1999: 41).  
As such, much contemporary thinking holds that ‘research quality should be enhanced by multi-
method investigations…because the insight gained can strengthen confidence in conclusions by 
providing multiple routes to the same result’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 67). However, as Bryman (2006: 
7) has argued, this attitudinal proliferation has taken place with little typological regard for 
methodological combination, with there being ‘quite often a mismatch between the rationale for 
the combined use of quantitative and qualitative research and how it is used in practice’ (Bryman, 
2006: 110). Especially problematic in this respect is a failure to address the data collection bias 
inherent in a given methodological combination, with one method’s corroborative power as regards 
another often being prioritised over their complementary reach. In particular, it is not uncommon to 
encounter confusion ‘over the difference between multi-method and multi-level analysis’ (Hoggart 
et al., 2002: 66) – a conceptual failure frequently resulting in ‘the ecological fallacy of transposing 
conclusions from one analytical level to another’ (Ibid.).  
Indeed, as Mckendrick argues, the difficulties inherent in composing a methodological portfolio 
whose components are theoretically compatible tends to have the effect of pushing researchers into 
a methodological corner defined by philosophy. From this perspective, ‘the survey questionnaire is 
particularly useful for the positivist, the interview is likewise useful for the realist…[whereas]…those 
working within a humanistic perspective would favour experiential fieldwork’ etc. (Mckendrick, 
1999: 44). Whilst there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach, and it is difficult to deny that 
‘for each research tradition, some methods are more useful than others’ (Ibid. [Italics in original]) the 
philosophical foundations of methodology should be guiding rather than limiting and ‘should not 
preclude the application of other methods, most obviously for circumstances where data availability 
is a problem, but also for circumstances whereby “alternative” methods provide complementary 
insights’ (Ibid.).  
Whilst McKendrick’s (1999: 43) argument that ‘deterministic conjunctions of epistemology and 
methodology hold sway’ is countered by Yeung, who posits that, on the contrary, ‘the 
methodological cart often comes before the theoretical horse in geographic research’ (1997: 51-52), 
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these positions are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they reflect a concern with the lack of consistency 
and rigour in the implementation of method, especially with respect to its linkages to both theory 
and philosophy. Thus, ‘the real need…is to achieve a dialectical mediation between philosophy 
(concerning ontology and epistemology) and the social sciences (concerning theory and 
methodology)’ (Yeung, 1997: 53), a task usefully undertaken by Yeung with respect to the realist 
practice of geography. As he argues, the realist geographer must ‘start at an empirical problem and 
proceeds to abstract the necessary relation between the concrete phenomenon and deeper causal 
structures to form generative mechanisms’ (Yeung, 1997: 58). In this respect: 
‘Qualitative methods such as interactive interviews and ethnography are necessary to 
abstract the causal mechanisms of which qualitative/ statistical methods are obvious. It 
should not be expected that these abstract causal mechanisms can explain events 
directly…Quantitative methods, on the other hand, are particularly useful to establish the 
empirical regularities between objects. Although these concrete regularities are not causal 
relations, they can inform the abstraction of causal mechanisms’ (Yeung, 1997: 57) 
As such, qualitative and quantitative data may be used in order to respectively abstract potential 
causal mechanisms, and to test the regularity and validity of those mechanisms. What should be 
evident from this is that ‘the realist method for theory construction is neither purely deductive, nor 
purely inductive’ (Yeung, 1997: 63). Rather, it operates ‘simultaneously in a deductive-inductive 
dialectic’ (Ibid.), meaning that it is able to simultaneously avoid the “deductive fallacy” of positivism, 
and the “inductive handicap” of rigidly post-structural approaches. Nevertheless, the consistent 
theme in Mckendrick’s and Yeung’s critiques of methodological practice in geography – that mixed-
method typologies are inadequately defined and insufficiently inter-referential – has yet to be 
constructively addressed herein. In order to do so, it is necessary to frame the proposed 
methodology within relevant, critically assessed exemplars. To this end, what follows is an 
examination of realist mixed methodology, focussing on those methodological frameworks utilised 
in Michael Watt’s (1983) and Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979) work. 
3.3 Realist Methodology in Practice 
The methodology for Watt’s study of Northern Nigeria begins with the determination of ‘a sampling 
frame through a village-wide population census and socioeconomic survey…[which]…could be 
compared directly to Kaita village tax records and a 1978 election census’ (Watts, 1983: 35). With 
this undertaken, he ‘was then able to stratify the population of householders…according to 
indigenous categories of economic status: namely the traditional elite…wealthy and successful 
farmers…farmers who are neither rich nor poor, and finally the poor and destitute’ (Ibid.). These two 
data sets represented the foundational framework of his investigation in that they ‘constituted the 
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two frames from which smaller samples [of ten or twenty percent] were taken to conduct intensive 
interviews on agronomy, drought, trade, and general economic activities’ (Ibid.).  
Several features are relevant here, not least Watt’s use of a stratified sampling procedure - a 
methodological concession to practicality which is only philosophically acceptable from a realist (or 
socially nuanced positivist) position, because of the manner in which it sacrifices individualistic detail 
for a wider sketch of social structure. Indeed, if a realist researcher is relatively confident in the 
broad outline of the social system he is attempting to uncover, then such a sampling procedure may 
be undertaken, in theory, with minimal cost, as individuals occupying an equivalent position within 
that system may be expected to view it in the same way. To document two such viewpoints may 
even be seen as methodologically profligate – although this position must be tempered for at least 
two reasons. First, the researcher is unlikely to have discerned the full extent of the social structure 
to be investigated at the point of sampling, meaning that the additional detail provided by multiple 
sampling is necessary; and second, it is problematic to view individuals as merely the passive bearers 
of structure. Some allowance must be made for differing perspectives on the social environment. 
A further notable feature of Watt’s sampling methodology may be found in his use of endogenous 
classification as its basis. This represents the deductive element in the ‘deductive-inductive dialectic’ 
referred to by Yeung (1997: 63) and helps to proof Watt’s method against criticism relating to 
excessive inference of the social environment. Indeed, approaching the identification of social 
stratification in such a manner makes an important concession to post-cultural turn perspectives in 
that it introduces an element of reflexivity to the research process by allowing the subjects to define 
their own parameters and classifications. Watts is, however, unclear about the specific informants 
utilised for this process and it is suggested here that in order to derive the maximum benefit of 
reflexivity, each sub-sample should be asked to provide their own perspective on the social makeup 
of the research environment. T his approach would not only go some way to allaying criticisms 
relating to the post-modern contention that ‘there is no truth outside of interpretation’ (Kitchin and 
Tate, 2000: 16) but also represent a useful corroborative mechanism from a realist perspective given 
that ‘significant differences may exist between how individuals themselves might classify their own 
occupations and how this might be defined by “social superiors”’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 226). 
In this respect, Watt’s use of multiple methods demonstrates a persistent desire to corroborate and 
substantiate the interpretations of his informants, especially because informants produced 
numerous inconsistencies in their respective accounts of certain aspects of village life. Indeed, he 
notes that ‘with respect to indebtedness and food sales, it quickly became clear that survey methods 
using sampling techniques were wholly inappropriate…[and]…reliable data could be obtained only 
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from a small number of individuals’ (Watts, 1983: 35). Watt’s solution to this - cross checking 
informant accounts both with each other, and village taxation and production records, demonstrates 
the utility of the mixed methods approach, but it also exemplifies the need to temper 
methodological subjectivity for practical purposes. Indeed, whilst the hermeneutic argument that no 
texts are objective or value free is a valid one, the idea that the values and perspectives they are 
associated with can be accounted for to some extent facilitates a level of investigation beyond that 
which is possible from a radically subjectivist standpoint.  
This position is taken further by Bourdieu, whose methodology adopts a famously pragmatic 
approach to the use of statistics. In this respect, ‘while qualitative techniques of research play a 
major role in Bourdieu’s research, it appears that he is comfortable substituting statistical methods 
of research whenever qualitative research would be difficult or time consuming’ (Griller, 1996: 9). 
Thus, just as Watts (1983) found some issues impossible to reliably elucidate through individual 
interviews, so too Bourdieu experienced significant difficulties in obtaining accurate data on the 
practices and attitudes of his subjects. However, his use of statistics in place of qualitative data was 
not purely pragmatic, being also solidly underpinned by ‘his fundamental epistemological ideas…that 
[one] cannot use survey questions to determine why people behave in the way that they 
do…[because]…as the generative principle of practice, habitus is unconscious’ (Griller, 1996: 9-10). 
As such, Bourdieu’s use of statistics is influenced by his theory of practice, wherein action is 
motivated by a structure internal to the individual, which is itself related to, and interlinked with, the 
structures within others because it is generated by external circumstances, many of which will be 
the same for most members of a given group. Thus, that many members of a particular class in a 
certain area may share attitudes and characteristics is understandable because these are shaped by 
the circumstances they have in common. That they do not all do so is also explicable, because their 
upbringings, roles and (particularly) those of their parents are not identical. Bourdieu described this 
philosophy ‘as being shaped by the objectivism of Levi-Strauss and the subjectivism of Sartre’ 
(Griller, 1996: 3-4) and argued that it revealed the subjectivist/ objectivist antimony as a false one 
because ‘each is faulty without the other’ (Griller, 1996: 5).   
The methodological implication of Bourdieu’s position is that multiple methods in social research are 
not only tolerable, but in fact necessary in order to fully explicate causality, action, and social 
structure. For instance, Bourdieu ‘sneers at the use of statistics to determine causality’ (Griller, 1996: 
9) but nevertheless requires their use, in conjunction with qualitative ethnography, because the 
habitus is invisible to the subject and must therefore be indirectly observed through actions, as well 
as thoughts and preferences. As such, with respect to its use of statistics and secondary sources in 
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order to overcome the perceived weaknesses of qualitative research, Bourdieu’s methodology 
evokes that utilised by Watts, although the two nevertheless diverge in the crucial area of 
classification. As noted above, Watts attempts to incorporate subjective reflexivity through the use 
of endogenous categories, a practice which Bourdieu’s epistemological position disallows. His 
methodology thus rests upon accurate classificatory work being undertaken by the fieldworker – a 
problematic proposition from a poststructural perspective, but one which he endeavours to solve 
through a process of reflexive examination on the part of the researcher himself. 
Indeed, for Bourdieu, ‘the purpose of reflexivity is to objectify the scientist by placing the researcher 
as researcher rather than as an individual in the social structure…and to objectify his or her 
relationship to the objectified subject of the study’ (Griller, 1996: 13 [Italics in original]). Rather than 
presenting his research as the subjective interpretation of an individual social scientist, Bourdieu 
thus resolves the objective-subjective contradiction by including himself as an object of study. This is 
an attractively neat proposition and one echoed by Cloke et al. (2004: 231 [Italics in original]), who 
argue that ‘whilst postmodern thinkers may complain of the “positivist” logic of [classificatory] 
mapping, the reality is that an “identity map” in which phenomena are categorised and sorted is 
being generated (it cannot but be generated) in every conceivable research project’.  
As such, any attempt to neutralise or reduce the position of the researcher, as undertaken arguably 
by Watts, is bound to fail: the researcher’s positionality must be incorporated into the study. 
However, as the above has sought to demonstrate, this does not preclude objectivity, but merely 
necessitates extra care in its discernment. In this respect, the above two methodologies are 
particularly useful as models of realist research because of the rigour with which they have 
addressed many of the concerns of post-cultural turn geography. What follows shall attempt to do 
the same for the study in question. 
3.4 Account of the Methods Employed 
Briefly summarised, the research set out in this Ph.D. has sought to produce a detailed and holistic 
picture of the networks which underpin Cambodian labour migration, so as to view them as fully 
embedded within the socio-economic and ecological context in which they operate. In doing so, it 
has sought to answer three core questions about social and migratory linkages in Cambodia. First, 
why do social networks operate as they do in Cambodia and to what extent are they related to the 
functional requirements of the household, such as the need to mitigate environmental risk or share 
labour? Second, how do migratory linkages differ in response to differing volumes and distributions 
of assets on the part of the rural household and what role does this play in the translocation of 
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inequality? Third, how does the migratory and non-migratory social structure elucidated by 
questions one and two feed back into itself from the point of view of social norms?     
 
The investigation of these questions was undertaken using a mixed method approach which was 
held here to be particularly important given that, as has long been my own experience, rigorous 
research requires a level of methodological flexibility on the part of the researcher in order to 
accommodate the reality that data may not be gleaned at the rate or in the manner initially 
expected. As a result, ‘many human geographers now argue against the depiction of the research 
process as a simple linear sequence of pre-defined steps from problem specification through to 
writing up results’ (Clifford et al., 2010: 426). Thus, as I did, many of those ‘those deploying multiple-
methods in multi-stage research…[in particular]…may find themselves writing up findings from 
introductory methods, while formulating research questions or supplementing their original 
research themes for the next stage of their research’ (Ibid.: 426-7). As such, ‘research design is a 
process rather than an event’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 40) and the usage of multiple methods from the 
outset was in part a means by which to establish a practical methodological emphasis derived from 
the findings of fieldwork, rather than relying entirely on methodological exemplars from 
comparative literature.  
Furthermore, as Hoggart et al. (2002: 69) argue, in many research projects, especially those 
attempting either to implement new methodologies or utilise old ones in novel ways, ‘we can have 
more faith if researchers call on different types of data, use more than one investigator…interpret 
evidence through different theoretical lenses and use more than one data collection technique’. In 
respect of this position, this research took place in conjunction with two experienced local 
fieldworkers from differing academic backgrounds, with whom I already had a strong working 
relationship following my two years of fieldwork for the Royal University of Phnom Penh on an IDRC 
funded study into Cambodia’s migrant enclaves and systematic rural-urban labour migration. In 
addition, the strong association which I retain with the Masters in Development Studies course at 
the Royal University of Phnom Penh – through which the aforementioned project was run, and 
where I read my Masters degree – allowed me to solicit the advice of local and Western academics 
with experience in relevant fields.  
Given the ‘enhanced effect’ of working with other researchers from different academic backgrounds 
(Hoggart et al., 2002: 69) this process added significant value to the research, especially with respect 
to ‘gaining access to the target population’, which is ‘a preliminary practical and ethical problem in 
any interview-based study’ due to the potential for overburdening informants (Winchester, 1996: 
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122). Local academics were able to minimise this risk by highlighting groups or persons to whom the 
time spent participating in research may be prejudicial, both in early office-based consultations and 
later, as they accompanied me in the field.  
Indeed, my use, throughout the research process, of a field assistant was based in large part on a 
desire to minimise any difficulties or awkwardness my presence as a researcher might create. In 
particular, the benefit of working with my assistant Ly Vouch Long, a long time friend and colleague 
and professional researcher for the IDRC, UN and World Bank, meant that he was able – not only as 
an experienced researcher but also as a Cambodian – to take note of the subtle implications of 
potential informants words and actions in a way that I, despite speaking Khmer to a good level, 
cannot necessarily do. For instance, the nature of politeness in Cambodia is such that many rural 
people may not feel comfortable refusing a request for an interview even if they are too busy or do 
not wish to participate. Long was able to identify any such unwillingness and inform me of it, as well 
as occasionally guiding my line of questioning in such a way as to minimise potential offense. 
Inevitably, the use of a field assistant in this manner carries with it certain methodological risks. In 
particular, the need to translate both questions and answers has the potential to lead to 
misunderstandings, inaccuracies, or the loss of nuance in qualitative research in particular. However, 
my knowledge of the Khmer language was a considerable advantage here, allowing me to supersede 
many of these difficulties simply because I could understand the questions asked and responses 
given. Long’s presence therefore served mainly as a “safety net”, helping me to understand the most 
challenging or colloquial responses and minimising the risk of offending or inconveniencing 
informants.  Moreover, his knowledge of local dialects and cultural practices also allowed me to fulfil 
the first two of the KCL ethical requirements discussed herein, in that they  complemented my own 
linguistic ability to ‘explain, in straightforward lay-language’ the aims of the study, and the 
procedures in place to safeguard the information gleaned through their participation.  
Indeed, before questionnaire delivery could begin, it was necessary to obtain official, generalized 
consent from the three relevant village chiefs and the Krang Youv commune chief. Following a full 
explanation of my own the research’ aims, this was readily given. Individualized consent was later 
obtained from each respondent using the attached consent form (see appendix C) as a preliminary 
part of the interview process. Furthermore, as Winchester (1996: 124) advises, further essential 
safeguards were employed ‘that protect powerful and powerless alike are procedures for data 
handling and the maintenance of confidentiality and safety’.  These included the use of a locked 
storage system for the safeguarding of completed questionnaires and an anonymizing process 
during data entry which will protect informants’ identity. Finally, as demanded from both an ethical 
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and methodological perspective, these arrangements were made known to all informants at the 
earliest opportunity so that ‘participants…[are]…assured that all the data collected will remain 
secure’ (Clifford et al., 2010: 111). 
This process of securing permission for research was included as part of the field site selection 
process, which was undertaken in consultation with academics at the Royal University of Phnom 
Penh, during a six week period of preliminary fieldwork prior to the main seven month research 
frame. In particular, it was a priority during this period to ensure that a clear distinction be drawn 
between the research undertaken for the purposes of this Ph.D. and that earlier carried out under 
the auspices of the RUPP-IDRC project. With this in mind, the lack of migrant households 
encountered during the preliminary scoping study who knew of, or were associated with either the 
primary urban site of that project, Teuk Thla, or the key rural study site of Prey Veng, was an 
important factor in selecting it. Moreover, this period allowed for the piloting of the various 
methodologies proposed herein and their testing for suitability in the specific context of the selected 
field site. Moreover, in addition to the use of focus groups and key informant interviews to ascertain 
the social and physical endowments of the site, its early identification allowed for a rigorous 
examination of the administrative records which would be available for study.  
As it transpired, the villages’ administrative records were very limited, necessitating a greater than 
expected reliance on informants recollection of dates and specific events in order to construct 
timelines pertaining to natural disasters and land sale/ purchase. Beginning with the first of these 
areas of enquiry, a funnel method of questioning was utilised wherein informants were asked initial 
questions concerning bad years, pressures and shocks of various types. Where events in each 
category were indicated, dates were obtained and triangulated using key temporal markers, such as 
national elections, in order to ensure the accuracy of the recall-based data. As this method proved to 
be both readily intelligible to the informants in the study and an effective means of gathering proxy-
longitudinal data, it was extended also to the construction of asset acquisition histories – concerning 
the purchase of productive and consumptive assets, livestock and land – for all of the core 72 rural 
households. 
In accordance with research aim two , to investigate questions of risk and vulnerability to natural 
disasters and their relationship to the form and function of village society, the selected site had a 
historical vulnerability to such events. In particular, it was affected by the widespread 2011 floods, 
the oral and written records of which were therefore “fresh” and easily corroborated. This was an 
important factor in the proposed study, as, although dates may be recalled with reasonable accuracy 
using the methodology described above, there is inevitably ‘greater inaccuracy as time progresses 
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from an event’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 121). The relative temporal proximity facilitated a deeper and 
more extensive line of qualitative questioning, which permitted greater clarity when attempting to 
draw linkages between environmental risk and other aspects of village life. 
This was particularly important because, as Hoggart et al. note, ‘the advantage of triangulation is not 
having different data sources as such but using complementary sources…[which]…should not just 
draw attention to the same human condition (at different geographical or temporal scales)’ (2002: 
71). Furthermore, ‘in close embraces with research subjects, only the most myopic can fail to grasp 
the value laden nature of research enquiry’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 204) so that this project’s attempts 
at triangulation necessarily took into account not only the livelihoods and social circumstances of the 
various informants, but also retained a critical stance towards the ability of certain methods to 
answer certain questions at all. Indeed, ‘to be clear, intensive methods are not appropriate for 
tabulating the incidence of events, but are appropriate for exploring rationalities, implications and 
meanings’ (Ibid.).  
As such, the use of triangulation employed during the course of this study was undertaken in as full a 
recognition as possible of these issues. Extensive quantitative data were used to challenge or 
corroborate the findings of more intensive methodologies and in turn, qualitative data were a key 
resource in determining the both the validity and potential causality of statistical correlations 
discerned during analysis of the results of the survey. In order to maximise the impact of this benefit, 
quantitative data were input and preliminarily analyzed during fieldwork in order that some of the 
early statistical findings could be investigated via interviews. An example of this is the correlation 
between labour sharing and natural disasters, which informant reports suggested was more likely to 
be due to households responding to pressures than successfully mitigating them. 
A similar issue to that raised with regard to triangulation also applied to the use of cross-sectional 
data, a necessity given the proposed fieldwork time frame of less than one year, but one with the 
potential to generate misleading findings if utilised incorrectly (Hoggart et al., 2002: 70). Indeed, in a 
country and province especially selected for their economic dynamism, it was essential to avoid the 
fallacy of substituting cross-sectional for longitudinal data. Rather than attempting to disguise a 
static time-frame with as many (apparently) complementary alternatives as possible then, it was 
preferable merely to pay careful attention to those inconsistencies which arose. As such, the view 
was taken that ‘the key to making best use of multi-method approaches is not to assume 
automatically that a problem of method exists. This should be examined but should be approached 
as one of a number of possible sources of inconsistency’, alongside sampling, and categorization or 
“entitation” as Hoggart et al. term it (Hoggart et al., 2002: 73). 
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Indeed, although generally referred to separately (by e.g. Clifford et al., 2010; Cloke et al., 2004; 
Hoggart et al., 2002), the sampling process is the first stage of entitation, and perhaps the most 
crucial. Of particular importance was the delimitation of the field site – a task which gains an 
additional level of difficulty where the object of study is population movement across village and 
rural-urban boundaries. Nevertheless, my previous experience in Cambodia suggested that the 
village of origin is a strongly significant variable in determining migratory incidence and destination, 
and should therefore represent the point of conceptual departure in sampling terms.  
This had the advantage of presenting a predetermined boundary in both population and spatial 
terms but, notwithstanding the practical and ethical convenience of such a sample frame (in that it 
would represent an immediately intelligible research area to communicate to participants), it would 
be disadvantageous to view this as an absolute delineation. Recent literature on Cambodian labour 
migration suggests that rural-rural migration remains significantly more prevalent than its rural-
urban counterpart (e.g. Diepart, 2008, RUPP-IDRC, 2009) and it was therefore essential to be 
sensitive to short-term and local population movement into and out of the sampled village by 
following up potential respondents who were unavailable at the time of their identification either by 
phone or a later visit. 
As such, and in keeping with the adaptive nature of the proposed methodology, site selection for 
urban research was delayed until the rural migratory survey was completed, at which point Sak te 
Bo, Andaing, and various locales within Phnom Penh were identified as key urban research sites. In 
the case both of these urban locales and the initial selection of the primary rural site, the early 
stages of the research process entailed a series of preliminary visits in conjunction with local 
researchers who have experience of the site in question to identify key informants as points of 
access to the site. These initial key informants were usually shopkeepers, landlords, trade union 
leaders, construction foremen, etc., who provided basic information about the research site as well 
as providing introductions to other migrants in the area.  
Interviews with these key informants therefore complemented the primary sample of migrants from 
those rural householders already interviewed in the primary rural research site. From these two 
sources, a system of qualitatively supported snowball sampling of key informants provided a 
widespread sample of respondents from which to garner further data to the main sample of 
migrants captured by the primary network mapping methodology outlined below. In doing so, 
however, steps were taken to avoid unintended sample bias, in particular the usage of multiple 
sampling “gatekeepers” from different occupations and social statuses in order to maximise the 
diversity of the sample.  
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Thus, data collection began initially in the primary rural research site and took place according to 
three primary methodologies. The first of these, and the most time consuming, was the delivery of a 
comprehensive socio-economic questionnaire to 72 snowball sampled villagers originating from 
three initial nodes. These primary nodes were selected on the basis of their residence within each of 
three sub-sites, North Ampil, South Ampil and Go, and Jake, identified during initial focus group 
discussions as being, relative to each other, poor, average, and wealthy. Thereafter, subsequent 
nodes were chosen on the basis of their membership of the social networks of the previous 
informants, which were defined, following a period of initial methodological testing, as those people 
who informants see most regularly and felt closest to.  
This combination of questions was found both to be the most readily intuitive to informants and to 
produce clear and tightly bounded groups which were involved in a number of activities (e.g. 
socializing, labour sharing, lending) together. However, one of the initial findings of this process of 
mapping social groups was that they appeared to be strongly, though by no means perfectly, 
correlated to gender. Given that the informant for both social and economic information at each 
point needed to be the node in question (rather than any member of the household) this might have 
raised issues concerning the overall distribution of gender in the sample, with all the concomitant 
methodological problems of balance and intra-household perspective which that might have 
brought. In order to avoid these, two of the initial nodes selected were female: one from a male 
headed household and the other from a female headed one.  
In addition to the these concerns, the network mapping methodology employed raised a number of 
parallel issues in the research process, not least of which was the physical logistics of finding the 
individuals identified by each informant as belonging to their primary social networks. On occasion, 
target individuals lived close by, but were often too far away to be visually indicated. Under these 
circumstances, the help of a family member or neighbour was enlisted to walk to the houses in 
question, introduce myself and my assistant, and allow us to record their location via GPS for 
subsequent interview. This logistical approach was found to be an efficient and effective one, with 
its accuracy being later confirmed once the network had acquired enough density for certain nodes 
to be selected by more than one informant. At this point I was able to discuss the location of many 
individuals in terms of their neighbours (i.e. “Sol who lives next to Hon Ki?”) and thereby to avoid the 
need to enlist further help in finding them.  
Having established a functional methodology of rural network mapping, another curiosity presented 
itself which necessitated a degree of conceptual adaptation of the project. Specifically, this 
pertained to the shape and extent of the social networks discerned by the mapping methodology, 
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which did not accord with official boundaries in the site. Although the possibility of extending the 
study site beyond the single village survey initially envisioned as the rural basis of this project had 
been raised during early stage qualitative data collection, Go village had not been included in the 
preliminary draft of the research site. The extent to which the networks of South Ampil and Go 
proved to be interlinked however, especially when compared with their mutual isolation from both 
North Ampil and Jake, necessitated a change of approach, wherein Go would be included in the 
study as part of the same categorical sub-location as Ampil. 
Having identified both the sub-boundaries of the research site and a selection of relevant nodes, 
questionnaire delivery began. In delivering this survey, it was held that the approximately 27% of 
female headed households in Cambodia (World Bank, 2010) was sufficient to explore any inter-
household gender differences in the data (see e.g., Rajaram, 2009). Similarly, the later, migrant 
focussed survey was designed to discern the nature of intra-household relationships and decision-
making which may be missed by the former methodology. Indeed, the use of more than one survey 
method in this way helped to proof the study against the problems inherent in questionnaire data 
collection which ‘can be threatened by many factors’ (Harris and Brown, 2010: 2), but which are 
liable to suffer, in particular, from design flaws which may lead either to key trends being missed or 
to inaccuracies in the data set. Although it was impossible to immunize this study completely against 
such risks, the use of more than one methodology in parallel, as well as a willingness to redraft and 
re-administer questionnaires which produced conflicting or dubious results, was deemed here to be 
sufficient to avoid serious error. 
With this in mind, the primary survey questionnaire was also divided into three partially interlocking 
sections, the first of which sought to ascertain the distribution of “productive” inter-household social 
linkages. In this respect, the questionnaire built upon Fafchamps (1992), Fachamps and Gubert 
(2005), Grooteart et al. (2004) and my own work with the aforementioned RUPP-IDRC project in 
seeking to map the social connections possessed by villagers by asking simple questions regarding 
who they had previously requested loans from or given loans to, with whom they have exchanged 
gifts and, in particular, the sources of any information or assistance relating to migration.  
The second section of this questionnaire pertained to the assets possessed by the household and 
any transactions which had taken place throughout the duration of the household’s post-DK period 
residence in the village, especially with respect to land and livestock sales. A third section was 
designed to cover action taken as a response to natural disasters, including ‘an increased reliance on 
wage work’ in the local area, rural-urban migration, and asset sale (Pellini, 2012: 64; Fitzgerald et al., 
2007). In order that such responses be satisfactorily disentangled from action motivated in other 
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ways, the delivery of this section was informed by a preliminary timeline of natural disasters and 
climate pressures, as well as the responses to section two.  
The second methodology undertaken during the course of this research concerned mapping the 
agricultural land distribution within the primary rural research site. This was based initially on 
satellite imagery derived from Google Maps, which is available in high resolution for the nearest 
provinces to Phnom Penh; Prey Veng and Kandal, from where imagery has been collected as recently 
as 2011. Using a grid system superimposed over this satellite imagery, informants’ answers to 
questions concerning the distance and direction of their land from triangulated landmarks such as 
lakes and roads were spatially recorded for subsequent input to the Gephi spatial analysis program.  
Having completed the mapping process and the delivery of the questionnaire to the primary rural 
site, and in the process garnered a comprehensive set of basic data regarding the village population, 
the fieldwork schedule then turned to the urban side of the research process. This aspect of the 
research was rooted in a list of all 34 internal migrants belonging to the households already 
interviewed using the primary questionnaire (of which 30 agreed to be interviewed), meaning that 
all of this study’s urban research sites are locales to which Krang Youv informants’ children have 
been tracked. Thereafter, however, migrants’ social networks were explored via the same 
methodology employed in Krang Youv – though this time examining only the first degree (or 
immediate) social networks of tracked out Krang Youv migrants – in order to examine the 
relationship between urban social networks and rural livelihoods. This “network sampling” phase, 
identified a further 20 respondents.  
During this phase of urban interviews, migrants were interviewed, usually in person near to their 
urban residence but occasionally by phone if they preferred, in both a qualitative and quantitative 
manner concurrently. As such, basic questions concerning wages and remittances were followed by 
more open ended questions regarding respondents’ impressions of urban life and their 
interpretation of their own financial obligations. This flexible method, which reduced both the length 
of the interviews and the number of follow ups required, was necessary given the time constraints 
experienced by busy urban workers. However, beyond its role as a methodological compromise, the 
approach was ultimately found to be effective as a means of focussing informants upon the day to 
day realities of their lives which were the subject of interview. 
The practicalities and difficulties of arranging interviews with busy urban migrants also meant that 
combining this phase of urban research with a second phase of rural data collection was the most 
efficient manner in which to proceed. As such, the research schedule was concurrently concerned 
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with a third rural methodology: the selection of informants for qualitative interviews and focus 
groups. The selection process, following an adapted version of Watt’s (1983) methodology, was 
based partly upon endogenous perceptions of wealth stratification as perceived by those comprising 
each wealth demographic. A parallel stratification also took place based upon informant location, so 
that each sub-location of the research site was given a more or less equal voice within the 
qualitative data. 
This process was designed to capture the most appropriate possible base of informants for extended 
qualitative interview, as well as to foster an understanding of the (informant-informant and 
researcher-informant) power relations involved. It intended to account, as far as possible, for the 
influence of such hierarchies on the data collected in this manner - one of the primary problems of 
rigour in qualitative interviews (Baxter and Eyles, 1996) and, together with the corroborative 
function of mixed methodology (Baxter and Eyles, 1996), sought to minimise inaccuracies in 
qualitative data collection. As such, although key informants included several villagers holding 
administrative positions in the village, including the village chief, members of the pagoda 
committee, district administrator etc., in order to avoid elite bias, a selection of key informants not 
holding executive or ceremonial positions was made from each wealth stratum. Similarly, the four 
focus groups undertaken included groups of farmers/ fishermen from each village and a mixed group 
of migrant workers from Krang Youv. 
In this regard, as Hoggart et al. (2002) note, ethical issues are not merely a concern during fieldwork, 
but are ‘relevant to research, design, implementation and presentation’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 245). 
When dealing with these key informants, then, there was a need for ethical issues to be particularly 
explicit, especially given the ‘increasing use of audio-visual aids by geographers to record and 
analyze intensive research’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 246). It has been noted that the presence of such 
devices may not only hamper the building of a productive rapport, but also raise concerns amongst 
informants as to the security and anonymity of the information they provide (Hoggart et al., 246). As 
a result, audio-visual devices were not used for qualitative or key informant interviews.  
Throughout this study, ethical issues had important reflexive implications for the quality of data 
collected through interview, given that ‘the use of interviews and focus groups…cannot be assumed 
to be a collaboration of equals’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 164). Rather, it was assumed that this was not the 
case, in recognition of the ‘uneven distribution of social power in society as well as the particular 
relations of dramatic collusion which occur in the interview itself (Cloke et al., 2004: 165). Thus, in 
order to avoid the subsumption of informants’ interpretations of their environment, ‘a process [was 
necessitated] by which the balance of power of the emotional relationship in an interview [was] 
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transferred from the interviewer to the interviewee…creating the interview as a safe space in which 
deep, mutual and trustworthy interactions and understandings emerge’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 165). 
Moreover: 
‘The key issue here is a combination of two related themes which permeate contemporary 
cultural geography. The first theme is that of representation, in particular of those deemed 
as 'other'. Such representations necessarily have to be mediated through our own words, 
knowledge and experience. The second theme is the reading of texts, in this case, usually 
transcriptions of the spoken word.’ (Winchester, 1996: 125) 
 
As Winchester goes on to note, however, the fostering of an ‘empathetic mode of interviewing 
appear[s] to offer at least a partial solution to the burning issue of representation’ (Winchester, 
1996: 125-6) by allowing a dialogue to take place over the researcher’s interpretations, which serves 
to minimise the possibility of misunderstanding or misrepresentation. The manner in which this 
fieldwork ultimately took place echoed Winchester (1996) in demonstrating that the best way to 
foster just such a productive environment is through the development of a persistent, key 
partnership with one or more informants within the field site. These affiliations not only yielded 
excellent and reliable information regarding the site itself, but also provided access to other groups 
and areas through endogenous connections.  
My introduction through a known third party in this way greatly increased the immediate level of 
trust, but also helped to allay potential ethical issues by facilitating the communication of the 
project’s research aims and purpose though a recognised and trusted individual, to whom it is 
possible to address questions and concerns about the process. Furthermore, the presence of one or 
more fully informed and involved local individuals in such a manner concords with the central tenet 
of ethical practice in geography, in as much as it seeks, as far as may be possible ‘to protect those 
people, places and organisms affected by our research’ (Clifford, French and Valentine, 2010: 45) by 
facilitating a two way discursive mechanism between the researcher and those individuals from 
whom he seeks to learn. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The preceding chapter has sought to outline a methodology which was both philosophically 
grounded and committed to the exposition of structures of causation through a diverse range of 
complementary methods. In this respect, a positivist approach was dismissed as unsuited to such 
work, proscribing as it does the use of secondary sources and the productive examination and 
categorisation of qualitative resources – the opinion, conjecture and gossip upon which, as 
described by Bourdieu (e.g. 1984) the social structure rests. Conversely, it was also concluded that a 
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complete reliance on subjective data of this sort represented a needless methodological limitation, 
so that an overly post-structuralist methodology must be similarly rejected. Ultimately, it was 
concluded that a critical realist philosophical basis, which facilitates the use of multiple methods of 
investigation and corroboration constitutes the logical methodological grounding upon which to 
proceed. 
The use of multiple methods in this way held both advantages and disadvantages. The research 
process was complex, comprising four interlinking phases spread across urban and rural research 
sites and presented a number of logistical challenges. In particular, the need to “track” both rural-
urban migrants and rural network members occupied a significant proportion of the research 
timeframe and reduced the number of interviews that were possible each day. However, the use of 
GPS, enlistment of family members to assist in locating villagers, and tessellation of the four 
research phases succeeded in overcoming these challenges. As a result, the type of data necessary 
to fulfil the theoretical and methodological precepts set out in chapters two and three were by and 
large obtained: data well balanced between qualitative and quantitative material, and which 
genuinely bridges the rural and urban spheres.   
Having now established the theoretical foundations of this thesis, as laid out in chapter two, and the 
methods employed during the period of fieldwork, this Ph.D.  will now turn to the empirical results 
obtained. In Chapters Five to Seven, the data will be analyzed in light of the research questions that 
guide the Ph.D., before which Chapter Four will provide an essential empirical background on 













Background to Cambodia 
Figure 4.1 Timeline of major events in Cambodian history    
 
Ever since Chinese merchants and diplomats set foot, early in the first millennium, in the peripheral 
rice-growing Kingdom they called Funan, Cambodia has been characterised as both ‘a gentle land’ 
(Vickery, 1984) and one resistant to change. Even in the aftermath of one of history’s most radical 
revolutions, it is a common pronouncement that the Angkor Wat civilisation ‘still defines the 
Cambodian soul’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677) and that past glories are intrinsically tied, in the Cambodian 
psyche, to an independence founded on rurality and rice. Consequently, it is argued, ‘the seemingly 
fixed structure of Cambodian inequality’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677), which has endured the efforts of 
‘many besides Pol Pot’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677) to eradicate it, represents an edifice that cannot be 
dismantled. 
In twenty first century Cambodia, there remains some truth to this perception, in that despite the 
remarkable economic gains made over the past decade and a half, Cambodia remains highly 
‘conservative and elitist’ (Mehmet, 1997: 676); possessed of an inequality of land distribution which 
is ‘one of the worst in the region’ (Davies, 2010: 163); and overwhelmingly ‘dependent on 
subsistence agriculture’ (Davies, 2010: 164). Nevertheless, the analysis which tends to accompany 
this observation – that ‘little seems to have changed in the basic structure of Khmer society’ for 
several centuries (Mehmet, 1997: 677) carries little factual weight. Khmer society has undergone 
profound changes in terms of religion, ethnicity, society and economy since the days of Angkor, all of 




Indeed, whilst in one respect, ‘Khmer history is [a] tragic’ account of brutal revolutions and 
burdensome vassalage (Mehmet, 1997: 677), in another there has been continuity in change. First, 
the religious reforms instigated by the revered twelfth century monarch, King Jayarvaman II, 
produced a ‘fatalistic’ (Vickery, 1984: 5) and deeply hierarchical social structure which retains an 
influential presence in the Khmer mindset. Later, the outward-looking economic shift towards the 
end of the Angkor era sowed the seeds for an urban-biased, foreign administrated society which, 
having been exacerbated to the point of caricature during French colonial rule, is as much 
responsible for Cambodia’s current inequality and human capital deficiency as the concentrated 
viciousness of the Democratic Kampuchea period, the influence of which is perhaps more keenly felt 
in terms of the huge waves of migration which accompanied it, and which have strained the ties 
between populace and land. 
What follows, then, will delineate the most significant of these developments in light of their 
relevance to the Kingdom’s contemporary socio-economic endowments, thereby providing the 
necessary context for this Ph.D.’s investigation into Cambodia’s social systems, labour movement 
and economy. In doing so, this chapter will first outline the introduction and development of 
Buddhism and patronage, and the manner in which this interacted with centuries of economic 
change to produce the flexible hierarchy of patronage in evidence today. After considering the 
impact, particularly in terms of human and physical capital, of the DK period and the surrounding 
years, Part Two will discuss contemporary Cambodia’s endowments and challenges in terms of 
population mobility, environmental risk, and social change. 
4.1 The Historical Evolution of Contemporary Cambodia 
4.1.1 A Decade of Growth 
From the point of view of those commentators seeking to assess Cambodia’s contemporary 
development from a primarily macro-economic perspective, the trajectory on which the formerly 
war-torn Kingdom now finds itself is almost unambiguously positive. Indeed, ‘following the end of 
decades of ravaging conflict in the 1990s’, Cambodia’s ‘impressive renaissance’ (Davies, 2010: 152) 
comprises a litany of economic accomplishments compiled with such breathtaking rapidity that – a 
mere two decades after becoming the UN’s most expensive mandate – the independent Cambodia 
Development Research Institute has forecast the attainment of middle-income status between 2016 
and 2018 if current levels of growth are maintained (CDRI, 2012: 4).  Furthermore, this transition has 
been managed with a long-term position in the international order kept firmly in mind, and ‘besides 
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political stability, economic growth and reducing poverty, the country [has] also reintegrated with 
the international community, joining ASEAN and the WTO’ (Davies, 2010: 152). 
This metamorphosis ‘is a product of almost two decades of policy transformation from a “centrally 
planned” to a “market oriented” economy that favours investment, trade and private sector 
development’ at both regional and global levels, and which has delivered growth averaging ‘7 -8 
percent between 1994 and 2010, lifted per capita income from USD 248 to USD 735 and changed 
the economic structure from an agrarian economy to a more balanced mix of agriculture, industry 
and services (CDRI, 2012: 1). As such, even accounting for the rapid population growth as a result of 
the baby boom of the late 1990s, ‘per capita GDP (on a PPP basis) increased more rapidly than 
almost all of Cambodia’s low-income peers’ (Davies, 2010: 153), in spite of having taken place in a 
region in which economic issues (i.e., the 1997 Asian Crisis, SARS) have impacted upon the progress 
of others. 
Moreover, Cambodia’s economic growth has been set against a background of sustained poverty 
reduction, from 47 percent in 1994 to 35 percent in 2006 (World Bank, 2006), and with ‘the most 
recent poverty incidence data generated by the National Institute of Statistics’ Commerce Database 
[suggesting] further poverty reductions to 27.4 percent in 2009 and 25.8 percent in 2010’ (NIS cited 
in Davies, 2010: 2). Nevertheless, whilst poverty alleviation has occurred in both urban and rural 
areas, there is a disparity in the pace of change which is manifesting in ‘widening inequality’ (Davies, 
2010: 2) – an internal discrepancy in the pace of economic expansion which is symptomatic of a key 
underlying issue in Cambodia’s growth pattern, in as much as it is characterised by a narrow, urban 
base, and an excessive dependency on certain externally oriented economic sectors, in particular 
construction, tourism and the garment industry. 
This has been no accident. ‘Cambodia’s geographical position, in the heart of one of the most 
dynamic regions in the world, between two rapidly growing neighbours and well connected to China 
and India makes it ideally placed to take advantage of globalisation’ (Davies, 2010: 162), with the 
result that ‘Cambodia’s development strategies have regarded trade and investment liberalisation as 
key to ensuring inclusive sustainable economic growth that can contribute to poverty reduction and 
social development’ (CDRI, 2012: 2). However, whilst such an outward-looking economic ethos has 
fostered a rapid expansion in trade volume, with total trade between 1995 and 2009 increasing at an 
average annual rate of 17.02 percent (CDRI, 2012: 2), it has also been associated with a notable 
upturn in inequality in terms of Cambodia’s national Gini coefficient, from 0.35 in 1994 to 0.4 in 
2004 (Davies, 2010: 154) and 0.43 in 2007 (CDRI, 2012: 2). 
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As such, although ‘Cambodia’s significant progress since emerging from conflict in the early 1990s 
has improved aggregate living standards markedly’ (Davies, 2010: 164), ‘the country still faces a 
number of challenges in achieving its longer term aspirations’ (CDRI, 2012: 7). In this respect, 
however, the structural base of the economy, whose ‘growth pattern is narrow based, making it 
extremely vulnerable to external shocks…[and therefore] unlikely to be sustainable in the long run’ 
(CDRI, 2012: 2) is more symptomatic than causal given the nation’s ability to diversify and to move 
up the manufacturing value-chain, in the manner of its Southeast Asian neighbours, is hamstrung by 
weak legal and administrative institutions, which ‘suffered heavily from the destruction of human 
capital during the Khmer Rouge era’ (Davies, 2010: 158).  
Indeed, Cambodia’s emergence into the global economy has taken place upon an administrative 
platform of notable sparseness and crudity, especially with respect to those institutions required for 
the maintenance of a system of market capitalism. Whilst much of the blame for this may be pinned 
upon the ‘Khmer Rouge period and the subsequent period of central planning [which] meant that 
the broader institutions of governance for a market economy did not exist in the mid-1990s’ (Davies, 
2010: 159), the Kingdom’s generalised dearth of human capital has its roots much further back in 
history. Indeed, even in the mid-nineteenth century, the ‘lopsided modernisation’ foisted upon the 
Cambodian quadrant of Indochina by the French in pursuit of a centrally controlled, extractive, 
‘village-based economy’ (Deac, 2004: 23) was borne, in part, of a belief that Cambodia was unusually 
lacking in an endogenous administrative or mercantile class.  
As Deac (2004: 17) notes, there was some truth in this assumption, with ‘the shift in economic 
emphasis’ from a rice-based to a trade economy which took place at the end of the Angkor period 
having attracted an influx of foreigners, especially Chinese, to ‘fill the void’ created by the fact that 
‘the traditionally self-sufficient Khmers had little experience with trade’. It would, therefore, be 
erroneous to view Cambodia’s current structural endowments as primarily the product of its 
twentieth century travails. Rather, they must be understood in the context of a variety of historical 
and geographical causes and effects given that, in addition to government institutions and policy, 
‘other factors also affect the rate and direction of development. These include how a developing 
society is structured, relations between different social groups, forms of political institutions and 
how power is exercised, systems of justice, and the kinds of freedoms enjoyed by citizens’ (Stewart-
Fox, 2010: 169). 
This is not to argue, as Prasso (1994) for instance has, that the deficiencies of Cambodian 
development are merely the latest manifestation of a socio-cultural system which has survived 
almost unchanged from Pre-Angkorean times. Indeed, to do so would, as Springer (2009) notes, be 
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manifestly suspect given the enormous breadth of political shifts, cultural influences, and economic 
transitions which have beset the region during the past centuries. Instead, what is called for is a 
recognition that whilst ‘culture is not fixed’, nevertheless, ‘no one escapes the history of their own 
society’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 169) and that, as a result, ‘markets’, and by extension the structural 
factors which support them, ‘cannot be understood apart from the power relationships and 
institutions in which they are located’ (Rodan et al., 2006: 7). The elucidation of these linkages 
between history, society and economy will occupy the following sections. 
4.1.2 Cambodia’s Early History: The Genesis of a Conservative Nationalism 
The ‘“changelessness” of Cambodian society’ (Chandler, 2000: 10) has been so frequently noted by 
Western commentators, as to have become something of a ubiquity in any piece of writing directed 
at describing the nature of a Kingdom in which, it is generally assumed, ‘traditions persist, continuity 
is maintained, and the deep beliefs of the people abide’ (Macdonald, 1958: 134). Indeed, this 
tendency is so ingrained that where any concession is made to the nation’s mutability in the face of 
a thousand years of global dynamism, it tends to be one suggestive of a slow, almost imperceptible 
decline – a double-edged recognition that whilst it may be ‘a smaller, less important place [,] In 
other ways it is the same’ (Macdonald, 1958: 134).  
This perception of Cambodia as a happily anachronistic nation, living ‘day by day, poor but 
contented’ (Poorée and Maspero [1938] in Derks, 2008: 30) fitted perfectly with the ethos of those 
agents of the French Mission Civilitriste ‘who in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw 
themselves as introducing change and civilisation to the region’ (Chandler, 2000: 10). However, the 
French did not create this caricature of wilful backwardness, which has its roots in the ‘deep 
continuities [and] refusals’ of Khmer culture (Chandler, 2000: 247) and which induced Pol Pot to 
claim ‘that Cambodians were asleep or ensnared for 2000 years’ (Chandler, 2000: 10) in order to 
justify the violent foreclosure of the period. Despite their basis in Khmer culture, though, such 
‘points of view ignore a great deal of evidence…[given that]…arguably the revolution of the 1970s 
was the fifth major one that Cambodia has undergone since prehistoric times’ (Chandler, 2000: 10), 
beginning  with the long process of Indianisation which began at the turn of the first millennium, and 
continuing via the Cham’s capture of Angkor and King Jayarvaman II’s re-conquest, to the overthrow 
of the French, and finally Democratic Kampuchea.  
Indeed, the early history of what is now Cambodia is a story of extinct empires, ‘each in turn 
succeed[ing] its forerunner through a process of dynastic usurpation and conquest…[:]…First the 
state called Funan, then the realm of Chenla, and finally Kampucha’ (Macdonald, 1958: 35). The first 
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of these is known only through Chinese references to a notable kingdom in the south (Vickery, 
2003), which provide very little detail as to its nature or internal organisation. What these sources do 
indicate, however, is that the state met its end in 616-617 (Vickery, 2003), when it was superseded 
by its former vassal state Chenla. Subsequently, after less than two centuries, the Chenla kingdom 
would itself fall to King Jayarvaman II who was to establish ‘Cambodia’s “golden age”, its claim to 
historical fame and national pride, the period of Angkor between 802 and 1431’ (Deac, 2004: 14) 
Although the Khmer empire’s domination of Southeast Asia began to fade almost six hundred years 
ago, with respect to the aims of this Ph.D., this is a period of notable importance due to its influence 
on Cambodian nationalism, which, unlike that of its neighbour Vietnam, for instance, ‘has not 
generally pictured itself as a struggle against foreign invaders and advice. Instead, national identity, 
until recent times, was seen as the sum of social arrangements in effect inside Cambodia’ (Chandler, 
2000: 13), recalling a time of regional pre-eminence which many of its neighbours have never 
enjoyed to the same extent. 
This period of stable evolution would come to an end, however, as King Jayarvaman VII, soon after 
having defeated the Cham and recaptured Angkor in 1191, resolved, ‘at the pinnacle of his power, to 
break with the Khmer past and imposed, in a brutal and totalitarian way, a Hinduisation program on 
his people, forcing them to convert from the Mahayana to the Theravada variant of Buddhism’ 
(Mehmet, 1997: 677). This enormous cultural upheaval, which Chandler (1993) has likened to the 
Democratic Kampuchea period eight centuries later, represents a key turning point in Khmer history 
and is of particular relevance herein for two reasons. First, it established the ‘fatalist’ (Vickery, 1984: 
5) Theravada doctrine which would come to underpin Khmer culture, and second, it set in motion 
the slow “decline” of the Angkor civilisation which would open Cambodia to external political and 
economic influence, and finally domination, in the succeeding years. 
 
4.1.3 Cambodia in the Second Millennium: Buddhism, Trade, and Subordination 
 
Although an analysis which focuses in detail upon the interrelationship of religious doctrine and 
Khmer society is beyond the remit of this thesis, it would nevertheless be remiss to exclude it 
entirely given that, as numerous authors have highlighted (e.g. Chandler, 2000; Kiernan, 1996; 
Vickery, 1984), the importance of Buddhism to the functionality and form of Khmer culture cannot 
be overstated. Stewart-Fox (2010: 173) for instance, argues that the generalized perception that ‘no 
one can escape Karma’s natural moral law...[and therefore that]…one’s deeds will inevitably be 
rewarded or punished, whether in this lifetime, or the next, or the next…is one reason why there is a 
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general lack of interest in Cambodia over the trial of Khmer Rouge leaders’. Indeed, ‘for the majority 
of people in Theravada countries, Buddhism shapes their worldview’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 173) to 
such an extent that social relations, of the sort this Ph.D. seeks to examine, should not be examined 
without prior reference to the religious foundations of inequality and structure. As Stewart-Fox 
(2010: 173) goes on to explain: 
‘Rebirth and Karma imply that social position has been earned in previous existences. In 
other words the rich and powerful have a moral right to their wealth and power and to use it 
for their personal benefit. Of course, how they use them will have its own karmic 
repercussions, but that is their concern. Thus karma legitimises and underpins social 
hierarchy…[and also]…undermines the notion of equality. For Buddhists, people are 
evidently not born equal and karma explains why’  
In addition, ‘the legitimising of power elites through social hierarchy received reinforcement from 
two other aspects of Theravada Buddhist political culture – the value accorded to social order and 
the use of patronage as the primary means by which to concentrate and exert political power’ 
(Stewart-Fox, 2010: 174). The first of these derives from the idea that a stable social order allows 
individuals to pursue their own spiritual paths, which is deemed to be separate to, and of greater 
importance than, the ability to make choices in other ways, so that  ‘ideals of social order tend to 
override individual rights’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 174). This spiritually rooted social construct has a 
tendency to manifest in a relatively high level of conservatism, as mediated though the view that 
‘what keeps society coherent’ is not equality or social guarantees, but ‘the proper observance of 
relationships between people’ (Chandler, 2000: 90). 
Whilst it should be noted that external accusations of conservatism are a feature of most developing 
countries and that, in fact, ‘the idea of progress [in its Western, imperative, sense] is not especially 
widespread’ (Chandler, 2000: 90), the extent to which Cambodian culture has persistently reflected 
the principles of structured inequality is of great relevance to this thesis, especially given the social 
upheavals which beset the country during the twentieth century. Indeed, patronage, the second 
aspect of Theravada Buddhist political culture as noted by Stewart-Fox (2010), is arguably the most 
consistent and enduring aspect of a society where ‘all political regimes and parties have functioned, 
and continue to function, as patronage networks…[from]…Sihanouk and his Sangkum party [to] the 
Lon Nol Regime, and [even] the dominant Cambodian People’s Party today’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 
175).  
In the interim, ‘the Khmer Rouge regime provides a striking example of how deep the roots of the 
political culture of patronage and hierarchy really go’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 175), seeking as it did to 
‘do away with Cambodian culture in its entirety [in order to] build a new revolutionary culture’ but 
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succeeding only in mirroring what it replaced in that ‘Angkar, the supreme authority, was a strictly 
hierarchical power structure, which, though it purported to act on behalf of the people, never 
consulted them in any way’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 175).  Indeed, although ‘traditional forms of 
hierarchy were broken down during this period of radical change’ (Hinton, 1998a: 109), with the 
Khmer Rouge destroying ‘much of the old hierarchical system, status differences continued to be 
structured vertically in the Communist regime’ (Hinton, 1998a: 111), with Cambodian social 
organisation consequently retaining much of its character in spite of the inverted positions of old 
[peasant] and new [urban/ educated] people. 
The persistence of such arrangements derives from their universality, which in turn is buttressed by 
the support they receive through wider Cambodian culture, especially language. Indeed, in contrast 
to English, ‘the Khmer language is replete with hierarchical terms which differentiate people’ 
(Hinton, 1998a: 99), with very few status-neutral words, such as “you”, “him”, or “her” available to 
facilitate social interaction outside of the formally structured system (Chandler, 2000: 91). Rather, 
Cambodians who wish to refer to “you” must choose from a list laddered from own [younger] to 
samdech [illustrious], with the terms for eating and various other activities being subject to similar 
gradation. Nevertheless, ‘because children are taught the terms at a young age, the conception of 
hierarchical difference implicit in these registers becomes natural to them’ (Hinton, 1998a: 99) and is 
supported by a range of other “enculturation” devices such as ritual praise and shaming during early 
education (Hinton, 1998a) so that ‘the rectitude and permanence of these relationships [is] 
drummed into everyone from birth’ (Chandler, 2000: 105). 
These subtle socio-cultural devices represent the foundational girders to the system under 
investigation within this Ph.D. Indeed, as Chandler (2000: 105) argues, ‘the considerable structural 
consistency in each Cambodian village and family’ derives from the fact that ‘Cambodians always 
identified themselves in terms of their status relative to the person being addressed’. Furthermore, 
the process is multi-scalar, as ‘this identification locate[s] them for a moment at a particular, but by 
no means fixed, point in a flexible set of dyadic relationships extending downwards from the king 
and the sangka [district] through the graded bureaucracy of the capital and kampong [port town] to 
the villages and past them to the landless debt slaves and minority peoples living literally at the edge 
of the state’ (Chandler, 2000: 105).  
As such, the incorporation of Theravada Buddhism into a society which had already absorbed social 
stratification to a significant degree during its millennium of “Indianization” served to entrench a 
system of inequality which is ‘structured like a Buddhist temple, in layer upon layer of groups and 
classes’ (Mehmet, 1997: 676) and which appears almost immutable given its persistence over ‘the 
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last 500 years… [during which]…. little seems to have changed in the basic structure of Khmer 
society’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677) in spite of the enormous social upheavals of recent history. 
Nevertheless, although King Jayarvaman VII’s religious reforms would become a key foundation to 
an enduringly conservative social structure, he also ushered in an age of change, setting in motion 
the transition from rice-based subsistence economy to trading nation which characterised the 
second part of the Angkor period.  
Despite the proportional influx of foreigners being small during this early period of trade, the effect 
on the social structure as a whole was significant given that, besides the ancient influence of India 
and the brief Cham invasion, Cambodia had experienced little exposure to external cultural influence 
and was thus unprepared for the ‘destabilising’ effect of a growing and increasingly foreign 
dominated mercantile elite (Kiernan, 1996: 5). Indeed, by the time the French arrived in the 
nineteenth century, ‘Cambodia nearly comprised two separate societies…one rural, producing for 
subsistence, the other largely urban, producing a few goods for the world market and consuming 
mostly international commodities’ (Kiernan, 1996: 5). The inequality of this arrangement, in which 
‘rice growers provided food for the city dwellers, but the cities offered little for rural consumption’ 
(Kiernan, 1996: 5), would come to underpin the events of the twentieth century, during which 
urbanites were excluded from the very definition of Khmer. Whether, in the age of mass labour 
migration, this rural-urban divide is meaningfully or only apparently shifting, is one of the key 
themes of investigation within this Ph.D. 
In this regard, it should be noted that this is not necessarily the greatest upheaval thus far. Indeed, 
‘the two main features of Cambodia’s “middle period” were a shift of the capital from the rice-
growing hinterlands of north western Cambodia, to the trade-oriented riverbanks in the vicinity of 
Phnom Penh, on the one hand, and the increasing importance of foreign powers in Cambodian 
internal affairs on the other’ (Chandler, 2000: 97). This macro-economic transition was reflected in a 
social, and to some extent ethnic, stratification at provincial level, as Khmer society came to be 
centred around ‘kamong – port-towns, which were relatively large and populated by Chinese or 
sino-Khmer people [and which] were surrounded, in a semi-circular arc, by rice growing villages’ 
(Chandler, 2000: 103 [emphasis added]) dependent on the kampong for defence, trade and 
administration.  This ceding of key activities came increasingly to define Khmer society over time as, 
‘not inclined to engage in business activities and lacking a middle class, the Khmers grew to rely on 
the Chinese as merchants and bankers and on the Vietnamese as craftsmen and small businessmen’ 
to such an extent that a fear of “cultural extinction”…coupled with fantasies of Angkorean 
greatness…ultimately bred distrust, resentment, nationalism and xenophobia’ (Deac, 2004: 18)  
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Moreover, whilst the economic “opening up” of Cambodia during the latter part of the Angkor 
empire was a significant event in itself, the economic and ethnic rural-urban divide was 
compounded by French Colonial practice, which, more so than other parts of Indochina (with the 
exception of Laos) viewed Cambodia initially as being of strategic and political, rather than 
economic, importance in the early part of its rule. As such, ‘under the French colonial system, 
Kampuchea became a peripheral area into which a great deal of development resources were not 
expended…[with the result that]…traditional [rural] society remained to a large extent intact’ 
(Kiljunen, 1984: 2). Even when the French began, belatedly, to ‘exploit the country’s natural 
resources by establishing plantations to produce rubber for export’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 2), as in pre-
colonial times, ‘trade and enterprise were mainly in the hands of Vietnamese and Chinese’, with 
Vietnamese, in particular, being ‘recruited by the colonial administration to fill the gaps in the civil 
service and police force’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 2) 
The overriding effect of French rule, then, was to accelerate the process of ‘transform[ing] the 
country’s primitive, self-sufficient economy into one [which was at once] dependent on the outside 
world’ and overwhelmingly ‘village-based’ (Deac, 2004: 23). This contradiction, which, much as Scott 
(1976; 1985) describes in Malaysia, left Cambodia fundamentally weak, continued to fester 
throughout the years of colonialism so that by ‘the latter half of the 1960s, Cambodia’s internal 
situation ensured that even without the Vietnam war, the nation was in trouble. Economic decline, 
exacerbated by the nationalization of various sectors of the economy, had not been reversed. 
Agriculture, the economy’s foundation, was stagnant. The historical gap between rich and poor, 
urban and rural, had broadened into a chasm’ (Deac, 2004: 54).  
As such, ‘by 1970, there were two peasantries in Cambodia’ – one which was able to benefit from 
extra-village connections and a much larger one which was not (Kiernan, 1996: 7). Furthermore, an 
increasingly significant proportion was landless, with the percentage of those thereby afflicted rising 
from 4 percent in 1950 to 20 percent in 1970. The combination of this huge, disenfranchised 
peasantry – whose situation was not created, but deeply exacerbated by the carpet bombing of 
Eastern Cambodia as a result of the Vietnam “sideshow” – with the ‘mass of politically aware 
teachers and students’ produced by the educational reforms of the 1950s and 60s and ‘on whose 
grievances ‘the Paris educated Pol Pot group were able to capitalise’ (Kiernan, 1996: 6), would 





4.1.4 The Democratic Kampuchea Period and Thereafter: Man and Land Divided 
Whilst Cambodia today remains very much ‘marked by the genocidal regime of the Khmer 
Rouge…[whose]…brutal bid to turn Cambodia into a Maoist, peasant-dominated agrarian 
cooperative resulted in the death of an estimated 2 million Cambodians…between 1975 and 1978’ 
(Davies, 2010: 152-3), the extent to which the destruction of Cambodia’s human and physical capital, 
in spite of the belated attempts to reverse it, was well underway before 1975 tends to be 
underestimated. Thus, in order to fully understand the consequences of that brief, but catastrophic 
period for contemporary Cambodia, it is necessary to view it as the ‘open ended’ (Chandler, 2000: 
227) central nadir of several decades of injurious national upheaval. Some of this has been outlined 
above, but it is a particularly worthy, and occasionally neglected, addendum that to the statistics of 
those who died as a result of murder or starvation under the devastatingly incompetent auspices of 
the Pol Pot regime must be added those whose deaths, displacement, and radicalisation during the 
Vietnam War, helped propel that regime to power.  
As Kiljunen (1984: 5-6) summarises, whilst ‘the human and material losses in the Vietnam War in 
Kampuchea were enormous’, the social cost was far greater. ‘Massive bombing of the rural areas led 
to a flood of refugees who crowded into the cities under the control of the Lon Nol government [so 
that] by the time the war ended in 1975 an estimated over one third of the rural population – some 
two million people – had become refugees…[leading to]…a near complete breakdown of the 
traditional social structure’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 5-6). As a result, ‘the population of Phnom Penh alone, 
within five years rose from some 600, 000 to over two million’, with such large-scale rural flight 
combining with livestock and crop destruction to produce ‘actual famine’ in the cities’ (Kiljunen, 
1984: 6). 
Placed in this context, the forced evacuation of the cities which was the immediate action of the 
victorious Khmer Rouge forces upon taking Phnom Penh in 1975 appears somewhat more logical 
than it is often supposed to have been. Although it seems likely that the forced ruralisation of the 
country was at least partly an ideological attempt to ‘assert the victory of the CPK [and] the 
dominance of the countryside over the cities’ (Chandler, 2000: 2010), it was also to some extent a 
pragmatic necessity given the state of the nation in which the DK regime had come to power. 
Indeed, given the extent of the Capital’s dependence on American food aid during the preceding 
conflict, which had ‘destroyed crops…disrupted transport connections’ and resulted in the death of 
‘75% of all domestic animals’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 6) the pressing need to maximise the only available 
agricultural resource – labour – is obvious. 
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Faced with this situation, the DK regime chose to instigate the second great wave of migration of the 
1970s, with urban residents, many of them already essentially refugee farmers, being set along a 
road towards one of the seven zones into which the country was now divided. A third wave would 
begin on ‘Christmas Day 1978, [when] Vietnamese forces, numbering over a hundred thousand, 
mounted a major offensive on several fronts’ eventually capturing an abandoned Phnom Penh on 
January 7th the following year (Chandler, 2010: 223). Thereafter, ‘throughout 1979 and the first few 
months of 1980, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians criss-crossed the country looking for 
relatives, returning to their homes, trading, or seeking refuge overseas’ in an impromptu mass-
mobilisation that ‘the civil authorities did nothing to prevent’ (Chandler, 2010: 229). Over a decade 
later, with the country having successfully completed its first independent elections, a final wave 
would occur, as ‘hundreds of thousands of people returned home from border camps’, 
predominantly situated in the East of Thailand (Lim, 2007: 7). 
As such, the direct impact of the events of the 1960s and 70s was to exacerbate the nationwide 
dislocation between man and land which had its roots in the colonial and post-colonial eras, but 
which reached unprecedented levels as a result of the prolonged bombing of the Kingdom’s Eastern 
border and ‘DK policies…[which]…deprived peasants of three of the most cherished features of their 
lifestyle: land, family, and religion’ (Kiernan, 1996: 162). Resultantly, and perhaps uniquely for a 
nation of Cambodia’s economic and productive endowments, the majority of Cambodians over forty 
have experienced migration at some point in their lives. Coupled with the upsurge of youth 
migration in the late 20th and early 21st century, ‘the recent momentum [of which] is extraordinary’ 
(Lim, 2007: 19), recent Cambodian history details an unprecedented rupture of the bonds between 
the environment and its inhabitants. The contemporary implications of this, as reflective of the 
wider concerns of this thesis, will be discussed in the following sections. 
4.2 Cambodia’s Contemporary Endowments and Challenges 
4.2.1 Migration and Demography 
Whilst the three huge movements of people which took place during the 1970s and 1980s have 
inevitably left their mark on Cambodian attitudes to migration, it would be unwise to assume that 
their legacy in this respect would necessarily be one of diminished insularity, or of a greater 
positivity towards the prospect and possibility of movement. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of pre-
war accounts of Khmer village life (most commonly Ebihara, 1968) with those which have sought to 
describe the upheaval of the late 20th century has had the unintended consequence of painting 
immobility, and undifferentiated subsistence agriculture, as the longstanding norm from which 
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those events instigated a deviation. In fact, this static conception of the peasantry may never have 
been an appropriate one, with Skeldon (1997: 7-8), for instance, having criticised this ‘myth of the 
immobile peasant’ as a pervasive caricature of pre-modern Asian societies. 
Certainly, there is evidence that the picture of the quiescent and immobile farmer is particularly 
inappropriate in Cambodia, where Kaleb (1968: 525) had spoken of ‘the great mobility of the 
Cambodian peasant’ in the pre-revolutionary era, but it nevertheless continues to hold considerable 
influence, as evidenced in a recent CDRI report (Lim, 2007: 7) which argues that ‘labour migration [in 
Cambodia] is still a relatively new phenomenon’. The primary problem with this conception is that 
the presumed novelty of labour migration carries with it an implied discordance between traditional 
household strategies and the phenomenon of labour movement, thereby helping to sustain the view 
that ‘Cambodian migrants’, undertaken almost exclusively by ‘poor and medium households’ (Lim, 
2007: 14), at best ‘view migration as a short term strategy to cope with unexpected problems and 
not as a long- or medium- term process to improve the socio-economic status of the family’ (Lim, 
2007: 8). 
This representation of Cambodian labour migration, wherein migrants suffer jobs that ‘only allow 
them to maintain the status quo rather than improving their standard of living’ (Maltoni, 2006: 3), 
may be challenged on two grounds. The first of these is found in more recent research, which 
suggests that migration is by no means characteristic only of poorer and medium villagers, but in fact 
comprises a greater proportion of medium and rich households than poorer ones, who often lack 
the necessary financial and social capital to migrate (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014). 
Furthermore, although the CDRI report (Lim, 2007: 14) concedes that ‘the poorest find it difficult to 
migrate’, the assertion that ‘those who decide to migrate are driven from their home communities 
by an overwhelming predominance of push factors’ (Lim, 2007: 8) is contested by Parsons, 
Lawreniuk and Pilgrim (2014) who note that the aspirational nature of urban work has expanded 
beyond the garment sector, previously highlighted as a solitary “pull factor” to urban work by Lim 
(2007) and Maltoni (2006). 
The second questionable assertion contained within the CDRI report (Lim, 2007) is that migration is 
both a novel and an emergency phenomenon in Cambodia. Indeed, whilst it may not be incorrect to 
argue that ‘the scope and scale of labour migration amongst young people has reached an 
unprecedented level, or even that ‘its recent momentum [driven by foreign investment and 
economic growth] is extraordinary’ (Lim, 2007: 19), as Diepart (2008) and RUPP-IDRC (2009) have 
noted, rural-rural migration is, and has historically been, a vital element in the livelihoods portfolios 
of most village wealth demographics.  
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Indeed, there are sufficient parallels to suggest that contemporary rural-urban labour migration 
should be viewed as part of a continuum alongside those traditional mobility strategies which 
persisted prior to Cambodia’s period of rapid industrial expansion and, further, that rural-urban 
labour migration is being incorporated into livelihoods portfolios alongside those alternative 
strategies, including NTFP collecting, seasonal fishing, and rural labour sale, which comprise the 
majority of yearly activities for the Kingdom’s numerous long term or temporary migrants, 
conservatively (and methodologically dubiously) estimated by the National institute of Statistics as 
comprising at least 35 percent of the population in 2004 (Maltoni, 2006).  
Nevertheless, in spite of the discrepancies regarding the potential benefits of contemporary 
Cambodian labour migration, one aspect upon which there is little dispute is the growing 
demographic pressure on Cambodia’s rural areas, as a result of the baby boom which followed the 
end of the Pol Pol regime, generating population growth of 1.81 percent annually (Lim, 2007), and 
which is now reflected in a labour force expanding at a rate of ‘200,000 people or 4 percent a year’ 
(Sida in Davies, 2010: 154). Furthermore, ‘with around 60 percent of the entire population 24 years 
or younger, creating jobs for those young adults has proven a daunting task for the 
government….[especially given that]…more than 80 percent of the population live in rural areas and 
engage mainly in agricultural activities, which normally offer only three to six months employment’ 
(Lim, 2007: 13).   
As a result of this rapidly expanding labour force, ‘employment in urban areas, mainly in garment 
factories and construction sites, is the talk of rural villages’ (Lim, 2007: 13), especially given that 
since the early 2000s, the increase in modern sector employment opportunities has largely kept 
pace with demand, with 330, 000 workers being employed in the garment industry, up to 260, 000 in 
construction and 61, 000 in hotels and restaurants as of 2006 (Lim, 2007: 13). Indeed, even taking 
into account the global economic downturn of 2008, from which Cambodia’s export industries have 
largely recovered (CDRI, 2012), the rapidly expanding working age population has largely been 
catered for through a combination of urban employment opportunities, and improved agricultural 
productivity – from less than two million tons of rice in 1980 to 8.25 million tons in 2010 (CDRI, 
2012: 51) – allowing the burgeoning labour force to make a substantially positive impact on growth, 
with estimates indicating it ‘contributed around 3.5 percentage points to annual GDP growth 
between 1995 and 2007’ (Davies, 2010: 154). 
Nevertheless, the need to productively accommodate such a large number of new workers every 
year places Cambodia in a vulnerable position given that its ability to do so through growth depends 
largely on external private investment.  Indeed, ‘except agriculture, which is a growth sustainer, 
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other drivers of growth were hit hard by the global financial crisis’ (CDRI, 2012: 2) and although 
competitive labour costs and working conditions relative to the region allowed the Kingdom to 
recover quickly, the year 2008 presented a microcosm of future economic perils, as ‘inflation 
reached a ten year high on the back of rising international prices and surging domestic monetary 
growth…[at the same time as]…external demand weakened in the crucial garment industry’ (Davies, 
2010: 160).  
As such, the ability to maintain growth rates as the labour base expands is a key issue for Cambodia, 
as, relatedly, are the low levels of human capital resulting from the events of the DK regime and the 
subsequent period of educational stagnation resulting from ‘very poor teaching standards’ during 
the Vietnamese occupation of the 1980s (Pellini, 2004: 65; Kiljunen, 1984). Whilst there are signs 
that the situation may be improving in this respect, given that ‘in 2004 the younger cohorts of the 
workforce had substantially more education than older workers’ (Sida in Davies, 2010: 154-5), the 
ability both to maintain this trend and to utilise a more educated workforce in such a way as to 
improve and expand the industrial base, represents a key determinant of Cambodia’s future 
development.  As will be demonstrated subsequently, ‘this requires addressing the agricultural 
sector that supplies the bulk of the population with its livelihood’ (Davies, 2010: 163) and whose 
linkages to modern sector are the primary focus herein. 
4.2.2 Agriculture and Vulnerability to Natural Disasters 
As noted above, ‘Cambodia’s agricultural sub-sectors, particularly rice, have made remarkable 
progress in recent years in terms of production, which has significantly contributed to national food 
security and poverty alleviation’ (CDRI, 2012: 51). This improvement has come largely as a result of 
‘fertiliser use, [which] has gradually increased [together with], modern farming equipment such as 
tractors, harvesters and threshers [having] been introduced, though traditional agricultural 
techniques are still widely used’ (CDRI, 2012: 51). However, although the gains made in this respect 
are notable, they have not been without cost as, much as Scott (1985) describes in Malaysia, 
wealthier farmers have been able, not only to capture much of the benefit of such improvements, 
but to utilise this advantage to impose further pressure on the livelihoods of the less well off. 
Furthermore, Cambodia’s agricultural development has also been associated with the widespread 
practice of land concessions, which has not only reduced the available stock of arable land, but 
removed the safety net provided to many poorer rural Cambodians by NTFP collection and fisheries 
(CDRI, 2012).  
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Running in parallel to these human-made pressures has been the associated challenges of climate 
change, which have the potential to directly ‘aggravate the situation as deforestation and land use 
change can cause top-soil erosion, subsequently impacting on agricultural crop production’ (CDRI, 
2012: 52). Indeed, there is a significant body of evidence that, partly as a result of widespread 
deforestation (Global Witness, 2002; De Lopez, 2001; Le Billon, 2000), Cambodia is becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to the impact of climatic conditions as ‘increasingly irregular rainfall, 
commonly associated with climate change, has adversely affected agricultural 
production…[and]…the rising frequency of drought and flood, including flash floods, over the last 
three decades has damaged hundreds of thousands of paddy fields’ (CDRI, 2012: 52), thereby placing 
the ‘livelihoods of the majority of Cambodian people under threat’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 9). 
Furthermore, since the turn of the millennium, the situation has degraded markedly, as a string of 
record breaking natural disasters has ravaged the Kingdom’s rural enclaves, bringing ‘the 
devastation of floods and droughts for five successive years’ between 2000 and 2005 (Oeur et al., 
2012: 60). The first of these, ‘the flood of 2000-01 was considered the worst in 70 years, affecting 
3.4 million people in 19 of the country’s 24 provinces and municipalities, and leaving 347 dead’ 
(Oeur et al., 2012: 60). This was quickly followed by the flood of 2001-2, which ‘affected 2.1 million 
people in many regions still recovering from the deluge of the previous year…[meaning that]…many 
rice farming households did not have sufficient rice seeds to plant [,] about one million of the flood 
victims suffered food shortages [and] a total of 62 people died’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 60). The following 
season, ‘In 2002-03, the country was once again ravaged by the combined effects of flood and 
drought…[with the government reporting that]…the drought experienced that year was the worst in 
two decades’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 60). 
 
Whilst the climactic difficulties experienced during the following years were, in general, marginally 
less severe than the succession of three floods and a drought between 2000 and 2003, all of which 
rank amongst Cambodia’s ten worst natural disasters since 1900 (Duong et al., 2013), the impact of 
the recent floods of 2011 has been, if anything, more severe. Indeed, according to the Asia 
Development Bank (2012: 1), ‘the damage from the 2011 flooding is expected to exceed that of 
floods in 1996 and 2000, both in terms of loss of life and impacts on infrastructure and agricultural 
crops, largely because the water rose and receded three times…[and thereby]… not only prolonged 
the period of inundation but also hindered the initiation of meaningful remedial measures’. 
 
This recent period of successive climate shocks has made Cambodia, whose vulnerability is 
exacerbated by high levels of rural poverty and a widespread reliance on subsistence agriculture, 
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‘one of the most disaster prone countries in East Asia’ (CDRI, 2012: 139), with the gathering intensity 
and regularity of such events suggestive of a nation beset by the worst effects of climate change. 
Indeed, ‘although a link to global climate change has yet to be established’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 61), 
‘the Mekong River Commission has calculated that the average temperature in Cambodia increased 
by 0.8˚C from 1960 to 2005’ (MRC in CDRI, 2012: 62), with it being ‘projected that the mean 
temperature will have risen by a further 0.3˚ to 0.6˚C by 2025 and another 1.4˚C to 4.3˚C by 2090’ 
(CDRI, 2012: 62). Clearly, this carries devastating implications for an overwhelmingly rural nation, 
whose agricultural subsistence is ‘inextricably linked to the annual cycle of flooding’ taking place in a 
regular and manageable manner (Oeur et al., 2012: 61). 
 
Whilst the combined effect of successive environmental disasters has had only a limited effect on 
the economy as a whole, reducing the World Bank’s growth forecast from 6.8% to 6% for the second 
half of 2011 in a response which was also reflective of a predicted slowdown in the E.U. and U.S. 
economies over the same period (World Bank, 2012), the impact on livelihoods has been severe and 
farmers have begun increasingly to recognise that ‘the damage caused to their farming in recent 
years is associated with climate related issues…[with]...local perception of these changes and market 
demand [having driven them] to use new early maturing (90 -100 days) varieties of rice seed and 
diversify their farming’ (CDRI, 2012: 6). As noted by Orlove (2005: 597), adaptive action of this sort is 
likely to be both environmentally and socially deleterious in the medium to long term, as adaptation  
under conditions of climate pressure has historically tended to ‘exacerbate rather than ameliorate 
vulnerability to climate fluctuations’. 
 
Furthermore, as  emphasised by Scott (1985), the ability to invest in new and diverse crop varieties is 
not available to all, especially given that ‘these events tend to hit the most vulnerable rural poor the 
hardest’ (CDRI, 2012: 65). Indeed, in a country such as Cambodia, to attempt to understand the 
outcomes of natural disasters in aggregate terms is a damaging reductionism. Rather, their impact is 
stratified in a variety of complex ways within regions, villages and households, as well as according 
to gender, wealth and the type of natural disaster in question. As CDRI (2012: 139) argue, for 
instance, ‘women are affected differently to men, and often more severely, by climate change and 
associated natural disasters such as floods, droughts, cyclones and storms’.  
This is because ‘women’s conventional roles and primary livelihoods activities accentuate their 
vulnerability, making them more susceptible to shock and undermining their ability to cope with 
climate change impacts’ (CDRI, 2012: 139), with the result that ‘loss of rice crop was observed to be 
statistically significant between male- and female- headed households’ in Cambodia (CDRI, 2012: 
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146). Furthermore, and of particular relevance to this study, the manner of the response to natural 
disasters differs according to gender, so that ‘in times of flood and drought, finding paid work 
outside the village was a priority for female-headed households, while male-headed households 
were more likely to look for a waged job, both inside and outside the village’ (CDRI, 2012: 149).   
As such, the impact of natural disasters, and indeed climate change more generally, cannot be 
separated from the social environment in which its impact is felt. Not only have human practices 
differentially worsened the effects on the local population, as a result of the natural resources base 
in certain areas being rapidly depleted through ‘over-exploitation by outside investors operating in 
collusion with powerful government officials, and by more people cutting wood, collecting non-
timber forest products and fishing with illegal techniques’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 62; Le Billon, 2002), but 
they are also key to mitigating the effects of climate shocks, both in terms of prior planning and 
recovery. Indeed, recent studies have produced evidence of a wide range of such activities, with 
villagers helping each other to ‘evacuate family members, watch over animals, patrol residential 
areas, ferry children to school, distribute water and provide small rice loans’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 81). 
Moreover, in the aftermath of natural disasters, it is often reported that the affected populations 
commonly ‘work together to repair community infrastructure such as canals, water gates, culverts, 
schools and roads’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 81), thereby helping to mitigate the effects of such shocks 
(Bankoff, 2003). 
 
4.2.3 Social Capital and Social Change in the 21st Century 
Community social resources are, then, a crucial factor in mitigating the severity of natural disasters, 
both at the individual and village level - all the more so because they extend beyond the village itself 
and are adaptive to the influx of the modern economy, thereby facilitating the uptake, by disaster-
hit households, of loans of either cash or rice, and of urban, or other non-traditional jobs ‘through 
relationships with relatives, friends, neighbours and recruitment agents’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 81). As 
such, what Oeur et al. term ‘bridging networks of social capital’, defined as relationships between 
peers who are either resident in different places, or engaged in differing employment, not only 
provide a short-term solution to the shocks resulting from agricultural vulnerability, but have, to 
take a wider view, ‘helped households…respond to the broader demands of social change taking 
place in their lives’ (Ouer et al, 2012: 81). 
As a result, kinship-based and familial strategies of the sort which facilitate migration continue to be 
essential in a country in which rural villagers consistently report ‘a severe lack of information on 
disaster preparedness’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 82) and in which ‘the flows of young migrant workers from 
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rural to urban areas are mainly through informal channels…[because]…a formal network is largely 
absent’ (Lim, 2007: 1). Nevertheless, whilst these networks may be informal, they are far from ad 
hoc arrangements. Although  the initial linkages between rural and urban areas are generated in 
what might appear to be a random manner, as ‘pioneer migrants tend to end up in a range of 
destinations…[with]…only a small minority of such moves…eventually result[ing] in network 
migration’ (De Haas, 2008: 32), the linkages which facilitate migration over the longer term rapidly 
consolidate, to the point that they are now ‘very strong’ in Cambodia, just over a decade after rural-
urban labour migration began to accelerate (Lim, 2007: 1). 
 
The persistence and continued importance of networks of these sorts demonstrates that ‘in terms of 
structural social capital and its composition, post-conflict forms do not differ greatly from those that 
existed before the wars’ of the 1960s and 70s (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21). However, whilst 
‘informal networks continue to be organised by kinship and affinity, just as they had before the 
fighting erupted’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21), there exists a broadening consensus that the 
Cambodian social structure is ‘increasingly beginning to be shaped by market forces…[with]…non-
farm activities, particularly small businesses and trade [serving to promote] new networks that go 
beyond the circle of relatives and friends’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21). In the same way, ‘networks 
formally based on the concept of mutual aid are giving way to new networks based on rigid 
reciprocity and the need to earn cash income’ with the result that traditional modes of community 
asset management such as provas dei [communal labour exchange] are in decline in some areas’ 
(Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21).  
Thus, ‘informal networks are not dissolving as a result of the ravages of conflict but are changing in 
response to the power and permeating influence of external market forces’ (Colletta and Cullen, 
2000: 21). Although ‘the lack of formal institutions of secular authority remains a prominent feature’ 
of Cambodian village life’ (Hughes, 2001: 12) and one which has tended to leave informal, traditional 
institutions and modes of conduct as the primary drivers of communal action, the fact that ‘in 
Cambodian society, power, honour, and wealth are highly interrelated’ (Hinton, 1998a: 109) leaves 
these arrangements particularly susceptible to the influence of the market in a manner which, as 
Colletta and Cullen argue (2000: 22), is serving to repair the Kingdom’s stocks of “bridging” social 
capital which were ‘stunted during warfare’. Indeed, several years on, it may be argued that 
“bridging” linkages of this sort are proliferating sufficiently rapidly as to begin to alter the “shape” of 
Cambodian social relations. As Lim (2007: 22) describes: 
‘In a traditional society like Cambodia, social networks are based in the village and spread 
out like a spider web, but with the migration of young adults from rural areas, a new linear 
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network, connecting rural and urban areas, has started to take root….While the traditional 
web-like network remains largely intact, albeit weaker, the new linear network has become 
stronger and stronger and played a very significant role in facilitating rural-urban migration. 
It is clear that those who remain outside this new network find migrating much harder’ 
The significance of this shift of practice is subject to some debate, with Colletta and Cullen’s (2000) 
interpretation of the market as a merely restorative influence tending to be challenged by those, 
such as Hughes (2001: 17), who posit the more culturally nuanced argument that ‘outside 
interactions and intrusions offer different cultural norms and standards, which can challenge the 
idea that particular conceptions of the good and the right are self-evident [and thereby dilute] the 
framework within which actors are judged by the village community’. Indeed, with respect to the 
most significant of these standards in Cambodia, the institution of patronage, ‘the impersonality of 
the money economy contrasts sharply with the highly personal nature of a social control achieved 
through the valorisation of particular conceptions of “a good name”’ (Hughes, 2001: 23).  
Furthermore, labour migration has been noted as having a particularly corrosive effect on 
entrenched norms of status and entitlement given that ‘even if it is not the intended effect, the 
exposure to new places, ideas and practices which migrants experience often seems to lead to a 
questioning of existing forms of hierarchy, or a reinvention of the self’s place within the social order’ 
(Gardner and Ossella, 2003: 14). That this phenomenon is taking place in an environment dominated 
by the Theravada Buddhist doctrine that whilst ones ‘condition in the present life is the result of past 
conduct’, the karmic rewards of one’s actions are not necessarily set at birth (Vickery, 1984: 5) 
suggests that the traditional social structure may be particularly malleable to the influence of 
modernity and the cash economy. 
As such, economic development, especially where it occurs with the rapidity evidenced in the 
Cambodian case, ‘involves a broadly based transformation of economic and social institutions…in 
which shifting and emergent groups and coalitions contend for favourable economic positions in a 
changing and uncertain social order and in which the very nature and extent of development is an 
outcome of social and class contestation’ (Deyo, 2001: 259). Whether or not ‘claims [such as those 
made by Lim, 2007] that Cambodia has developed into a country of “insiders and outsiders” in which 
those who maintain “connections” (ksae) with powerful patrons are able to prevail over their 
neighbours’ (Hughes, 2001: 19) is open to debate, given that the relations currently in evidence are 
in fact ‘a long-standing feature of society’ (Hughes, 2001: 19). Nevertheless, though it may represent 
only a shift in emphasis, social change is once more apparent in the Kingdom.  
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What follows will seek to preliminarily interrogate the nature and extent of such change in Krang 
Youv commune, the rural area of Kandal province which was discussed with reference to the 
methodological issues it raised in chapter three. In doing so, it will build upon this historical account 
of the Cambodian socio-economy with an account of the study site’s own history and development, 
in order that the broader social changes outlined hitherto may be understood with the full benefit of 
local context. Further details of the study site’s social and economic endowments will follow in 
chapter five. 
 
4.3 Krang Youv: History and Contemporary Endowments 
Figure 4.2 Map of Cambodia (right) and Kandal province (left). Krang Youv commune is marked with a thick black square. 
(Source: VVOB Cambodia) 
 
Situated just within the Kandal side of the border with Takeo, about an hour and a half south of 
Phnom Penh by car, Krang Youv commune’s lengthy history has, until relatively recently, been one of 
peripheral isolation, with regular flooding necessitating travel by boat to the nearest market for 
much of the year. Until the construction of a tarmac road in 1990 signalled the beginning of an age 
of rapid change for the area, this remoteness was reflected in a largely rice based village economy, 
with the difficulty in reaching buyers or sellers with any regularity generally restricting villagers to 
the consumption of locally produced rice, fish, and small quantities of fruit (Focus Group, 16/08/12) 
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The first village on entering Krang Youv commune from the north is Ampil, a settlement which in 
many ways typifies the change and development experienced by the area in recent years. Now a 
medium sized village of approximately 320 households, Ampil previously comprised three hamlets, 
Ampil Kranhenh, Ampil Ama [Bluebottle Ampil tree], and Ampil Chongpoum [Village-end Ampil tree]. 
Whilst these have now been amalgamated into one administrative unit, each of the sub-sections 
continues to function independently to some extent, each visiting the pagoda separately during 
religious celebrations (Deputy Village Chief, 16/08/12). Furthermore, this social dislocation is 
reflected in a wide geographic dispersal, which the Village Chief has deemed so impractical in 
administrative terms that she has applied to the commune council to formally bisect the village in 
the near future.  
As shown in figure 4.2, this division is sufficiently important from a socio-economic perspective, that 
the two parts of the village have been categorically separated in forthcoming the analysis presented 
in chapters five to seven.  However, the division within this community (henceforth referred to as 
North and South Ampil) is relatively rare within Krang Youv more generally. The commune has a 
recognisably homogeneous history, although since its beginnings precede its oldest current 
inhabitant, neither the village chiefs, deputies, nor any of the elders are able to recall even a rough 
date for its emergence as a settlement. Nevertheless, they are aware that Ampil village, for example, 
‘was created a long time prior to [King] Sihanouk [crowned in 1941] – even before the French’ (Focus 
Group, 08/08/13) and that during this period the area was still ‘deep in the forest’ (Focus Group, 
08/08/13). In common with much of Cambodia, the local wat [pagoda] provided the only education 
for the vast majority of the commune’s history, until a school was constructed in 1993 (Focus Group, 
08/08/13). 
This school, named in common with over a third of all schools in Cambodia after Prime Minister Hun 
Sen (often in combination with his wife Bun Rany),  is situated almost directly in the centre of the 
Krang Youv study site shown in figure 4.2, below, and serves all three of three of the villages 
investigated herein. Moreover, the pagoda which,  as described by Ebihara (1968) and Vickery (1984) 
for instance, serve as important social hubs for clusters of proximate villages, is similarly located. It 
lies across the road from the school, just to the south of Ampil and Go villages and about a kilometre 
north of Jake village. As such, although this tri-village area extends nearly three kilometres from 
north to south, it shares a close communal history which extends to long before the advent of the 





Figure 4.3 Map of the study site in Krang Youv (Source: Google Earth, 2014) 
 
During this period, inhabitants of Krang Youv commune wishing to travel to the permanent market, 
in the small provincial town of Prey Touic which straddles national road number two would face a 
gruelling fifteen kilometre walk through paddy fields. Even during the dry season, this would usually 
take around five hours each way, a journey regularly undertaken by some older villagers who would 
‘get up and leave at 4am, arrive at Prey Touic at 9 o clock and then sell things at the market until the 
afternoon and come home’ (Sruen, 07/05/13). Even this difficult and time consuming access to the 
outside world was cut off in the wet season, however, when floods made the fields and paths 
impassable for months at a time. 
Nevertheless, given the small size of these settlements, and their general lack of economic 
diversification, a lack of market access was not the problem it would be today. Before French 
colonisation, each village possessed only about thirty or forty houses, home to ‘only a few people 
living far from the road and growing only rice’ (Focus Group, 09/05/13). Despite a reported complete 
absence of in or out migration (Focus Group, 09/05/13), the population of the area grew steadily 
over the subsequent century, reaching an estimated seventy households per village by the time of 
King Sihanouk’s accession. That period also saw the first small signs of modernisation, as some 
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villagers acquired bicycles and the first four or five inhabitants – specialist house builders, left for 
Phnom Penh in search of work (Focus Group, 09/05/13). 
Although subject to relatively limited upheaval during the DK period as a result of its poverty and 
isolation, Krang Youv was not immune to the mass movement of people that characterised the era. 
As the older villagers describe, ‘Pol Pot took the rich people from this village – people who had a rice 
milling machine or a speaker…[after which they]… don’t know where they went  and they never 
came back. [They] suspect that they died’ (Focus Group, 08/08/13). At around the same time, ‘some 
people from Prey Veng and Takeo’ were briefly housed in the village on route to other areas – 
residents of Ampil report this as the first notable in-migration of their history – houses and land 
were communalised and ‘big houses were broken down’ and replaced with smaller ones (Focus 
Group, 09/05/13). Furthermore, and of particular note herein, when the DK period drew to a close in 
1979-80, agricultural land was reallocated equally by the Vietnamese administration, with each 
person receiving 7 Are [a commonly  used land unit in Cambodia and other non-European 
Francophone countries, equating to 100m²]. 
Today, Krang Youv is characterised by high levels of migration, both to Thailand (although only four 
or five households have sent migrants internationally), and Phnom Penh. This labour movement is 
undertaken overwhelmingly by young people, with garment and construction work (attracting 
female and male migrants respectively) being the primary occupations taken up. According to the 
village chief of Ampil (29/04/13), migration of this type has not led to major wealth stratification, but 
rather ‘allows people to solve problems such as debt and illness’ (Ampil village chief, 29/04/13). The 
validity of this claim will be the subject of extensive investigation in the subsequent chapters. 
However, one position made especially clear by the Ampil Village Chief, and corroborated by the 
Krang Youv Commune Chief (15/08/13), is that debt is a rapidly worsening problem in the area, 
having arisen almost entirely since the construction of the road in 1993, before which ‘there was 
little’ (Ampil Village Chief, 29/04/13). They claim that this debt was accumulated primarily as a result 
of the cost of major social events, particularly weddings, and is generally owed to banks, rather than 
private moneylenders. Furthermore, they report a relatively high degree of inequality, describing a 
significant minority – nearly one sixth of the area – as ‘rich’ (Ampil Village Chief, 29/04/13), as a 
result of selling substantial landholdings during a period of rapidly rising prices. The remaining 
residents described as being divided equally between a ‘medium’ strata, whose income is derived 
partly from their own rice fields and partly from local and rural-urban migration; and a ‘poor’ strata 
who have little or no land and who subsist almost entirely on wage labour, proportions which will be 
scrutinized in detail hereafter. 
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Crucially for the purposes of this study, the area is also prone to drought and other ‘common’ 
livelihoods shocks such as floods and pests. These necessitates a range of community risk mitigation 
behaviours including, for example, mutual lending schemes and recourse to alternative income 
sources such as fisheries (Ampil Village Chief, 29/04/13). Furthermore, the presence of three lakes in 
the commune (see figure 5.1, below) results in sporadically consequent high water levels which 
frequently cut the area off from easy access to surrounding villages, thereby contributing to its 
historical isolation and agricultural self sufficiency. Although the construction of a road improved the 
situation, the severe flooding which ravaged much of the country in October of 2011 had a severe 
impact nonetheless, flooding parts of the area for long periods and seriously affecting local 
agriculture. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Contemporary Cambodia, and in particular the key themes under investigation: risk, inequality and 
social change, have been fundamentally shaped by two powerful historical forces: Buddhist systems 
of hierarchy and patronage; and the slow but inexorable process of economic “opening”, which has 
been a crucial factor in Cambodia’s rapid integration into the modern globalised economy, but which 
has been continually associated with widening inequality, urban-bias, and the ceding of executive 
agency to foreign powers, groups, and individuals.   
Inevitably, ‘such cultural heritage may handicap a nation state in the face of international 
competition...but though they are slow to change, even core beliefs are not immutable and culture 
constantly evolves to take account of new technologies and patterns of consumption’ (Fox, 2010: 
186). This has been the case in Cambodia, where a culture which developed an exceptionalist 
mindset during the Angkor period and the thousand Mayahana Buddhist years before (Deac, 2004), 
and whose ‘perennial and self-absorbed terms of reference [have] been part of its appeal to visitors 
and scholars for many years’ (Chandler, 2000: 247) has been called upon to endure successive 
external challenges for several centuries. 
Indeed, although Cambodia continues to be characterised by ‘an inward-looking family oriented 
conservatism’ which has been integral to its ‘surviving the impact of the past and the incursions of 
foreign powers and ideas’ (Chandler, 2000: 247), Khmer culture has been pragmatic and flexible in 
its pursuit of stability. Just as ‘French attempts to change [entrenched systems of patriarchy] only 
added sophistication to the old ways’ (Deac, 2004: 20), so ‘Pol Pot’s revolution failed in part because 
so many Cambodians, finding its premises painful and irrelevant, were unwilling or unable to carry it 
out’ (Chandler, 2000: 247). The extent to which Cambodia succeeds in facing the challenges of an 
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open economy, climate change and corruption in the 21st century will depend, similarly, on the 
nature of the response.  
Data and analysis pertaining to this reaction will be presented in the following three chapters, the 
first of which will concern the nature of migratory linkages as an embedded resource within the 
village socio-economy. Therein, the discussion will focus upon the relationship of these social 
linkages to strategies of resilience and risk mitigation, and the manner in which these co-exist with 
rural-urban migration as elements within the wider social structure of Krang Youv. Having 
established these linkages between migration, community and the environment, chapters six and 





















Function: Risk and Asset Distributions as Determinants of Social Structure                                        
As a low lying and predominantly flat rice growing nation, Cambodia is a country long equated with 
the mitigation and management of risk. Nevertheless, the recent climatic, political and economic 
events detailed in chapter four have placed new pressures on old systems of coping. Successive 
years of floods and droughts, alternating or in tandem, between 2000 and 2003 set the tone for the 
new millennium and more than a decade later this theme shows little sign of abating. Every year the 
nation’s crops are beset, to a greater or lesser extent, by an increasingly uncertain climate, so that 
rice farming has begun to resemble more of a rich man’s gamble than a poor man’s staple. Wide 
ranging marketising reforms, which have taken place almost in tandem with this environmental 
process, have long been claimed to hold respite. However, how exactly it is that Cambodians have 
“succeeded” in circumventing the difficulties in their traditional livelihoods is little known.  
Certainly, the “safety valves” of debt and migration are increasingly important means of mitigating 
environmental risk. There can be little doubt that climate pressures have contributed in part to the 
booming uptake of both. However, as this chapter will highlight, the relationship between pressure 
and response is not a direct one, but is mediated by the social relations in which those affected 
participate and vice versa. In response to various modalities of risk, linkages to patrons and peers are 
constructed or abandoned; and the prevalence of “traditional” modes of association such as 
informal loans and labour sharing rises and falls. In this way, the economic and natural environment 
shape patterns of association in Cambodia’s rural villages. 
As such, this chapter seeks to explore the linkages between the increasing environmental risk to 
which rural Cambodians are exposed and the form and functionality of the social systems which are 
enacted, increasingly, amidst an atmosphere of change, movement, and uncertain livelihoods. 
Herein, it will be argued that in light of a growing body of evidence concerning the vital role played 
by norms and networks in smoothing consumption in other parts of the world, a greater 
appreciation of their embeddedness within the physical environment is necessary. In order to lay the 
groundwork for the examination of inequality transportation and changing cultural norms which will 
constitute the themes of chapters six and seven respectively, what follows shall begin to delineate a 






5.1 Spatial Distributions of Assets and Liabilities 
5.1.1 Heterogeneity 
The prevailing narrative of risk in Cambodia is a story of homogeneity and rice. The very words for 
the countryside, srok srai [rice country]; and for rural people, neak srai [rice people], are indicative 
of a nation for whom paddy is not only the staple but the soul. As such, when questioned on the 
risks faced by the inhabitants of Krang Youv commune, the administrative chief of the area had no 
hesitation in responding .‘This year’, he continued, the people ‘met two main problems: mice and 
insects. 94% of people here are farmers’ (Commune Chief Interview, 15/08/13).  
This perspective is widespread to the point of cliché both within and outside the Kingdom. The 
image of Cambodia as a land characterised by unending paddy fields and villages of farmers to work 
them is a much loved one in Khmer culture, especially given its association with the glorious Angkor 
era (Chandler, 2000). Neither does the World Bank’s (2009) estimation that around 86% of the 
country depend primarily upon agriculture suggest that the official statistics on Krang Youv are 
incorrect. All signs, it seems, indicate sameness over difference. 
Nevertheless, if the prevailing wisdom ever told the whole story, population and economic growth, 
with their associated pushes and pulls away from a unitary household income, have played their part 
in dislocating this axiom from reality. On the basis of the quantitative livelihoods data collected 
during the course of this study, the following assessment, made by a man who, with land holdings of 
35 hectares, was by some distance the richest encountered in the study, represents a far more 
accurate picture than that provided by the commune chief. As he explained: 
‘In Krang Youv commune, there are sixteen villages, divided into four compass points. In the 
West part, most people depend on fishing. Here in the south, they depend on rice…Ampil is 
dominated by the market. Everybody is selling and trading things. The fishing part of the 
village is very poor. They rely on fishing and the rest of the time they just play cards (Pan 
Mon, 28/05/13). 
This neatly summarised distinction constitutes a useful approximate typology of Krang Youv. In 
reality, though, these groupings are neither static, nor mutually exclusive. The three primary income 
sources overlap and interact amongst themselves and numerous others to the extent that even 
within the study site itself they constitute a merely heuristic classification. What they serve to 
achieve is to highlight ‘the great variety of income, including fishing and other businesses as well’ 
(Pan Mon, 28/05/13) which exists even within relatively small geographic areas. 
In order to capture this diversity in as comprehensive a manner as possible, the sampling 
methodology employed herein has been adapted to reflect the situation discerned during the course 
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of early stage and preliminary research. These data, obtained from a combination of village officials, 
key informants and ordinary villagers suggested that, from a network perspective, village boundaries 
are of little value. Furthermore, they indicated that villagers’ conceptions of locality were similarly 
unaffected by administrative borders, with questioning regarding relative wealth and zones of 
poverty or affluence drawing inevitable references to a wider area than the village in question.  
As such, the initial single village sample frame was expanded upon in such a way as to include two 
other adjacent or nearby villages, comprising a “village system” across which networks extend and in 
relation to the whole of which respondents appear to compare themselves. Within this wider zone, 
three cross-cutting sub-locations were identified, via a succession of qualitative interviews, as 
distinct locales characterised by differing endowments and livelihoods. As shown in Figure 4.2, 
above, these were: North Ampil, described as poor and dependent on fishing; South Ampil and Go, 
described as being of average wealth and dominated by its market; and Jake, described as rich and 
successful in farming. 
Unlike the commune chief, then, villagers throughout the sample frame had little difficulty in 
offering an economically disaggregated picture of their local environment, albeit in a generalised 
manner. Furthermore, that the three sub-locations remain to some extent spatially and conceptually 
linked makes them an ideal environment to study the relationship between natural resources and 
social practice. In particular, this will facilitate the exploration of research questions one and two, 
which pertain respectively to the role of social networks in the migration process, and the role of risk 
and natural resources in generating and shaping these networks. Before seeking to explore these 
linkages, however, the following section shall outline, as fully as possible, the endowments of the 
research site, both as a whole and in terms of its three component locales.  
 
 
5.1.2 The Spatial Distribution of Income and Assets 
Taking the village system as a whole, mean landholdings appear to compare favourably with those of 
Cambodia in general. The average plot size of nearly 1.3 Ha per household would place its holders 
well out of reach of most poverty indices, even allowing, in many cases, for the stockpiling of an 
agricultural surplus to serve as insurance against climate shocks and the associated risk of crop 
failure. A closer investigation of the statistics involved, however, reveals not only a highly unequal 





       Table 5.1. Aggregate Land Area Statistics (own data). 
Aggregate Land Area Statistics 
Mean 1.286 Ha/ Household 
Median 0.5 Ha/ Household 
Mode 0 Ha/ Household 
Standard Deviation 3.1 
Range 35 Ha 
                                                  
Furthermore, when the differing patterns of landholding are understood in the context of their 
respective natural endowments, the picture becomes much clearer. The inhabitants of North Ampil 
are the closest of the three to the large lake towards the north of the study site and the only ones to 
be partially within its flood zone. Numerous informants during the course of the study reported 
frequent incidents of flooding of their house land in North Ampil, alongside associated dangers such 
as drowned livestock, snakes, or risk to infants and small children.  Furthermore, the ‘difficulty of 
travelling’ (Kim Long, 03/06/13) around these areas during floods is doubly problematic, as the 
inhabitants of more isolated parts of the village report a persistent difficulty in obtaining 
government disaster relief payments, as in the case of Sim, a fisherman from North Ampil, who 
noted that ‘nobody helps me when natural disasters happen because my house is at the edge of the 
village, so it is difficult to reach during a flood. They just help people on the higher ground [to the 
south] (Sun Lim, 17/06/13). 
                                                                     Figure 5.1 Mean Riceland Holdings by Location (own data) 
        
                                                                                
By contrast, South Ampil and Go is far enough away from the lake to avoid such dangers, but 
nevertheless close enough for some of its inhabitants to own land on its edge, which, though 
completely flooded during the wet season is nevertheless a superior source of dry season rice as a 
result of its proximity to the lake once the waters have receded. Jake Village, finally, located some 
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two kilometres south of South Ampil and Go is positioned equidistantly from a large lake to the east 
and a much smaller, sickle shaped lake to the West. This location, where ‘the land is high quality and 
goes for a better price’ (Jan Win Si, 24/05/13) is high enough so that crops are ‘damaged only a little’ 
(Net Mom, 28/06/13) during floods, making Jake Village an ideal area for paddy farming. 
Figure 5.2 Location of Land Owned by Residents of the Study Site (own data). 
 
Indeed, the issue of the practicality of access to farm land has emerged as a significant determinant 
of the locations in which the three study sites’ inhabitants farm, as well as, relatedly, one of the 
primary reasons, alongside severe or chronic income shocks, for land sale. Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in Figure 5.2, although all three locations demonstrate a strong covariance between 
the location of their household and their riceland, this constraint diminishes from North Ampil to 
South Ampil and Go, and then further, to Jake Village, the inhabitants of which possess riceland 
spread across an area several times larger than those of North Ampil. 
Although causality is difficult to determine, the data shown in table 5.2 suggest that this difference is 
may be related to the greater number of households possessing means of transportation in the 
more southern locations. The extent to which this increased sphere of practical farming constitutes a 
tangible benefit to those who possess it will be discussed in the following subsection. Currently, 
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though, it is sufficient to note that it co-varies with all other major indicators of wealth, including 
material assets, productive assets, and yearly wedding attendance expenditure, as well as total 
aggregated yearly income. 
       Table 5.2. Mean Assets and Income Disaggregated by Location (own data) 
Mean Assets and Income Disaggregated by Location 
Location Bicycles Motorbikes Televisions Total Livestock Value Total Income 
North Ampil 0.23 0.08 0.38 $311 $1368/annum 
South Ampil and Go 0.62 0.57 0.86 $836 $2858/annum 
Jake 1.2 1.27 0.93 $1994 $10958/annum 
 
Thus, as the preceding statistics demonstrate, many of the assets surveyed are characterised by a 
robust covariance, both to each other and to geographic location. Aggregated income (shown here 
in Cambodia’s second official currency, US dollars, which, although generally used less extensively 
than Khmer Riel in the countryside, are nevertheless habitually used to refer to amounts more than 
1 -2 million Riel [$250-500]) is generally higher towards the south, as are the numbers of all major 
asset classes. More southern villagers both consume more – both in terms of wedding spend and 
other consumptive assets such as televisions, radios, speakers and stereos – and hold a greater 
number of productive assets  - whether viewed as land, livestock, farming machinery or any 
combination thereof.  
Furthermore, those with rice land obtain a higher yield in terms of kilograms per hectare towards 
the south, although it is not clear whether this is due to the limited farming which can be achieved in 
the more flood prone areas of the north, the economies of scale available to villagers possessing a 
greater amount of land, the higher quality of farming inputs available to those with a higher income, 
or the higher levels of agricultural knowledge possessed by farmers in Jake Village, as indicated by a 
number of informants having received visits from agricultural NGOs to train them in improved 
farming methods. It appears most likely that the truth is a combination of all of these factors, 
although it is worthy of note that this superiority is a known source of self-congratulation in Jake 
Village, as articulated by one such villager: 
‘This village is the best part of the commune because people take farming seriously. In other 
parts they get loans, but just spend them on buying other things. Here they buy [hand] 
tractors – even widows, who can’t operate a tractor, have one. In other places, they just sit 
around and drink and play cards’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13). 
As such, the indicators outlined above, which constitute many of the most common measures of 
wealth and poverty in Global Southern locales such as Cambodia (Scoones, 1995), appear to bear out 
the view, earlier expounded by Pan Mon and supported by the village chief of Ampil, that it is 
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‘especially the fishermen’ (29/04/13) who constitute the most deprived group in the study area. 
Viewed in terms of income and assets, then, a picture has emerged of a linear progression of 
physical and economic capital from north to south. Via an analysis of liabilities, focussing on risk and 
debt, what follows will seek to demonstrate how such an approach is a necessary, but insufficient 
means of conceptualising the different socio-economies under investigation. 
5.1.3 Liabilities and Environmental Risk 
As noted recently by Bylander (2013), after a decade of destabilising vulnerability to natural 
disasters (Oeur et al., 2012; Davies, 2010) and miraculous growth (World Bank, 2012), the kingdom 
presents a unique opportunity ‘to study questions of the impact of the environment on migration’ 
(Bylander, 2013: 3). The contemporary vulnerability of Cambodian agriculture and fisheries has 
forced those who depend on them to think more than ever about risk, and to quicken the pace at 
which they conceive of and operationalise alternatives. Though always woven into the fabric of 
Khmer society, risk has now risen to even greater prominence as a motivator of social action and 
livelihoods decisions (Bylander, 2013). 
In this regard, certain years emerge from the data as having been particularly disaster prone. As 
demonstrated in Figure 5.3, the most severe of these was the nationwide flood (and in some cases 
subsequent drought) of 1993. After this, the years 2011 and 2012, wherein widespread drought and 
flood respectively destroyed a significant proportion of the harvest and reduced yields elsewhere, 
emerge as having been notably problematic from an agricultural perspective. Furthermore, these 
dates display some similarity to nationwide statistics on displacement and damage due to natural 











     Figure 5.3 Annual percentage of respondents suffering crop loss due to natural disasters (own data) 
         
Nevertheless, to view severe income shocks such as these in a homogenous manner is to elide a 
great deal of the subtlety of their incidence. Although certain years stand out as particularly difficult, 
it is worthy of note that even in 1993, a  time still spoken about as an environmental nadir across the 
community, less than a fifth of all respondents reported having suffered lost income, or damage to 
their homes or property. Similarly, during the severe nationwide climate events of 2000 and 2003, 
highlighted by Oeur et al. (2011) as some of the most powerful of the successive waves of climate 
shocks suffered by Cambodians since the turn of the new millennium, less than ten percent of those 
surveyed complained of having personally suffered. 
This is not to suggest, though, that Krang Youv commune, or any part of Cambodia, is insulated from 
such events. Indeed, more general questions and in depth conversations reveal a full appreciation of 
the scale and regularity with which the climate imperils the livelihoods of fellow villagers. Rather, it 
is to emphasize that ‘deprivation’, whether deriving from a lack of assets or their vulnerability, ‘is not 
a uniform process’ (Bryant, 1998: 85) and therefore that shocks such as these are individualised, 
rather than aggregate phenomena. Due to the location of their land, the type of farming they 
undertook, or the extent to which they possessed the means to compensate themselves for lack of 
income, neighbours living side by side may highlight entirely different years as the low points of their 
climate memory.  
The type of recall based methodology employed to gather this information carries inevitable pitfalls. 
However, as noted in chapter three, significant efforts were made to supersede these inaccuracies. 
For instance, discussing climate events in temporal relation to national elections and significant 
village events, such as road construction, was found to be an effective way of improving accuracy. 
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Furthermore, triangulation with migrants’ accounts of these events gleaned largely corroborative 
results, suggesting that the trends observed in these data are valid ones. 
These data are presented in Figure 5.4, which collates data concerning the climate shocks 
respondents have experienced and the extent of their losses at those times. The percentage of their 
crop lost on each occasion has been aggregated to generate a lifetime cumulative crop loss figure 
designed to reflect their long term vulnerability to shocks. The mean cumulative crop loss figure for 
each location is shown by the heavy black line on each boxplot, the box itself shows the middle fifty 
percent of data and the whiskers denote the range (excluding outliers). 
As such, figure 5.4. shows that the three subsectors of the research site demonstrate notably 
different histories of crop loss in response to climate shocks. For instance, the poorer, fisheries 
dominated area of Northern Ampil report a historical loss of around four times less than the richer, 
high capital rice farmers of the north. Given that these loss figures correlate significantly with 
riceland area (Spearman’s = 0.357, p = 0.000), this is likely to be reflective, in large part, of the 
differing income distributions in the three sites. By extension, the nature of the methodology 
employed to collect the data, which asked questions related to environmental shocks, rather than 
chronic pressures or other types of shock, such as those connected to health, have likely contributed 
to the predominance of farming-related income shocks in the data.  
                                                 Figure 5.4 Mean cumulative percentage crop loss disaggregated by location (own data) 
 
With this in mind, the graphic is indicative of two things: First, that rice farming constitutes a high 
risk income source and second, that high risk does not equate to low income. Rather, as argued by 
Scott (esp. 1976), not only does a more compelling case exist for the obverse, but, furthermore, for a 
conscious obverse, wherein ‘individuals make risk averse decisions because of their uncertain and 
precarious economic situations’ (Henrich and McElreith, 2002: 1).  
Certainly, for many farmers, there exists a degree of consciousness that the unpredictability of the 
climate makes rice farming, in particular, something of a personal lottery. It is not, for instance, a 
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given that rice crops are destroyed by floods – some seed types are suited to high water levels – 
whereas, for those with land next to large water sources a drought may represent a welcome period 
of security from flooding. What is necessary is either a correct anticipation of the conditions, a 
portfolio of land which spans more than one agro-ecological zone, or both where possible. Even for 
the better off, however, this can prove to be problematic, as highlighted by one wealthy farmer: 
‘We have to be patient doing rice. Sometimes you make a profit, sometimes you make a 
loss. For instance, last time we expected the water level to be lower so we planted rice 
designed for that, but in fact it was very high so we lost a lot. A previous time, the opposite 
happened, compounded by a mouse problem (Pan Mon, 28/05/13) 
Furthermore, this unpredictability of the conditions upon which Cambodian agriculture depends has 
a corollary in the creeping diminution in the quality of fisheries in the area. As two fisherman 
independently reported, ‘the quantity of fish is getting lower and lower…and also it is getting hotter 
and hotter, making the water levels low’ (Yan Yin, 22/04/13). This has already resulted in ‘there 
[being] fewer and fewer fish to catch’ (Chuen, 08/04/13). However, as a neighbouring fisherman 
noted, the key issues faced by those involved in local fisheries have begun to compound each other, 
putting increasing pressure on fish stocks and forcing many to ‘use illegal equipment which kills all 
the fish’ (Run Tooks, 16/06/13). 
He refers, in particular, to the masin chut, a jerry rigged device comprising a plastic fishing rod tied 
to a basket and hooked up to a car battery. From the tip of the rod, two small, stiff, wires extend a 
few centimetres apart which, when touched upon the surface of the water, discharge a current 
strong enough to electrocute any fish within a radius of a few feet. Compared with traditional fishing 
methods, which require not only a far greater level of skill, but also considerable time and energy, 
the yields are enticingly high. Some fishermen and their wives (who sell any surplus fish either at 
market or to middlemen but never fish themselves) reported a yield of roughly double the average 
obtainable without the device, although even this may be an underestimate according to data from 
Battambang province, in the Northwest of Cambodia, which suggests improvements of up to five 
times may be commonplace (Kurien, 2007). 
Although such practices are illegal throughout Cambodia, whether they are making the difference 
between 10, 000 ($2.50) and 20, 000 riel ($5.00) per day, or 8,000 ($2.00) and 40,000 ($10.00), the 
incentive to circumvent such legal prohibition is evident. Furthermore, as Werthmann (2007) notes, 
the structure by which state legislation on fisheries is implemented tends to limit its efficiency. As he 
goes on to explain: 
‘The Commune Fishery Office and the police are responsible for monitoring, exposing and 
fining the use of illegal fishing gears. Thus, the village head does not have the legal right to 
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fine the offenders, but he reports his observations to the commune head and the police. 
Because of the size of the water resource, offenders are seldom caught’ (Werthmann, 2007: 
5) 
 
In addition to such bureaucratic shortcomings, the simple fact that the fishermen of north Ampil and 
their wives are removed by some distance and well out of sight of the village chief, who lives around 
200 metres south next to the main road through Ampil, may have contributed to a situation in which 
illegal fishing equipment is paraded with both ubiquity and apparent impunity. Whilst the ecological 
cost of such practices have yet to be accurately ascertained in Cambodia, it seems clear from the 
qualitative data that they are blamed by fisherman for putting further pressure on their rapidly 
deteriorating livelihoods.  
Given, though, that those involved in fishing tend to have amongst the least assets available with 
which to move away from the use of deteriorating water resources – and in most cases also lack the 
money and social connections to migrate – the fishermen of Ampil village are left only with the 
choice between accruing formal debt for consumption, or, at an investment cost of only $30 - 40 
(Kurien, 2007), the masin chut, and the short term prospect of a better life it offers. One villager, 
who charges the batteries used by the fisherman for a fee, explained that those involved in the 
practice have no other choice: 
‘These batteries are for electrocuting mice, which are a major pest in the fields, but people 
also use them for fishing. Most of the people who use them to catch fish are poor people. 
The authorities have banned this [practice], but they continue because if they don’t do it 
they will have nothing to eat’ (Bo Simlai, 14/06/13). 
Within the same village, then, and even more so within the broader area of the “village system” 
which constitutes the study site as a whole, different households experience the environment, and 
the difficulties and rewards it brings, in radically different ways. Although aggregate data on natural 
disaster losses is on some levels instructive, it does little to highlight the manner in which the same 
event may result in a web of cross-tessellating outcomes, as livelihoods are threatened, boosted, or 
shifted in response to the changing base of assets and liabilities. Under certain conditions a drought, 
the bane of many farmers, may be a welcome boon for fishermen, as fish are – they argue – drawn 
closer together by the lower water levels. Similarly, whilst a flood might impact most visibly upon 
the day to day livelihoods of the poorest, who are likely to reside in areas least protected from the 
elements, it may in fact have the greatest long term impact on medium, or richer individuals, who, 
as a result of their particular asset endowments, are more exposed to its effects in terms of income. 
In his longitudinal analysis of a North-eastern Thai village over more than a quarter of a century, Rigg 
(2012) provides compelling evidence for this perspective. Specifically, he demonstrates that the 
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distribution of wealth in his site has been subject to such a significant “churning” effect that less 
than a handful have retained a place within the same quartile of village wealth between the study 
periods. Whilst some of this effect is attributed to structural factors such as the demographic 
dependency ratio of working ages adults to family members too young or old to work, a greater 
proportion is found to have resulted from ‘idiosyncratic’ (Rigg, 2012: 135) events, including climate 
shocks, natural disasters, and illness.   
 
To a certain extent, however, any such medium to long term downturns in fortunes are likely to have 
been masked in Cambodia by the increasingly pervasive presence of household debt, which has 
resulted, in part, from the proliferation of microfinance organisations during the previous two 
decades. Especially for those households possessing larger landholdings, and thus a higher level of 
collateral, the availability of credit constitutes a means of mitigating or avoiding the effects of 
potentially chronic livelihoods shocks. For those less well endowed in this respect, alternative 
strategies – such as migration or informal loans – may be necessary, so that the distribution and type 
of credit utilised throughout the study site constitutes a structural backdrop to the social and risk 
environments therein. In furthering this Ph.D.’s concern with linking the social, economic and 
environmental spheres, what follows shall begin to delineate the nature of debt in Krang Youv. 
 
5.1.4 The Geography of Debt 
Although not initially selected as one of the primary areas of investigation herein, the role of debt in 
village life has emerged, during the course of the study, as one of the key features of the socio-
economic environment. Indeed, although questions pertaining to debt were included in the primary 
quantitative survey, the collection of data is not an essential precursor to an appreciation of the 
scale of the issue in Cambodia. Gleaming, air conditioned credit offices flank dusty rural roads at 
regular intervals in Kandal province. Even within the villages themselves, until relatively recently 
isolated even from the nearest market for half the year due to annual floods, young men in 
immaculately fitted white shirts are frequently to be seen riding their company scooters between 
various appointments to collect, sell, or advertise debt. 
In total, thirteen sources of credit were identified over the three sites, of which ten were MFIs. 
Indeed, although it was recorded as taking place, large-scale private lending appears, as noted 
below, to have declined rapidly and markedly as a result of the competition presented by MFIs, in 
particular, as does the tontin – a traditional system of credit saving practised in both rural and urban 
areas, as well as some migrant enclaves (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014). Therein, members 
contribute to a pot every month and draw lots to decide who may use the money each month ‘for 
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farming activities’ and ‘at a lower interest rate than the other banks’ (Chooen Moon, 29/05/13). As 
one such user related: 
‘It is a ten person savings group into which everybody pays 2000 riel per month. I don’t 
remember very well, but some time ago I borrowed 400,000 riel [$100] as part of a group of 
five people. It was repaid over four months and the interest was 10,000 riel [$2.50]’ (Ton 
Truen Savoon, 13/06/13). 
By some distance the largest single lender, however, was the emergent Cambodian financial 
behemoth ACLEDA, to whom 27 of the 60 debt holding households (from 72 surveyed in total) 
currently owed money. Unlike the majority of the other credit sources noted within the survey sites, 
ACLEDA   is now a for-profit banking institution, following a ten year commercialisation process 
begun in 1998 and modelled on the success of Bolivia’s BancoSol (Phalla, 2004). The upper limit of 
loans from ACLEDA is much higher than those available via microfinance, making it a popular choice 
for those looking to ‘invest in rice farming’ (Chuen Hing, 06/05/13) in a profitable manner, or to 
move into an alternative business such as ‘becoming a mushroom middleman’ (Sirun Ji, 06/06/13).  
Although its uptake was wide, however, informants at every scale would highlight the corrosive 
effect of debt on the livelihoods of those living within the commune, bemoaning the extent to which 
the availability of credit had proved deleterious to the poorest people in the commune so quickly 
since its emergence roughly ten years previously. However, as Dr. Karin Schelzig, Senior Sector 
Specialist of the Asia Development Bank’s Cambodia branch highlighted, the issue may be masking 
not only itself, but a host of other unresolved issues related to poverty and livelihoods. As she 
argued: 
‘[Cambodian] people end up to their eyeballs in debt, taking out more and more loans to 
survive climate shocks. In all poverty figures, poverty has plummeted over the last few years, 
from around half the population to 20%. Even at the height of various [economic and 
environmental] crises, the government are explaining it as deriving from rising rice prices, but 
what about those who are net consumers of rice? Nearly half of the bottom income quintile 
have outstanding debt and a large proportion say that this is for household consumption. 
People are smoothing their consumption with debt’ (Karin Schelzig, 15/08/13) 
This perspective was echoed, with a high degree of accuracy, by numerous informants within the 
research site, wherein it was a common pronouncement that ‘many people borrow from banks and 
microfinance organisations, but the people never escape their debt, even if they go abroad to try to 
earn something to send back’ (Focus Group, 09/05/13). Even more damningly, the village chief of 
Ampil sought to highlight the long term danger of easy credit availability for those with the least 
assets. As she stated, ‘previously [the poor] did not borrow from banks because there were no banks 
to borrow from. According to government policy, such banks should be helping to reduce poverty, 
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but in fact they are making people poorer and poorer. They eat today, but they get poorer and 
poorer in the future’ (Truen Ngum, Ampil Village Chief, 29/04/13) 
Furthermore, as in many parts of the developing world (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Pretty and 
Ward, 2001), formal borrowing such as this tells only part of the story of credit in Krang Youv. 
Although only a handful of respondents reported having taken out a large, or semi-formal, loan with 
an individual moneylender, over half of respondents stated their involvement in ad hoc systems of 
informal credit with either their friends, neighbours, or both. The values and durations of these 
lending arrangements, disaggregated by sub-location, are shown in table 5.3.  
The data therein demonstrate two things: First, both the volume of money exchanged in informal 
flows and the number of aggregated borrowing and lending “events” co-vary with the uneven North-
South distribution of asset and income values observed elsewhere. Second, the ratio of borrowing to 
lending changes in the same manner. In the poorer North, for instance, reported borrowing 
considerably outstrips reported lending, a possible explanation for which is that its inhabitants 
borrow outside the close networks upon which these data are focussed. Conversely, in the richer 
Jake village, lending slightly outstrips borrowing, suggesting that its villagers may lend outside their 
close networks in addition to within them.   
Although the scale and duration of such lending, usually ‘just for three to five days during the 
farming season’ (Soon Lom, 15/05/13), is small compared to that which takes place between 
individuals and institutions, it nevertheless appears to serve a vital role both in terms of smoothing 
consumption and the timely purchase of production inputs, such as ‘fertiliser and fuel for the 
pumping machine’ (Wun Tee, 03/06/13). Moreover, on the evidence of this study, it appears to be a 
genuinely reciprocal process, associated with no interest charges even where – as in North Ampil – 
the volume of borrowing considerably outstrips that of lending.  
                                                Table 5.3. Informal Lending Patterns Disaggregated by Location (own data). 
Location North Ampil South Ampil and Go Jake 
Mean Frequency of Lending/ Year 
per household 
2.32 4.88 6.66 
Mean Frequency of Borrowing/ Year 
per household 
7.06 5.62 6.02 
Mean Total Transactions/ Year per 
household 
9.38 10.5 12.68 
Mean Value Lent/ Year per 
household 
$12 $113 $109 
Mean Value Borrowed/ Year per 
household 




Debt is not, furthermore, the only form of widespread reciprocity in Krang Youv. Additional evidence 
for the prevalence of informal cooperation is provided by the significant proportion of informants 
regularly (i.e., on at least a yearly basis) engaged in traditional labour sharing, or provas dei [lit.: lend 
a hand]. Over half of all respondents indicated that they did so, many ‘every year’ (Wun Tee, 
03/06/13), a figure rising to sixty percent amongst those possessing at least 0.1 Ha of land. Although 
the minutiae of provas dei vary according to the case in question, from ‘helping each other to 
transplant and harvest rice’ (Jan Suen, 08/05/13) to ‘land preparation’ (Song Lyn, 09/05/13), or 
‘pulling each others boats when their engines break’ (Yan Yin, 22/04/13), the free exchange of equal 
amounts of assistance during busy periods is its undergirding principle. 
 
          Figure 5.5 Percentage Doing Labour Sharing by Location                      Figure 5.6 Mean Yearly Income by Location 
           
          
 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in figures 5.5 and 5.6, the uptake of provas dei varies greatly 
according to location and, on a community basis at least, appears to be loosely covariant with wealth 
viewed in terms of gross yearly income. However, the above figures (5.6 and 5.7) are misleading. It is 
not in fact wealth, in the sense of income or assets, which drives the locational differences in 
productive social behaviour such as interest free informal lending and labour sharing, but land, risk, 
and a variety of other such environmental risk. What follows shall examine the extent to which the 





5.2 Socio-Physical Linkages 
5.2.1 Social Capital or Risk Response? 
At a somewhat simplistic level, the results outlined thus far appear well suited to the support of an 
orthodox, Putnamian, social capital argument, wherein the volume of social interaction, viewed as a 
quantitative abstraction based upon various simple indicators, constitutes a major determinant of 
the “wealth” of a given community (e.g. Putnam, 2000). Indeed, both of the key measures of social 
interaction explored thus far, provas dei and informal loan provision, behave in a sufficiently similar 
way as to support their amalgamation into a variable denoting “positive” social activity of the sort 
utilised throughout the social capital literature. 
Nevertheless, such unexamined functionalist thinking is one of social capital’s theory’s weakest 
characteristics (e.g. Fine, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2010; Fischer, 2005). Performing a similar function, 
especially when this function is as nebulous as “positivity” or “benefit” should not, of itself, 
constitute the basis of a category. As such, recent work conducted within the field of social capital 
has seen a process of ‘opening up and broadening out’ (Franklin, Holland and Edwards, 2012: 5) the 
investigation of phenomena previously ‘squeezed under [a] single rubric’ (Fischer, 2005: 4).  
In this regard, once people’s interactions have been typologically disentangled from what good they 
bring, they become open to analysis in terms of why they are done, a conceptual adjustment which 
serves to avoid many of the pitfalls of the Putnamian “broad functionalist” (Bjornskov and 
Sonderskov, 2010) approach to social capital. Thus, by utilising a narrower, more specific mode of 
analysis, social action may be viewed in terms of what it is intended to do, and what it may be a 
reaction to, so that the assumptions of perfect functionality carried forward from Parsonian 
Structural Functionalism may be avoided. Otherwise put, just as an investigation of dating behaviour 
which examined only those dates ending in marriage would miss much, so too does any enquiry into 
social practice which fails to examine reactive motivations and unintended or not specifically 
functional consequences. 
The functionality of provas dei is one such narrow theme. Even when controlling for rice land area, 
which, as noted above, is significantly linked to a household’s exposure to natural disasters, the data 
also show a notable correlation between the cumulative percentage crop loss statistic and the 
incidence of provas dei labour sharing. Using a cumulative percentage crop loss measure derived 
from the summation of all reported percentage losses incurred during the informant’s working life, 
the following graphic (Figure 5.7) highlights the roughly fifty percent difference in cumulative losses 
between those who engage in labour sharing and those who don’t.   
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Figure 5.7 Disaster loss compared with provas dei uptake (own data) 
                           
 
This cumulative crop loss statistic, like the disaster timeline above, is built from reported data on the 
three worst crop losses suffered during informants’ lifetimes and as such should be considered with 
a degree of care. However, it requires note that the figures were obtained via extended discussions 
of informant livelihoods and structured around events such as the acquisition of pumps, wells or 
new land. These background data permit a greater degree of confidence than might otherwise be 
appropriate were the figures otherwise obtained, so that broad and clear co-variances, such as that 
shown in figure 5.7 are, it is held here, valid for their intended purpose.   
Moreover, although the statistical evidence of figure 5.7 alone cannot indicate causation, the 
qualitative data suggest that the extent to which mitigate crop may be mitigated by social activity is 
generally rather limited. Informant interviews indicate that any diminution in the effect of climate 
shocks is likely to be more a function of the location of a farmer’s land, in terms of elevation and 
proximity to a reliable water source, than to the success or otherwise of preventative action. 
Consequently, respondents’ participation in these sorts of mutual assistance groups may be 
hypothesised as being, at least over the long term, a reaction to their mutual perception of risk.  
Indeed, the mutuality of these groupings is significant. They are viewed as an efficient mode of 
working and take many forms, including the sharing of agricultural machinery amongst wealthier 
farmers, rather than anything resembling assistance. When asked about their experience of people 
“helping” each other either in the wake of disasters or at any other time, almost nobody interviewed 
reported having been aided by their friends or neighbours to a significant degree. Instead, a 
frequent refrain noted that although ‘the CPP [Cambodian People’s Party] gave me around 20-30kg 
of rice and 20 -30kg of rice seeds…there was no help from my neighbours. They never help [in this 
way]’ (Gaw Wi, 18/04/13).  
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Notably this stated lack of assistance is not generally associated with an unwillingness to help, but is 
driven by the narrative that ‘everybody suffers the same’ (Pan Yuen, 30/04/13) during severe 
climate events so that people ‘mostly…need to help themselves’ (Yan Yin, 22/04/13). More than one 
informant stated, for instance that ‘I can’t remember when the worst disasters were, but if you ask 
my neighbours I will say oh yes! The same for me’ (Net Took, 18/06/13). Even some landless villagers 
stated an affinity with the problems of the landowning farmers, noting that ‘there is less farming 
work around for us’ even though ‘it is less trouble than for the landholders’ (Pan Yuen, 30/04/13).  
The quantitative data collected on natural disasters and crop loss, however (as presented in table 
5.4), suggest that the nature of their experience is anything but homogeneous. Moreover, numerous 
farmers stated that they ‘have never suffered a natural disaster’ (Yen Mom, 29/04/13), either 
because their ‘land is amongst the highest in the village’ (Wun Tee, 03/06/13), or ‘there is a well 
close by’ (Wun Tee, 03/06/13). As a result of these and other factors, the total proportion of 
harvests lost during severe climate shocks varies enormously between households.  Much like the 
myth of Cambodia as a land of unending rice fields, then, this appears to be a community narrative 
with limited basis in reality. 
Nevertheless, it is representative of a general lack of organised community action. During the course 
of the study, only a handful of examples of active communal measures aimed at mitigating the 
impact of natural disasters were uncovered. One such example was the erecting of sand bags in 
anticipation of a flood, which ‘all of the local houses did together’ (Truen Ngum, 29/04/13). This was 
a rare exception, however. More commonly, when community initiatives did take place, they took 
the form of post-hoc responses to individual misfortunes, usually in the form of fundraising for 
bereaved families.   
For instance, at the village chief’s behest, several members of the community contributed money to 
assist the family of a child ‘who died when his house collapsed in a storm and he couldn’t escape 
(Yan Yin, 22/04/13). This type of community response was also mentioned by the commune chief, 
who referred to a recent occasion when ‘the whole village raised 3 million riel [$750]’ to help the 
widow of ‘a man who was killed in a traffic accident’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13).  
Although other villagers have confirmed that these events did take place in some form, that both of 
these stories originated from village officials, in whose interest it is to describe a strong and mutually 
supportive community is a necessary caveat even to this limited evidence of community action. 
Furthermore, in more than one case an opposite view was advanced, wherein rather than facilitating 
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community wide assistance, village officials, consciously or unconsciously, constrained the flow of 
assistance to within their own networks. As one villager stated:  
‘There are organisations who can help the very poor people, however, when they ask the 
village chief to find the poorer people, she selects them based on their ability to pay for the 
selection’ (Yen Tac, 25/04/13)  
Similarly, following a severe flood the previous year: 
‘In this village, there was some assistance from Mr. Hun Sen [it is commonplace in Cambodia 
to personify government payments and aid in this way], but I didn’t receive any help. I don’t 
know why. Maybe they didn’t know that I had problems. Probably the people who received 
help were very close to the village chief, so that he knew about their problems’ (Ton Truen 
Savooen, 07/06/13) 
As such, the evidence suggests that any concerted community-wide action is not sufficient to 
significantly mitigate the effects of climate shocks, leaving villagers to rely on reactive and 
prophylactic action at the level of small groups. Crucially, this conceptual position departs from that 
offered by social capital in that it views social action as being generated by external events, as 
opposed to the implicit autopoiesis which characterises much work conducted under the banner of 
that doctrine. Furthermore, from a social capital perspective, why those affected by natural disasters 
may wish to engage more readily in mutual labour sharing is unclear given that involvement in 
agricultural labour sharing arrangements fails to correlate significantly with any indicators of wealth, 
either in terms of income, or productive or consumptive assets. 
Viewed through an alternative lens, however, the phenomenon has been noted, and explanations 
proffered, by a number of authors elsewhere (i.e. Okamoto, 2011; Scott, 1972, 1985; Brocheaux, 
1983; Platteau, 1995; Fafchamps, 2005; 1992; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). What these studies 
suggest is that the uncertainty of the natural environment encourages the generation of informal 
sharing arrangements involving various types of resources and, as noted by Bankoff (2007), that 
these arrangements may change or become apparent only sporadically in response to certain 
events. The correlation between disaster loss and provas dei uptake (Spearman’s = 0.319, p = 0.017), 
shown also in Figure 5.7, is supportive of this argument. 
As such, a convincing case may be made that the uncertain nature of income and expenditure which 
characterises rural livelihoods in Cambodia renders informal modes of cooperation characterised by 
flexible reciprocity and indeterminate timeframes, such as provas dei, particularly attractive.  
However, there is a wider significance here in that the evidence for this type of preferential 
behaviour may extend beyond the covariance of informal lending and borrowing into other social 
practices with ostensibly little relation to farming. 
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Indeed, as regards the role of risk in shaping the social structure of Cambodian communities, the 
nature of participation in wedding celebrations is particularly instructive. It is, for instance, common 
practice for wedding guests to present their hosts with a variable sum of money upon their 
attendance, amounting, in this study, to a median “gift” of $10 per household. This money is 
outwardly intended merely to cover the cost of the wedding, which in both rural and urban areas 
can be considerable and even for poorer households usually constitutes the hire of a sound system 
(or a live band for the better off), marquee, numerous costumes for both bride and groom, and food 
and drink for all invitees. From an alternative perspective, however, the reciprocity and variance in 
the size of these payments may potentially be indicative of a more complex social function. 
Indeed, with regard, first, to reciprocity, numerous respondents noted that the amount they were 
expected to pay for their attendance included a strong element in this regard, as exemplified by 
several villagers bemoaning that ‘at the moment, the cost of going to weddings is higher because I 
have to repay those people who attended my childrens’ weddings’ (Li Li, 27/04/13). Similarly, a 
landless widow reported regular payments of up to $20 per wedding, far higher than the usual. She 
explained that this was ‘to pay back the other people who came to my weddings and paid me then’ 
(San Tai, 05/06/13). 
San Tai’s participation in this process of reciprocity is part of a Khmer tradition wherein, as a 
research assistant explained, ‘people must repay slightly more than they received’ at their children’s 
weddings (Long, 19/06/13). When combined with a third informant’s suggestion that ‘nowadays I 
don’t really get invited to any weddings because all of my children are already married’, a picture 
emerges of wedding attendance as reciprocal social action, characterised by implicit agreements 
over indeterminate timeframes.  
Despite being an unavoidable and highly ostentatious part of both rural and urban life in Cambodia, 
though, there exists little literature, beyond Ebihara’s classic study (1968), concerning the role 
played by wedding celebrations in Khmer society. To some extent, this may simply be due to the 
apparent self evidence of the social function sought by the holders of wedding parties: the 
demonstration of wealth. A family’s economic standing is denoted in every detail of a wedding 
ceremony, from the size of the tent (almost every wedding, and also funeral, is held in a temporary 
marquee), to a hierarchically ordered scale of alcoholic spirits, to the visibility and prominence of 
location, which must be “purchased” via relatively standardized payments to police. Furthermore, 
the inevitable corollary to this is that wedding attendance is also a subject of boasting amongst 
richer farmers, who like to claim that they are ‘invited to every event in the village’ (Soravanna, 
27/04/13). Another large landowner proclaimed that: 
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‘I go to weddings very often, so I spend over a thousand dollars a year just on weddings. 
[During the wedding season] I go to a wedding at least once a day. Sometimes two or three 
times a day. (Pan Nol, 04/05/13). 
Nevertheless, as highlighted in table 5.4, a closer examination reveals that it is the poorer and the 
poorest residents of Krang Youv who are most financially committed to engagement in rural social 
life. The data therein show that although mean wedding spend increases considerably with income, 
it does not remain proportionally the same. Although the inhabitants of Jake village reported 
spending larger gross sums, their much greater average income means that in proportional terms 
they spend just over a third of that reported in North Ampil, and South Ampil and Go, who report an 
expenditure of over a quarter of gross income on wedding donations. This was further reflected in 
statements of North Ampil residents, one of whom noted that ‘I spend a lot on both [weddings and 
ceremonies]. More than I spend on my house!’ (Ban Korn, 23/04/13). 
 
                                                          Table 5.4. Wedding spend disaggregated by location (own data). 
Percentage of Total Income Spent on Weddings 
Entire Site North Ampil South Ampil and Go Jake Village  
22 % 28% 27% 10% 
$11.10 per wedding $9.20 per wedding $11.75 per wedding $12.48 per wedding 
 
It would be wrong, however, to denote these costs purely as expenses. The gifts given to a couple’s 
family by their wedding guests are presented in named envelopes and recorded in a ledger so that 
the same amount may be returned when it is the giver’s turn to host. In this light, informal 
reciprocity involved in the provision of wedding gifts may, as suggested above in relation to the 
practice of provas dei, constitute a means of long term risk pooling. Even the poorest members of a 
community are likely to need to fund several weddings during their lifetimes. Under this scenario, 
the wedding “gifts” given at weddings may in fact be viewed by their givers as a means of ensuring 
that their own household will have the financial means to conduct the marriages of their own 
children regardless (or taking less consideration of) their individual circumstances at that point in the 
future. 
 
This blurring of the lines between productive and consumptive social relations has important 
implications for the way in which social systems are constructed. Just as investments in physical 
assets may have a number of separate or overlapping functions, being variously or potentially useful 
as, for instance, savings, consumption, or as an indicator or social status, so too does a “social 
investment” have the potential to fulfil a number of different overlapping and intersecting roles. In 
building upon this understanding and in furthering the core aims of this Ph.D., what follows shall 
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explore the potential of network mapping as an additional means of understanding the role played 
by the distribution of various assets in structuring Cambodian social life.   
 
 
5.2.3 Detecting Rural Hierarchies: Moving Beyond Assets as Measures of Patron-Client Relations 
 
Cambodian society, in common with much of Asia, has tended to be characterised as deeply 
hierarchical in nature. Just as Brocheaux (1983) refers to vast pyramidical structures of power 
relations stretching from the bottom to the top of Vietnamese society, so too do Vickery (1984) 
Hinton (1998a; 1998b), Ledgerwood and Vijghen (2002) amongst many other evoke images of 
implicitly understood layers of authority rising from the rice fields like the tapering towers of a 
Buddhist stupa. This deeply entrenched hierarchy, assumed to be at once obvious in its effects and 
difficult, or indeed impossible, to discern with any degree of specificity by Western eyes, is viewed as 
an inescapable fact, and one which, not withstanding its occasional positive roles, lies at the root of 
many of Cambodia’s contemporary problems. 
 
Nevertheless, despite an apparent consensus that the architecture of Cambodian society is a major 
factor in the functioning of all aspects of the Cambodian political economy, little or no effort has 
been made to move beyond a generalized appreciation of its existence towards a more specific 
understanding of the linkages between functionality and form. Although one exception to this may 
be found in Le Billon’s (2000) study of the influence of patronage networks on the logging trade, it is 
notable by its isolation. Rare though it may be, though, Le Billon’s (2000) study fulfils a vital heuristic 
role in highlighting the utility of focussing upon a single measure – here, logs – as a means of 
elucidating wider structures with broader implications. Otherwise put, it permits a snapshot of a 
structure that would otherwise remain hidden in its entirety.  
 
Following Le Billon (2000), then, this study has adopted the principle that in seeking to move beyond 
generalised claims regarding the hierarchy and patronage, single measurements may reveal more 
than expected. In this case, however, the key variable was not a physical object but the somewhat 
less tangible resource of information and/ or assistance, both pertaining to migration specifically and 
to the maintenance of village livelihoods more broadly. Various means of measuring this valuable 
asset were instigated during the course of the study, some successfully and some with mixed results. 
Ultimately, though, the means which stood out as most effective were those which respondents 




With this in mind, informants were asked to identify the people, beyond their nuclear household, to 
whom they felt closest and saw most regularly. After obtaining a list of names, varying in size 
between none and ten but averaging just over three across the entire sample, respondents were 
asked simple questions regarding the sharing of loans, information and labour within the group, and 
to indicate where group members lived in order that they could be interviewed subsequently. These 
secondary names were then followed up, as were their own groups, so as to establish a network 
based in three initial points and extended to the third degree.  
Otherwise put, the friends, friends of friends, and friends of friends of friends of the primary nodes 
were mapped, although it should be noted that the volume of necessary interviews was considerably 
reduced by some nodes occupying multiple positions in the network. In this way, a picture of the 
social life of the study sites was built up which, although ostensibly both mono-dimensional and 
partial in the sense that it accounted neither for every person in the village, nor of the vertical 
linkages hypothesised by social capital theorists (e.g. Putnam, 2000; Portes, 1998) and alluded to by 
ethnographers of Cambodia (e.g. Vickery, 1984; Hinton, 1998a, 1998b; Hughes, 2001; Ledgerwood 
and Vijghen, 2002) aims, as does Le Billon’s study (2000), to fulfil a microcosmic role.  
Thus, despite the fact that the methodology accounted, in principle, only for the detection of 
“bonding” linkages between close friends, it has yielded a variety of instructive results, the relevance 
of which may extend beyond the single stratum of social life which that sub-classification would 
suggest. Indeed, the scope of relationships in evidence is sufficiently broad as to suggest that such 
rigid typologies are poorly suited to the Cambodian context, supporting instead a more fluid 
conception wherein individuals fulfil multiple roles concurrently. As such, what may, according to a 
snapshot view, be termed a typical patron-client relationship may in fact be complicated by the 
presence of a number of other roles. Whether an individual acts as patron, client, co-worker, or 
friend depends, it would seem, on the specific circumstances in question, so that they are better 
imagined, as Scott argues, as: 
 
‘A shifting social landscape [in which] people move among structural categories, [and] in and 
out of particular relationships, repeatedly reformulating the parameters of their identities, 
communities and histories’ (Scott, 2009: 244). 
 
The ability to link shifting functional arrangements and persistent hierarchies within the target 
communities is one of the key aims herein and constitutes a pre-requisite to the analysis of mobile 
inequality outlined subsequently, in chapter six. Ergo, in seeking to discern the social structural role 
played by the risk-led social practices thus far identified, various measures of network centrality 
emerge as promising tools, with eigenvector centrality, an established statistical tool for measuring 
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status positions within a network  (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001), chief amongst them. The eigenvector 
measures the importance of a node to a network by assigning a value, between 0 and 1, based not 
only upon the number of connections that node has, but also the number of connections those 
connections have, and so on. As such, eigenvector centrality relies on the assumption that ‘in a 
communication network being connected to well-connected individuals adds more to one's 
knowledge pool. Having popular friends adds more to ones own popularity’ (Bonacich and Lloyd, 
2004: 1). 
 
In accordance with this principle, the social network mapping methodology employed herein is 
directed primarily towards discerning this sort of social prominence, as well as the factors which are 
related to it, or cause it within a communication network extraneous to the individual - i.e. within 
the village social context as a whole in this case. By way of example, the following graphic shows the 
central part of the South Ampil and Go social network map, with name labels attached to the node 
with the highest eigenvector score in the tri-village sample, Soon Lom, and his immediate group of 
close associates. The selection of these individuals is intended to highlight some of the factors which 
may contribute to high eigenvector scores. However, it should be noted that this is not an egocentric 
map, but retains the geographical positioning of all nodes within the village system.   
 
With this in mind, it may be observed that Soon Lom, marked in Figure 5.8 has the highest 
eigenvector score in the South Ampil and Go sub-location. He is a man of 47 and possesses 0.7 
hectares of land, two cows, and an electric pump, making him one of the better off residents of the 
village, though by no means the wealthiest. As such, it is his network of close associates which 
distinguishes him. Though only four strong, the selection is varied and, crucially, comprises 
individuals who all require extensive networks to maximise their income. These include Theari, the 
popular dessert seller to whom customers from all over the village ‘come every day’ (07/05/13); 
Chuen Hing, one of the wealthiest farmers in the village with 1.5 Ha of riceland complemented by 
two daughters working in garment factories; Kaw Win, the owner of both a tractor and a harvester; 










                          Figure 5.8 Ampil and Go Social Network Map with Labels for Soon Lom’s Egocentric Network (own data) 
 
                
Part of Soon Lom’s eigenvector score is explained by his close friends’ high level of integration into 
the community. Indeed, his own score would be far lower if the other members of this group were 
less well connected themselves. However, this is not the only factor. As a village elder, as well as a 
well liked and highly respected member of the community, several villagers cited Soon Lom amongst 
their close friends whom he did not reciprocally cite. This also boosted his score and helps to 
demonstrate one of the more direct ways in which generalised esteem may manifest in a higher 
eigenvector centrality score. 
 
As such, Soon Lom’s case demonstrates some of the socio-economic conditions conducive to high 
levels of personal integration into a social network. However, it has been the aim throughout this 
chapter, as well as one of the core aims of this Ph.D. more generally, to investigate the interaction of 
these sorts of social “assets” with the wider physical and economic environment. Ergo, in exploring 
these linkages at a larger scale, the following graphics are representations of each respondent 
positioned according to their geographic location (as determined by GPS) and with network lines 
demonstrating the linkages between various persons. The size and colour of the nodes which mark 
each individual’s position indicate the eigenvector centrality of that respondent: the larger the node, 
the more central the respondent according to this measure. Blue nodes are also more central than 
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red nodes, with the small selection of green nodes visible in North Ampil being the least connected 
individuals in the village system. 
 
       Figure 5.9. South Ampil and Go: Eigenvector (own data, n=84)   Figure 5.10. North Ampil: Eigenvector (own  data, n=40) 
 
 






Figure 5.11. Jake: Eigenvector (own data, n=51) 
                               
                             
With the graph having been divided into three parts according to study location, two features are 
immediately apparent. The first is the difference in the size of the three networks. Excluding isolated 
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outlying cases, the South Ampil and Go network (Figure 5.9) is considerably larger, at around 
3.25km², than either Jake,  at 1.2km²  (Figure 5.11), or North Ampil, at 0.36km² (Figure 5.10), a 
difference which partly reflects the number of nodes in each network, but is also indicative of their 
respective geographical extents. Secondly, differing patterns of node size may also be observed. 
Eigenvector centrality in North Ampil and Jake Village is considerably more homogenous than in 
South Ampil and Go, which appears to contain more highly central individuals.  
 
                      Figure 5.12 South Ampil and Go: Degree (own data)        Figure 5.13 North Ampil: Degree (own data) 
                                                           
                           
                          
 
Figure 5.14 Jake Village: Degree (own data) 
 
 
Given, then, that ‘the eigenvector is an appropriate measure when one believes that actors’ status is 
determined by those with whom they are in contact’ (Bonnacich and Lloyd, 2001: 199), the 
difference between Figures 5.9 – 5.11, showing eigenvector scores, and Figures 5.12 -5.14 displaying 
degree (raw number of connections), emerges as a significant indicator of hierarchical structures 
within the data. Indeed, there appears to be little difference in the volume of connections reported 
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as close friends either across or within the three locations. It is the way that they are distributed 
which differs. 
 
Thus, what these data suggest is not that people in Ampil and Go have more connections to other 
people, but that they are less evenly connected, giving rise to pyramidical authority structures, in 
which one person has access to several independent groups (Bonnacich, 2007). Notably, these 
structures appear to fit comfortably within the typology of hierarchies noted throughout the 
literature on patron-clientism in Southeast Asia generally (e.g. Rigg, 2012, 2001; Scott, 1972), and 
Cambodia in particular (e.g. Vickery, 1984; Hinton, 1998a, 1998b; Hughes, 2001; Ledgerwood and 
Vijghen, 2002). Ledgerwood (2002: 2), for instance, has chosen to emphasise the structurally 
individualised nature of such systems above all other features in her discussion of Cambodian 
conceptions of power. As she argues: 
 
‘Clients are not united as a group; rather they are linked to the patron by personal 
obligation. This then works in a pyramid fashion, midlevel patrons know someone higher and 
they in turn know someone higher – up the social ladder. The only way to get something 
that is beyond your capacity is to attach yourself to a superior’. 
 
Given the apparent systematic clarity of these structural clusters, though, and the means to detect 
them, the question remains as to the reason for their unequal distribution across the study site. 
Although both North Ampil, and Jake villages both exhibit some network inequality, with better 
connected individuals being discernible from those less so, they are fewer in number and smaller in 
centrality than the handful of “patron-like” individuals in South Ampil and Go, who appear to occupy 
such ostentatiously central positions in the social network of their villages.  
 
With this in mind, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that social centrality of this sort is not directly 
covariant either with either wealth or political position. Although all of those with the highest 
eigenvector scores are relatively wealthy within the village, they are not necessarily the wealthiest 
and whilst the Village Chief of Ampil village, Truen Ngum, is not amongst the group with the highest 
centrality, the Village Chief of Go is amongst the very best connected.  
 
This may be reflective of several factors, the first of which is that those who seek connections in 
pursuit of financial gain may not necessarily have achieved their objective at the time of 
investigation, or as Ledgerwood (2002: 3) has it, that ‘wealth follows power, not vice-versa’. 
Furthermore, as alluded to within the discussion of wedding behaviour above, wealth measured in 
terms of gross income is not the same as wealth from a social point of view, the latter of which, as 
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Scott (1985) highlights, must be visible in a way that modern sector income, or even large scale land 
rental, are not. At the very least, the principle that villagers are aware of each others’ physical assets 
was strongly supported by the research experience, wherein respondents would frequently be 
corrected by neighbours when relating their assets, or ask neighbours for help in remembering their 
own.    
In addition, Scott’s perspective is further borne out by a significant correlation between eigenvector 
centrality and ownership of certain kinds of high value - and by extension high visibility – assets, 
specifically hand tractors (Spearman’s = 0.277; p=0.02). Practical considerations such as the need to 
share information on mechanical farming may therefore produce ostensibly similar effects to those 
instigated by expenditure on certain consumer durable. Ergo, centrality within a network may be the 
product, or externality, of a number of arrangements or circumstances. 
For instance, a number of villagers complained that village officials controlled access to community 
aid and disaster relief offered both by government and NGOs, arguing that poor people must ‘pay 
for their selection’ (Yen Tac, 25/04/13) in this respect. Even those who praised the officials noted the 
importance of their role, explaining how it was necessary to ‘ask permission from the village chief to 
live near the lake’ as they had no other land (Pheap Son, 23/06/13). Furthermore, both the Go and 
Ampil village chiefs admitted that local ‘employers contact me to find labour from this village’ (Wat 
Yarm, 19/05/13). All of these arrangements create positions of power which are reflected in the 
network centrality of the officials in question, sometimes via mutual selection within each others’ 
networks and sometimes via unilateral selection of powerful individuals by many less powerful 
respondents. Nevertheless, formal authority is only one way in which such centrality may be 
achieved. 
Indeed, fulfilling an economic role of some description is likely to be another. Within Ampil and Go, 
the only village system with an integrated permanent market and a consequently wider variety of 
non-agricultural income sources, certain individuals may have attained a degree of prominence as a 
result of their business. One such example is Theari, the roadside dessert seller in Ampil village who 
was amongst the very few to remark upon the social benefits of her work. As she noted, ‘because 
I’m a sweet seller, people come to my house every day. It is a good way to meet people’ (Theari, 
07/05/13). Her reference to her own social integration is rare, however. The general tendency to 
self-identify as average in wealth terms was echoed in descriptions of village social life, with 
reference to which it is unusual to admit having any connections of note. ‘Everybody here’, they are 
wont to say, ‘is just simple. Nobody has ksai [social connections, lit.: string]’ (Khorum, 18/05/13).  
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Nevertheless, respondents’ social networks reveal a different story to that which they modestly put 
forward. Almost all of the respondents interviewed during the course of the study site were 
embedded within networks of close friends, whose regular meetings and durable association 
perhaps obscuring the usefulness of their association. Indeed, there is a significant homogeneity of 
occupational interests within these close knit “bonding” groups which is revealed only by further 
questioning as to the habitual conversations which take place at their regular gatherings. As one 
informant summarised, when they meet, ‘we just talk about work and how to find more income’ 
(Yarm Pan, 23/05/13).  
Thus, just as the linkages involved in close knit social groupings are vital means of reducing risk in an 
uncertain ecological environment, alternative patterns of association may be necessary in order to 
mitigate different types of risk. Given that Ampil and Go has by some distance the highest 
percentage of “non-primary” household income (i.e. income derived from sources other than 
farming and fishing) amongst the three sites – a mean of 51% compared with 21% in North Ampil 
and only 6% in Jake – it is possible that the less agrarian risk profile therein may be partly 
responsible for the more uneven social structure the area appears to exhibit.  
Indeed, the risk of lost income for a taxi driver or middleman, for example, cannot be mitigated 
effectively via the sort of close knit groups which are effective in hedging agricultural risk. However, 
as Burt (2001) has shown, individuals who bridge “structural holes” between two or more discrete 
groups have a significant advantage in terms of information acquisition. It therefore emerges as a 
plausible hypothesis that the need of the less agriculturally dependent Ampil and Go villagers to 
associate with people who are well positioned to know about opportunities, prices and trends 
outside the village may have notably increased the eigenvector calculated “popularity” of certain 
individuals. 
In reality, it is likely that the specific social structures of North Ampil, South Ampil and Go, and Jake 
villages have emerged in response to these and a number of other factors in conjunction, some of 
which may not have been detected by the survey. Moreover, although this methodology, 
constructed primarily around “bonds of affection” has produced some significant results concerning 
the functionality and dynamism of social linkages between peers, it may have been less successful in 
detecting other types of vertical linkage. By way of example, the richest individual in any of the study 
sites was identified by only one person (also one of the wealthiest encountered) and, perhaps even 
more tellingly, himself selected nobody as a regular confidante. Instead he declared that: ‘I don’t 
have any close friends. I help myself. I know all the people in the surrounding villages. Everyone is 
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simple to me…I know every official: Commune chief, village chief etc. Sometimes they come to ask 
my advice’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13). 
As the owner of thirty five hectares of rice land, two trucks, a full size (as opposed to the more 
common hand-) tractor, a new four wheel drive imported car and the only fully concrete house in 
the survey area, though, Pan Mon towers above his immediate and wider neighbours in wealth 
terms to such an extent that his disavowal of the kind of (at least partly) horizontal relationships 
sought by this study is largely understandable. As noted by one of the interpreters working on the 
study, he occupies the traditional Cambodian position of dongkauv, a wealthy and powerful 
individual of pre-eminent import within a rural village or district. Thus, he is by definition an outlier 
to the general picture of village social life, as demonstrated in figure 5.15, which compares the Jake 
village network with nodes sized by rice land holdings (above) and by eigenvector centrality (below).  
 
Figure 5.15 Comparison of Riceland Holdings and Eigenvector Scores in Jake Village 
 
 
As such, figure 5.15 demonstrates that in Pan Mon’s pre-eminence in land ownership is poorly 
correlated with his eigenvector score. Indeed, his network centrality is dwarfed by the group of 
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medium sized landowners  to the right of the graphic, who possess a comparatively diminutive 0.8 – 
3Ha per household. In this respect, he is something of an outlier from the data, wherein most 
wealthy individuals are also significantly above average in terms of eigenvector score. Nevertheless, 
despite his outlier status, he does serve as a useful example of the rationale underpinning the 
formation of the social groups discerned elsewhere. The manner in which Pan Mon differs from 
other wealthy villagers is not simply in the absence of obvious peers to associate with, but also from 
a lack of need to do so. Not only can he not share his risk with anyone even close to matching the 
scale of his agricultural investments, but as the owner of all necessary means of production and of 
the means to hire the labour to operate them, he simply does not need to associate with those 
around him in the same way as other rural Cambodians. Rather than the gradiated linkages observed 
elsewhere, his endowments allow him to sit high atop the social milieu of the area. 
 
This is, of course, not to suggest that the relationship between the natural environment and 
community structure runs only one way. Rather, in expanding upon the somewhat lopsided 
interpretation offered by the social capital theory, it serves to emphasize that ecological and 
economic conditions can just as readily impinge upon social functionality as the latter can facilitate 
catalytic expansions in the former.  Over time, these practical, short term shifts in behaviour may 
manifest in more persistent social structures or cultural practices, but they are never fixed. As will be 
discussed in the subsequent section, traditional practices such as provas dei, informal lending and 
wedding behaviour remain subject to constant negotiation according to the needs of the social 
environment in which they occur. 
 
5.2.4 Pragmatism Stratification 
 
In the light of the data presented above, the concept of social capital generally proposed within the 
literature, wherein social resources, themselves the product of culture and history more than 
environment, constitute a catalytic means of maximising the available (individual or community) 
gains from economic opportunities emerges as an understandable error. The issue of causality has 
long been a weapon with which to attack the work of social capital practitioners and it would 
appear, on the basis of this data, that their opponents have the better of the argument. The 
evidence here is that the physical and economic environment, at both the historical and dynamic 
timescales, continually moulds the shape of social practice, rather than merely the obverse. 
Indeed, what is sometimes implicitly overlooked in the examination of relatively “simple” societies is 
that, as highlighted by the data in the first section of this chapter, ‘livelihoods in many rural areas of 
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the world are complex and dynamic…[with]…perhaps the one constant [being] the day-to-day 
uncertainty of survival’ (Marshke and Berkes, 2005: 1). Under such circumstances, the persistent 
success of consumption smoothing noted here and elsewhere (e.g. Okamoto, 2011; Platteau, 1995) 
indicates that social arrangements must have developed in such a way as to reflect not only the 
prevailing ecology of a nation or region, but also the distribution of risk and availability of rewards 
on a much smaller scale. 
 
In support of this proposal, two exemplars may be drawn from the data presented above, relating 
respectively to investment and risk mitigation behaviour. First, the overwhelming preference, within 
savings behaviour, for physical assets over interest bearing accounts or even cash holdings cannot be 
explained merely as ignorance or risk aversion. Throughout the study site, only a single individual, 
the village chief of Go, admitted to possessing some $250 of savings, ‘for emergencies, especially 
sickness and for joining weddings’ (Wat Yarm, 17/05/13). The many others, even amongst those 
possessing strong linkages to the modern sector possess essentially ‘no savings’, ‘although [they] 
may save short term to buy land’ (Pon Tow, 01/06/13). When this is unavailable, there remains an 
almost exclusive preference for asset based saving strategies despite a full awareness of the rapid 
depreciation in the value of assets such as cars or motorbikes.  
 
Given the correlation, detailed above, between high value assets, such as tractors, and the 
Eigenvector measure of network centrality, it emerges as a potential hypothesis that their ownership 
may be viewed as useful in a manner which extends beyond their immediate utility. Indeed, 
possession of such items may be viewed as facilitating the additional benefit of improvement in 
accessibility to useful social networks which may in turn reduce risk or improve productivity. This 
need not, however, suggest that respondents consider this kind of social benefit to be an end in 
itself but rather, as Ledgerwood (2002) suggests, as a route to longer term social gains which may be 
complementary to the benefits of the tool or object in question.  
 
Furthermore, a similar pattern may be observed with regard to risk mitigation behaviour, wherein a 
clear relationship is in evidence between the incidence of provas dei and historical percentage crop 
loss, even when controlling for both location and income. Given the small likelihood that labour 
sharing contributes to worse or more frequent agricultural losses, the remaining line of causality 
suggests that those whose livelihoods are more exposed to environmental risk are more likely to 
participate in social groups and networks which serve, in indirect ways, to pool it. Those with more 
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secure livelihoods have less need to engage in these sorts of social arrangements, as exemplified by 
one such low-risk farmer: 
 
‘I have never suffered a flood or drought which has damaged my land because my land is too 
high to be damaged by flooding and I have a well. Droughts are only a problem for people 
without wells…I never do provas dei, I just rent everything I need’ (Tic Hong, 27/05/13). 
 
Conceived in this way, activities which may be declared purely recreation, such as meeting to eat 
and drink ‘just for fun’ (Pan Yuen, 14/05/13) may serve a dual social structural and functional role.  
Rather than being directed towards the acquisition of nebulous social “goods” such as prestige, 
standing, or integration,  though, social activities may in fact be predicated to a greater extent upon 
local and household level assets and liabilities than is often suggested within the literature. 
Individuals and households may engage in labour sharing behaviour where necessary, for instance 
under conditions of high environmental risk, and later abandon it when less beneficial. Similarly, 
they may seek out more central networks as a means of obtaining better access to information, 
whether this pertains to farming methods, migratory information, or other economic opportunities. 
Certainly, qualitative interviews combined with data on social practices appear to provide a strong 
body of support in this regard. Groups which might be viewed merely as reflective of social 
stratification or hierarchical reinforcement appear to have a specifically functional basis founded in 
communal interests of productivity and mutual insurance. In discussing his social activities, for 
instance, one farmer commented that he sees his close friends nearly every day, regularly meeting 
to drink or share meals, but that these activities are grounded in a need to share information and 
resources. As he put it:  ‘we meet to discuss rice farming: How to produce it, take care of it, and how 
to manage pests’ (Port, 19/04/13). 
Similarly, a second medium scale farmer from South Ampil stated that ‘when we meet, we talk about 
our job – how to increase our yield, do rice farming well, manage pests, and especially how to 
manage pesticides’ (Chuen Hing, 06/05/13). This overriding concern with productive activities 
contrasts to some extent with statements by residents of North Ampil, wherein farming jostled with 
debt and expenses as the major themes of the area. For instance, it was a typical pronouncement 
that ‘we usually meet up to talk about our worries, especially farming and weddings, but in 
particular how to repay the banks’ (Sin, 28/04/13). 
Although only partially instructive in their own right, taken together, these statements appear to 
closely mirror the various resource distributions in evidence within the three sites. Furthermore, 
they serve to highlight a phenomenon which constitutes not so much wealth based stratification as 
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homophily on the basis of income type. As one larger landowner stated, ‘when we meet up it is to 
talk about work and how to make more money’ (Yarm Pan, 17/05/13). As another confirmed, ‘we 
meet each other when we go out to farm and then we meet each other again when we come home. 
Generally we just sit around and talk about rice farming and crop growing’ (Mooen Chun, 29/05/13).  
Rice farming is not, however, a homogeneous enterprise. Different sizes of land present different 
issues for discussion, with larger plots often necessitating machinery or labour to harvest, or 
middlemen to convey the sale of large volumes of rice at a good price. These differing concerns may, 
therefore, constitute one of the factors which produces or entrenches social stratification, 
encouraging people to associate with others whose assets are similar for the practical informational 
benefits they are able to provide. This hypothesis is partly supported on a macro-scale by the skew 
of larger nodes, depicting riceland area, towards the left of Figure 5.16, which shows nodes arranged 
by their network proximity, rather than GPS location. 
                  Figure 5.16 Nodes Sized by Riceland Area and Arranged According to Network Structure (own data, n=212) 
                        
As such, the oft discussed multi-layered hierarchy of Cambodian society appears predicated, at least 
from one perspective, not on income, consumption, or inherited conceptions of class or caste, but 
upon the rational logic of need, production and environment. Individuals not only relate to those 
who do similar things, but appear to actively seek them out as a mechanism of mutual benefit. In 
turn, these micro structures underpin the shape of the community as a whole, so that , as Fafchamps 
notes, ‘solidarity does not really operate as a group insurance….[but rather]…as a network in which 
individuals are connected to a small number of other people, who, in turn, are connected to other 
people’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 158). 
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The distinction, then, of society and community from everyday practical interaction, appears to be in 
many ways a false one. The quotidian realities of production, risk and livelihood, rather than 
operating upon a distinct plane from the more ‘nebulous’ (Rigg, 2006: 187) realm of culture, in fact 
constitute a structural trellis around which social networks emerge. As a result, culture and social 
structure are imbued with the needs of production. Thereafter, as Kirkvliet (2009) and Fafchamps 
(1992) have argued, it constitutes a conceptually vital adjustment to promote these inherently 
practical, everyday atoms of social life from their traditional depiction as largely incidental and 
subservient to the wider forces of political economy, to a leading role within the structure of 
communities. As the former posits, everyday forms of support for and compliance 
with…[social]…relationships and their roles in the production, distribution, and use of resources 
constitute the basis of rural politics.’ (Kirkvliet, 2009: 235) 
Unlike the more rigid homophily based in ethnicity or kinship, preferential association of this sort 
cannot reasonably be labelled as “parochial” in the manner described by Putnam’s in reference to 
bonding linkages (Leonard, 2004). Nor, indeed, may it be viewed as either permanent or exclusive 
given their relationship to environmental risk, noted above. Even those with few assets and little 
income are prone to frequent adjustments to the type and location of their labour, rendering their 
communities ‘in constant flux, involving perturbations and shifts of people and resources’ (Marschke 
and Berkes, 2006: 13).  
 
In this way, just as the reality of Cambodian livelihoods appears far more differentiated than is 
generally appreciated, so too is the Cambodian social hierarchy, famed for its anachronistic 
intransigence (Chandler, 2000; MacDonald, 1958), rather more fluid and pragmatic than is often 
supposed.  Indeed, whilst the deep social inequality which the principle of hierarchy represents is no 
myth, its conception as a layered “stupa” of increasing exclusivity does not tell the whole story. 
Khmer rural society, though unequal, is characterised by movement, flexibility and pragmatism, 
enacted within a structure determined not only by history or class, but also by local endowments of 




Analysis of Cambodian social relations tends to be limited, in general, to the emphasis of two 
structural forms: the ‘pyramid’ of hierarchical, patron-clientist linkages and a ‘net’ (Meas, 1999) or 
‘web’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000) of horizontally based linkages. In recent years, the latter of these 
has come to be viewed as performing a useful role in facilitating the exchange of information related 
to various resources and opportunities, whilst the former remains, in spite of scattered arguments to 
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the contrary (e.g. Platteau, 1995; Fafchamps 1992), cast as an instrument of iniquitous wealth 
extraction, as well as key impediment to bureaucratic rationality. 
 
In spite of assertions, by Ledgerwood (2000: 2) in particular, as to the fluidity of a system wherein 
‘clients may leave one patron and attach themselves to another, or may be attached to multiple 
patrons to access different kinds of resources’, the dichotomy of vertical patron-client ties, and 
horizontal linkages to family and peers, is rarely challenged in a comprehensive manner. Nor, 
indeed, has much headway been made in elucidating the relationship between the external 
conditions which cause individual ‘patrons to rise and fall in fortune’ (Ledgerwood, 2000: 2) and the 
more generalized impact of shifting resource availability on local social structures and their 
functioning.  
 
To some degree, this is reflective of the relatively small amount of detailed research conducted in 
Cambodia in the post-war era. However, to a significant extent it appears also to be predicated upon 
the widespread notion, derived from Khmer culture and in common with numerous other societies 
throughout Asia, that ‘a gain in power for one person is a loss for someone else’ (Ledgerwood, 2000: 
2-3), so that individual occupants of certain roles are subsumed by the patterned immutability of a 
structure which retains its shape irrespective of the fate of its constituent human parts.  
 
The data presented herein appear to challenge this “zero sum” conception on several levels. To 
begin with, the variety of relationships uncovered via the exploration of what would nominally be 
termed bonding linkages suggests that the distinction between horizontal and vertical associations 
constitutes a poor delineation. In addition, they have highlighted the dynamic linkages between 
what people have, the risks they face, and the sorts of social groupings in which they participate. In 
doing so, they have also posited evidence concerning the functionality of those structures and their 
cultural accoutrements, which have emerged as more suited to the locally specific requirements of a 
variety of unpredictable environments than is generally suggested by the universalistic conception of 
Khmer society which has historically dominated the literature.  
 
As such, in accordance with the themes outlined in research questions one and two, concerning the 
study of social networks and their relationship to environmental risk, this chapter has sought 
answers to two broadly defined areas of investigation: First, regarding the social structure of Khmer 
rural society and second, concerning the relationship between this social structure and the natural 
environment. As postulated throughout the theoretical framework which constitutes the second 
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chapter of this Ph.D., the data presented herein have shown the linkages between the natural and 
social environment are robust and bi-directional. Just as cultural practices shape the natural 
environment, so too do the practicalities of generating income in an uncertain natural environment 
influence which aspects of their culture people prioritize and engage with. 
 
Furthermore, the landscape of natural endowments which influences social systems in the longer 
term, also appears to play a shorter term role, encouraging households and communities to rely 
upon each other more or less depending upon the risks they face. In this regard, robust correlations 
between simple social interactions, such as loans and labour sharing, and historical propensity to 
crop losses from environmental risk, have been complemented, within the data, by correlations 
between risk sharing behaviour and the network centrality which determines the hierarchical 
structure of the community. Village level co-variances have also been noted between non-traditional 
income sources and the equality of eigenvector distribution. 
 
Finally, the linkages observed between the levels of engagement with traditional practices and 
environmental factors, for example expenditure on wedding gifts and rice paddy holdings; or the 
ownership of certain high value, high visibility goods such as motorbikes and hand-tractors, and 
network centrality, suggests that aspects of the cultural realm may themselves be connected, in 
complex ways, to ecology. As a result, even in a country characterised by apparent homogeneity and 
intransigence, Cambodian rural social structures, considered in the light of their relationship with 
risk and rural livelihoods, are far more diverse, dynamic and practically grounded than is often 
supposed. However, though rooted in the villages of Cambodia, their impact is not limited to the 
rural sphere. Rather, these pragmatically constructed networks and linkages form an integrated 
whole with the migratory networks which are the subject of this Ph.D. In seeking to elucidate this 
relationship, and its impact on urban livelihoods, the subsequent chapter will use a range of 










Form: “Durable Inequalities” in a Changing Environment 
 
The evidence presented in chapter five, which highlighted some of the ways in which pragmatic 
arrangements may give rise to hierarchical social structures, has laid the groundwork for the 
dynamic conception of inequality which will be the subject of this chapter. Indeed, one of the key 
assertions of Galtung’s (1969; 1990) structural violence framework – one of the conceptual 
addendums necessary to a systems framework of migration as discussed in chapter two – is that the 
inequality he views as inhering within the socio-political systems in which humans reside is, for the 
most part a ‘silent’ (Galtung, 1969: 173) force. Only during times of change does it become apparent, 
like ‘an enormous rock in a creek’ (Galtung, 1969: 173), as he puts it, impeding the progress of those 
less privileged and sweeping the beneficiaries of structured inequality into positions of power and 
wealth. What may before have seemed an incidental, even natural, distribution of resources is 
thereby revealed as a constructed permanence. 
In this respect, throughout Cambodia’s most recent two decades, when foreign direct investment 
and rapid growth have contributed to an environment of insistent change and a much mooted 
expansion of opportunity for businesses and individuals alike, the Kingdom has, in common with 
several of its Southeast Asian neighbours, borne out Galtung’s predictions. There, as elsewhere in 
the region, ‘both employment and growth elasticities of poverty have declined despite 
accelerating growth rates’ (Palanival and Gul Unal, 2011: 39). The rock of Cambodia’s structural 
inequality, barely visible for decades beneath the still waters of economic stagnation and 
political brutality, has emerged to direct the current of opportunity. 
By following out thirty migrants from the 72 households explored above, as well as a further 
twenty of their urban friends, associates and relatives, this chapter will explore how the 
persistence of inequality in this way is undergirded not only by long held historical advantage, 
but by small variations in the landscape of wealth, risk, and power. In doing so, it will highlight 
how subtle imbalances in an ostensibly equitable socio-economic field expand and coalesce, in 
times of change and opportunity, into “durable inequalities” (Tilly, 1998) with the ability to 
survive and bridge the gap between the rural and urban spheres. Otherwise put, this chapter is 
directed towards the exposition of a schema of labour migration wherein opportunity, rather 
than destabilising rigid hierarchies, acts as a catalyst to further (dis)advantage.  
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In so doing, this chapter builds upon the understanding of society as grounded in the physical 
environment outlined in chapter five. Whereas that chapter sought to highlight the functionality 
of social arrangements and the role they play in mitigating risk, however, this one will 
emphasize their restrictive role. As such, in accordance with research questions one, two and 
three of this Ph.D., concerning rural-urban migratory networks, socio-ecological linkages, and 
persistent inequality respectively, this chapter will explore the role of social networks in linking 
the rural natural environment and migrant livelihoods. Furthermore, by delineating the diversity 
of the migrant experience in this way, this chapter will lay the groundwork for the examination 
of new cultural narratives explored in chapter seven. 
6.1.1 Equality and Difference in the Migrant Experience 
During the final week of the fieldwork conducted for the purposes of this Ph.D., an interview with a 
local farmer and garment worker who had taken leave from his factory in order to harvest his rice 
crop encapsulated the inequality which had by then begun to emerge in the quantitative data, 
highlighting how keenly it is felt on a social level. ‘The problems here’, he opined, ‘are now only for 
poor people’, who are caught between the stringent demands of urban labour and the increasing 
impossibility of maintaining small agricultural crops in the face of worse and more frequent climate 
shocks and the rising price of the tools and equipment [such as water pumps and fertilizer] needed 
to ameliorate them. As he continued:   
‘The relationship between the rich and the poor is torn, as if it has been pulled apart. Poor 
people rarely go to rich people’s houses. You can see now that if the rich people have a 
party, then so many people will come. If a poor person has a party, then only the poor will 
come’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13). 
In Sok Tol’s eyes, rural inequality in Krang Youv is at its worst in living memory, as modern sector 
wages have begun drive up prices for key goods and push the less fortunate to the margins of 
survival. Nevertheless, Sok Tol himself, as a garment worker, is a beneficiary of this urban boom, 
raising the question as to how he could feel so marginalised by the economic development he 
participates in. The answer is that Sok Tol is not a garment worker, but a farmer engaging in garment 
work. His plot is small and his family young, and these challenges remain with him in the city, where 
he must satisfy only his barest subsistence needs in order to meet those of his rural household. 
Rather than being an unusual case, Sok Tol’s persistent, primordial obligation to his rural livelihood 
encapsulates the undergirding truth of migration in Cambodia. The hoards of garment workers 
emerging from their factories at 4pm each day, though recipients of a roughly equivalent monthly 
wage, do not constitute a socially bounded group. Unlike much of the factory bound labour 
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movement undertaken by their European precursors (Williamson, 2002), Cambodian migration from 
the countryside currently constitutes neither a mass abandonment of the land, nor, usually, an 
individual one, with the majority of migrants returning within a handful of years to their villages of 
origin. 
Furthermore, what little homogeneity may be read into the livelihoods of factory workers is even 
less relevant when applied to their peers in other occupations. Construction work, domestic labour, 
petty trade and garage work are all determined by the particularistic nature of the arrangement. 
Even within such categories, the difference between those construction workers who nightly pitch 
their hammocks amidst the mud of their construction site, and those who return home to the brick 
built urban houses of their families is such that it must be viewed as a distinction not only in degree, 
but in kind. 
Thus, as discussed in chapter two, any typology of migration which attempts to separate occupation 
and location necessarily ignores the vital interrelationships between those factors which combine to 
comprise the migration experience. Nevertheless, the presentation of data renders some degree of 
categorical compromise essential. In seeking to preserve as holistic a view as possible of the 
Cambodian migration system, therefore, the data have been classified initially under three broad 
categorical umbrellas, which between them contain a considerable majority of the migrants tracked 
out from Phnom Penh: international migration to Malaysia and Thailand; the semi-rural factory 
enclaves of Sak te Bo and Andaing; and the periphery and centre of Phnom Penh. 
6.1.2 International Migration to Malaysia and Thailand: Brokers and Illegal Cross-Border Labour 
As large sections of the literature on migration have noted, both in the Cambodian context (e.g. 
Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014; Diepart, 2010; Kaleb, 1968) and elsewhere (e.g. Potts, 2010; 
Gugler, 1968, 1991), migration is a process dominated by informal social and familial linkages. 
Moreover, with respect to internal migration within Cambodia this is especially true: around 99% of 
internal migrations involve at least one family member (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014). 
When undertaken internationally, however, the logistical challenges of cross-border movement 
mean that relying upon known and trusted persons alone is not sufficient. Potential migrants and 
their families must place their faith in agents and middlemen they barely know, supported by little 
information, and underwritten by heavy debts in cash or kind. 
As a result of such uncertainties, a significant proportion of international migrations end in failure, as 
a number of respondents highlighted during focus group discussions. These conversations brought 
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across a picture of a process characterised not only by illegality, but also fruitlessness, as highlighted 
by a villager from Ampil: 
‘There are two kinds of international migration here: legal and illegal. Legal migration lasts 
for two years because those who do it have a passport and everything they need. 
Unfortunately people who take the illegal path tend to come back in three or four months’ 
(Focus Group, 03/06/13).  
The reasons underpinning failed international migrations take a variety of forms. Most commonly, 
however, the adverse outcomes which prompt a return take the form of gross exaggeration on the 
part of the initial broker, or may kjal  (lit.: head of the wind), who entices potential migrants with 
tales of monthly salaries far higher than it would be possible to earn in Phnom Penh, let alone more 
locally. Having arrived, workers in this situation find that a large proportion of their wages are 
retained by the company for hidden transport and accommodation costs. Unable to save what they 
had anticipated, or even what they could in a domestic factory, those who find themselves in this 
situation often simply return home. For some, however, overt misdeeds on the part of employers 
force even legal migrants into a situation of reduced autonomy: 
‘I know one worker whose passport was stolen by his boss in Thailand. He didn’t have the 
money to get home [illegally] without it, so he had to wait until he had saved 300, 000 riel 
[$75] in this job until he could come back’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). 
The agents who facilitate moves to exploitative situations such as this, or more lucrative alternatives 
are, in practice, impossible to distinguish. They enter the village as lone salespeople, arriving to 
spread the word of the opportunities they offer one day and returning to discuss the details, 
logistics, and cost of the endeavour with any interested parties at a later date. Little or nothing is 
known about them and, as what they offer is often illegal, they are not expected to be acting in an 
official capacity for a company or organisation. Their word is all they offer and all that is taken as 
collateral for the young people of the villages they visit. 
 As one such migrant, to Thailand, explained ‘a woman came to our village one day. She said she was 
looking for labourers to work as illegal construction workers in Thailand. So we went.’ (Ton Truen, 
06/06/13). Other villagers reported a similar story, explaining that:  
‘Now and then somebody comes around looking for a certain number of workers [to take 
abroad]. He takes their names and arranges transport from here to the border. After they 
get these, somebody else picks them up on the other side and takes them to where they are 
needed.’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13). 
Drawn in by the promise of earning $200 to $300 per month in Malaysia or Thailand, some villagers 
take on more debt to fund the up front cost of the journey, only to find themselves working for far 
lower wages upon arrival. Stories of passport confiscation or even of being ‘robbed by the company’ 
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(Song Lyn, 09/05/13) are commonplace, though they usually end in the acquisition of even greater 
debt or land sale to fund the return journey, rather than long term wage slavery abroad.  
In some cases, however, the inherent risks associated with the movement of the vulnerable into the 
unknown manifest in tragedy even for those families with some previous experience of the process. 
One such case is that of the elderly couple Ming and Ton Truen’s child Heng, who, having 
accompanied his seven brothers and sisters to Thailand on the latest of several trips to start work in 
a Thai garment factory at the age of sixteen, simply disappeared without explanation five years ago. 
As his mother explained, such occurrences are made even less bearable by the lack of closure they 
offer to the family: 
‘Five years ago, he left here at sixteen years old to go to work in the factory in Thailand. I suspect 
that he has died, but it just doesn’t seem real to us because we still don’t know for sure’ (Ming, 
06/06/13).   
Perhaps worst of all, though, the family had to make the decision to continue with their regular 
journeys across the border to the Thai factory. Having ‘sold [their roughly 0.8 Ha of] land twenty or 
thirty years ago because [their] living standard was already so low and our daughter was seriously ill’ 
(Ming, 06/06/13), their status as a family for hire was confirmed as soon as the new owner of their 
family plot terminated the sharecropping agreement. As Ming explained, this happened ‘after two 
years because he had found enough freelance labourers to do the work’ for a wage that they 
themselves had been doing for a proportion of the yield (Ming, 06/06/13).  
With agricultural labour in the village long insufficient to meet the needs of a large young family, 
Ming’s family’s long history of migration began even before this, however. Some thirty years ago, 
her husband, Ton Truen, travelled to Phnom Penh to work as a cyclo (rickshaw) driver. There he 
spent several days at a time transporting passengers on his hired cyclo, in which he would also sleep 
at night parked alongside several other similarly employed drivers, before returning home to see his 
family and fix bicycles for three days of each week, earning around 4-5000 riel [$1-1.25] per day. 
Possessing only Ming’s sporadic agricultural wage labour to complement Ton Truen’s meagre 
earnings, this family is one for whom the avoidance of risk is a priority in permanent subordination 
to the pressing daily requirements of income generation. For them, the greatest risk is to earn no 
money in a given month, week or day. As such, the low opportunity cost and relative likelihood of 
employment associated with trusting a known international middleman perhaps explains their 
lengthy engagement with illegal cross-border migration, where domestic alternatives were generally 
available, but never completely certain. Only in the last month, five years after their brother’s 
disappearance, have all seven remaining children returned to take up work in Phnom Penh and Sak 
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te Bo, having been assured of the availability of work by family members already employed in those 
areas. 
Moreover, the slowness with which Ming’s cohort of family migrants came to abandon the 
expeditions to Thailand even after they had cost the family a member demonstrates an undergirding 
truth about labour migration in Cambodia: that the endowments of the household determine to a 
large extent the manner in which it takes place. Landless families, or those whose debts are 
unmanageable without remittances, are unable to explore new economic avenues in the way that 
those with alternative sources of income can. As a result, they are more likely to remain in low 
paying or dangerous employment for longer, even as better opportunities arise.   
Given these circumstances, this one family’s transition to domestic labour migration constitutes a 
small victory for government policy, which ‘wishes to discourage [international] labour migration 
according to sub-decree 190’ (Khleang Rim, ILO, 09/08/13) in recognition of a view that ‘illegal 
migration to Thailand is the biggest problem in Cambodia right now’ (Khleang Rim, ILO, 09/08/13). 
That it has taken Ming’s family so many years to abandon their illicit cross-border working patterns 
in favour of a completely legal, and in principle safer, alternative goes some way to demonstrating 
the extent to which such arrangements become subject to a degree of lock-in, however. 
Indeed, the downside of a system of internal migration mediated at low, or no, cost via informal 
linkages is that those who lack the requisite connections can find themselves excluded from the 
process. In this way, entire households such as Ming’s are forced, for want of the requisite networks, 
into illegality and, perhaps the greater risk, persistent reliance upon strangers for the logistics of 
their journeys and subsequent work. Nevertheless, as what follows will seek to show, internal 
migration is neither the preserve of the privileged, nor free of risk itself. Rather, within Cambodia, 
just as it is outside, the migrant experience is characterised by a vast heterogeneity derived in large 









6.1.3 Sak te Bo and Andaing: Risk, Impropriety and Differentiation in a Salaried Environment 
                                       Figure 6.1. Sak te Bo in 2006 (left) and in 2010 (right). Source: Google Earth. 
 
 
Located some fifteen kilometres from the outskirts of Phnom Penh and a further twenty from the 
initial rural study site of Ampil, Sak te Bo, and its slightly smaller neighbour Andaing, are 
communities which in the course of the past sixteen years have expanded from a collection of small 
riverside villages to two of the largest centres of garment work in Cambodia (CCHR, 2013). Now 
comprising a vast cohort of garment workers, the continued expansion of factories and the 
necessary accommodation for their staff has also attracted a significant volume of construction 
workers, as well as schools and medical centres to cater for themselves and their children, and a 
bustling roadside market economy selling foodstuffs, consumer durables and various other services. 
As a local rented room owner explained, since the first factory opened in 1997, the area has changed 
almost beyond recognition: 
‘Since then, the houses around here have changed from palm leaves to concrete, and the 
young people in the area now have something to do. Local people get money to improve 
their houses by selling things to the workers in the factory and people also sometimes sell 
their riceland to the companies because you can get a good price…You can make a lot of 
money selling land: a hectare goes for [$]10k or 20k. It’s very expensive. [As a result], people 
don’t farm rice much any more, just vegetables and chamkar [non-rice agricultural plots 
which require little land].’ (Rented Room Owner Interview, 21/06/13) 
Furthermore, this account of the physical changes to the local environment is borne out by satellite 
imagery, which, as demonstrated in Figure 6.1, shows a significant amount of development in only 
four years between the earliest and latest available images. In particular, the number of tin and tile 
roofed houses, which show up more brightly in satellite imagery than those constructed with wood 
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or other traditional materials, appears to have expanded markedly, as has the number of rented 
rooms, which show up as longer, tin [i.e. blue] roofed buildings arranged tangentially to the road.  
As regards the industry which drives such changes, not only has the cluster of factories to the left of 
the river expanded to incorporate new buildings, but so too has the area of chemically infused liquid 
waste and rainwater overspill, now a highly visible feature of the landscape from above. Though 
invisible from the main road, this encroachment has not bypassed the livelihoods of local people, 
many of whose farm land is flooded on a regular basis by liquid emissions from the factory. As a local 
shopkeeper explained, though, those affected have no recourse to authority: 
‘I have a problem with the factory. My land is lower than the factory, which has a flood pipe 
coming out of the side of the building which floods my land completely in rainy season. I 
have asked the commune chief to intervene, but whilst they acknowledge there’s a problem, 
they don’t do anything. This has been going on for nearly twenty years, since the factory 
opened. As a result, I never farm in the wet season, just a very small vegetable crop in the 
dry season’ (Shopkeeper Interview, 21/06/13) 
Despite the damage done to local agriculture, however, the majority of residents claim to have 
gained from the presence of the factories, as a local economic boom fuelled by salaried garment 
workers, as well as the construction workers who build the factories which pay them, has led to 
marked benefits for much of the local community. Many of those who previously relied on rice and 
fishing based livelihoods have taken advantage of the rapidly expanding market for their produce, 
and especially the skyrocketing value of their land, to invest in alternative, high value crops, or 
commercial premises the better to further exploit the growing opportunity in the area. One such 
beneficiary is the same shopkeeper whose land is regularly flooded by the factories, who went on to 
explain that: 
‘[Migrants] amount to about ninety percent of my business, because local people generally 
just do chamkar [vegetable plantations]. I also have rented rooms and regularly borrow from 
the bank to expand them...all of [my children] are vendors along this street.’ (Shopkeeper 
and Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13) 
Furthermore, the (physical and economic) market has provided opportunities even for some of 
those who were landless or near landless prior to the influx of the garment industry. Low value items 
such as hair clips and nail varnish are cheap to purchase and can be sold at a small profit in great 
volumes during the 30-60 minute lunch breaks afforded by the factories to their workers, as well as 
before and after shifts. The predictability and brevity of these vending periods during the day has led 
several poorer informants to split their days between traditional activities such as fishing and 
agricultural wage labour, and daily periods of vending to migrants. 
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‘In the morning, we go fishing in the river, but in the afternoon I rent a space on the floor 
outside the factory gates for 3-4k for two hours. I move from factory to factory, all along the 
road, as well as several in Sak te Bo and Ta Khmao. I work with my wife every day, making a 
turnover of 50k and a profit of 10k. In the evening, I go to another factory, making another 
10k. Around the time garment workers get paid, I earn a lot more. The most popular 
product, in general, is nail varnish, especially the red one.’ (Make up and Accessories 
Vendor, 08/07/13) 
The importance of this market as a source of income to poorer and richer locals alike, together with 
the higher than average presence of local people in the factories themselves, means that migrants to 
Sak te Bo and the surrounding area tend to experience a significantly greater degree of daily 
interaction with “indigenous” locals than do those who move to other destinations, especially the 
more established enclaves encountered in certain parts of Phnom Penh, where migrant amenities 
are run, by and large, by migrants themselves. Moreover, this is reflected in the social life of the 
area, where migrants are far more likely than average to count locals amongst their friends, and the 
incidence of marriage between locals and migrants is considerably higher than elsewhere. As the 
case of a local informant exemplifies, household livelihoods in Sak te Bo are frequently split between 
migrant and non-migrant activities: 
One of my children is a garment worker in Sak te Bo, another is a vendor in Toul Kork 
market, in Phnom Penh, another two work as chamkar farmers on my land, but also sell 
things in the market. My friends’ children also work in the factories (Rented Room Owner, 
21/06/13). 
Nevertheless, this somewhat higher level of integration has not prevented a good deal of 
generalised stigma accumulating in relation to migrants and their activities. Migrants are seen by 
many as pleasure seeking and anarchic, with boys drinking away their wages, ‘fights happening on 
average every two to three days’ (Shopkeeper and Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13), and girls 
opening their doors to lovers.  Rented room owners – unlike in other sites, where they tended to 
adopt either a laissaiz faire approach or, more commonly, assert that their authority was respected – 
bemoaned a degenerative lack of respect for their advice, often stating that the migrants living in 
their property ‘never listen to me any more’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13). 
In particular, sexual impropriety is viewed as endemic and as elsewhere in the region, ‘salacious 
stories circulate’ about the shameful behaviour of migrant girls and their partners (Elmhirst, 2002: 
155). A local pharmacist’s claim that up to a third of the female migrants in the area had approached 
her for ‘abortion medicine’ (Pharmacist, 08/07/13) seem implausibly high, but is nevertheless 
matched or surpassed by the majority of locals questioned on the subject. As the owner of one 
accommodation block argued, his presence in the building does not deter girls and boys bringing 
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partners ‘who eat with them and have to be paid for’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/07/13) to live with 
them for extended periods or even, as another room owner noted, on a nightly basis. As he 
continued: ‘now the young girls always bring boys back to their room in the evening, who then leave 
in the early morning. Only about one in ten of them is good’ (Shopkeeper and Rented Room Owner, 
21/06/13). 
This culture of denigration, which relates in particular but not exclusively to female migrants, is 
especially relevant when viewed in terms of the “bridging” nature of migrants’ linked rural-urban 
networks (Silvey, 2001). Indeed, as noted in chapter two, the pressures placed upon migrant women 
to remit in a dutiful manner not only ‘bind’ them to their employment (Resurreccion, 2005) but also 
contribute to “stretched lifeworlds” (Samuels, 2001) in which the honour they gain in the rural 
sphere for helping their families is simultaneously undermined by a culture of denigration 
surrounding the behaviour of young migrants in the urban environment in which they work. They 
are, in the manner alluded to also by Derks (2008) at once honourable and dishonourable; lauded 
and looked down upon. 
Moreover, in spite of an undergirding narrative which labels some migrants ‘good’ and many ‘bad’ 
(Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13), their behaviour is rarely assessed on a personal basis. Indeed, it is 
viewed not as individual deviance, but rather as symptomatic of a more widespread submission to 
the forces of modernity [ka tomneup]. In this respect, the qualitative data indicate a conception 
which is both highly dichotomous and strongly normative, as noted also by Chandler (2000), wherein 
the traditional virtues of chastity and self sacrifice are contrasted with the modern “vices” of 
conspicuous consumption and pleasure seeking. Thus, to appear modern is implicitly to abjure not 
only moral but also financial responsibilities to the family, as highlighted by another local informant:   
‘Some garment workers are able to save a lot of money for their families, others less 
because of modernity. People want phones and new clothes etc. Some girls and boys have 
partners in their rooms’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/03/13). 
In this way, for female migrants in particular (Elmhirst, 2002), the ability to send money home is 
viewed not only as a practical, but a moral issue, to the extent that, subsistence permitting, for an 
unmarried factory worker to spend a higher proportion of their salary on themselves than they remit 
constitutes, in many cases, less transient self interest and more a fall from grace. Those occasional 
migrants who neglect to remit when it is expected are branded ‘lazy’ and ‘uncaring’ by their parents 
(Srawoon, 08/06/13). As a result, the proportion of wages remitted across all migrant occupations is 
extremely high, with the garment workers of Sak te Bo being no exception in spite of the supposed 
temptations of the local area. In order to afford such payments, all of the garment workers 
148 
 
interviewed undertook regular overtime work, although, as noted also by Jolly and Reeves (2005: 9), 
the extent to which this reflects a “voluntary” arrangement is open to debate and, at the very least, 
appears to vary from factory to factory. 
On balance, the best interpretation would appear to be that rates of explicit compulsion have 
declined from ‘the time they didn’t have labour laws, so the owners forced [the workers] to work 
overtime’ (Srey Mier, 27/06/13). Nevertheless, the general desire on the part of employees to work 
overtime when available appears to mask an implicit but firm expectation of its uptake. When 
healthy, factory employees almost invariably claim to ‘take anything I can’ in terms of overtime (An 
Songsi, 09/08/13), but sickness and family commitments occasionally create a conflict in this respect. 
Most workers are aware that their supervisors would not take kindly to a rejection and some have 
seen them becoming ‘angry’ under such circumstances before (Srey Ro, 18/07/ 13). 
Indeed, although many workers expressed a degree of gratitude for the opportunity of higher wages 
offered by the overtime arrangements, in particular some of those who were still working five years 
after the 2008 global economic downturn hugely reduced the availability of additional hours 
(Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014), the intractability of shift managers to workers requests for 
brief (i.e. one or two day) periods of leave – either from overtime or regular work – was cited by 
many former workers as a reason for leaving the factories in search of other employment and by 
numerous current workers as a major disadvantage of the job. As one such worker, Virun from 
Ampil, complained:  
‘When I work I feel exhausted, but I have to follow the manager’s orders. When they order 
me to do anything I have to do it, which feels very bad. There are really no good things about 
working here. [My salary] is not really enough for me because I need to spend money on 
rent, food and travel every day. It is difficult for me. What I have left is often not enough for 
me to buy food, clothes, or anything else, although sometimes my parents send me rice, 
fish, or money to help me.  If I work every day in the month, without absences, then I receive 
a $5-7 bonus. Even one absence and I lose this, though.’ (Virun, 13/08/13) 
The bonus Virun refers to here is an institutionalised system of ensuring attendance which was 
found to be in evidence across all of the factories included in this study. Although the terms vary 
slightly in their basing of full attendance on either a six or seven day week, the draconian 
implementation of its forfeit is remarkably consistent. A single absence, whether resulting from 
illness, bereavement, or family crisis; requested in advance or otherwise, will see any additional 
money removed from a worker’s salary package. Furthermore, in some cases, factories dock pay 
beyond the attendance bonus, with $10 fines for ‘unauthorized absences’ being reported by some 
garment workers (Garment Worker Focus Group, 21/06/13). 
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Over and above the various health threatening aspects of a garment factory’s working conditions, 
which range, according to the workers themselves and the pharmacists who treat them, from 
exhaustion and associated colds and headaches, to rashes and bleaching of the skin brought on by 
the chemicals used in material production, it is this inflexibility which garment workers deplore. 
Rather than being merely a cultural predilection, though, born of a language containing ‘no value-
neutral, or even non-pejorative word for “work for”’ (Vickery, 1984: 24), attendance to the needs of 
the family is, as with remittances, a question of honour. Earning urban wages does not, in principle, 
bring exemption in this respect. 
In this way, the extent to which many migrants remain bound for years both to their urban 
employment and rural household commitments is a particularly notable feature in Cambodia, where 
almost everybody works within half a day’s travel of their rural households, and most considerably 
less. Consequently, the manner in which migrants produce or reproduce their identities within a 
linked rural-urban ‘socio-spatial context’ (Silvey, 2001) is an especially important question here, due 
to the proportional difference in the weighting of rural and urban. Whereas in large parts of other 
high migration countries such as Bangladesh, the majority of migrants workers live more than a day 
away (Kuhn, 2003), here the proportional difference varies hugely: from a few minutes to twelve 
hours and everything in between. Under such divergent conditions, the extent to which migrants’ 
identities are defined by their household inevitably vary from place to place. 
Indeed, in spite of, or as a result of, the difficulties inherent in balancing the conflicting interests of 
rigorously controlled factory labour and the unpredictable callings of family duty, Sak te Bo and 
Andaing are sometimes viewed by its migrant residents as something of a “half-way house” of 
migration, ‘less dangerous and busy than Phnom Penh’ (Powim, 28/06/13). Moreover, many of its 
labourers come either from Kandal province itself or from one of its neighbours, Prey Veng, Takeo, 
or Kampong Speu. Of these, a significant proportion commute up to an hour and a half to and from 
work to their rural household on the numerous flat bed trucks which charge between 1000 and 2000 
riel [$0.25 to $0.50] to as many passengers as can be squeezed, shoulder to shoulder, into the 
truck’s wooden pen.  
Furthermore, even amongst those Sak te Bo and Andaing residents who occupy rented rooms in the 
area, proximity to home is viewed as a both a practical and emotional advantage, with many workers 
returning home on a weekly basis to see their families ‘from Saturday night to Sunday afternoon’ 
(Focus Group, 21/06/13). Furthermore, as highlighted by one such worker from the Krang Youv 
study site, who had left a well paid job in Thailand in order to work closer to her family, such 
advantages are prized highly enough to induce movement in pursuit of them: 
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‘After a year and a half I felt like I had to return as I missed my parents and family too much. 
Once I got back, I decided to work in Andaing…[where]…I receive only a medium wage, but live 
close to my brother and sister and can visit my parents on weekends or on holidays’ (Heng, 
30/07/13). 
In contrast to many of these workers, then, migrants to Phnom Penh experience a far greater 
physical detachment from their households, both receiving and undertaking fewer familial visits and 
often returning home only for the major national festivals of Pchum Ben [ancestors’ day] and Khmer 
New Year. Nevertheless, as the following section will explore, such circumstances do nothing to 
weaken the bonds between household and migrant. Whether undertaking skilled labour near the 
centre of the city, or unskilled construction work at its periphery, migrants remain fundamentally 
attuned to the needs of their household.  
As highlighted in chapter five, risk, opportunity, and constraint are not experienced directly, but via 
the prism of familial livelihoods, rooting the hierarchies and dichotomies of urban labour firmly in 
the rural. In order to elucidate these differences, what follows shall initially re-focus the 
investigation of migrant livelihoods upon the upper and lower boundaries of income, freedom, and 
opportunity, all of which are visible within Phnom Penh. Thereafter, in accordance with research 
question three of this Ph.D.’s concern with the rural-urban transmission of inequality, the sample 
will be broadened to include all interviewed migrants. In the light of the qualitative evidence 
presented below, this will facilitate an additional statistical examination of the mechanisms which 












6.1.4 The Two Sides of the City: Central Mechanics and Peripheral Construction Workers 
Figure 6.2 Map of Phnom Penh showing interview sites. The rectangular box indicates central Phnom Penh (Source: 
Google Maps, 2014) 
      
Home to over two million of Cambodia’s fifteen million inhabitants, Phnom Penh in the twenty first 
century is too large and too diverse to be considered a single destination. Even those rural farmers 
who have never and likely will never visit their nation’s capital tend to avoid the blanket claim that 
their sons and daughters are working in Phnom Penh in favour of a more specific answer: Boeung 
Trabek lake, Orrussey market, or the informal industrial suburb of Cham Jao are viewed, in many 
ways quite rightly, as having little to do with one another, other than their status as temporary 
homes to Krang Youv’s sons and daughters. 
Nevertheless, it was not ever thus. The current situation is not the product of an historical, sprawling 
primacy, but of an untrammelled economic boom which has transformed a city described in 1998 as 
a member of those “fourth world” stragglers characterised by complete ‘structural irrelevance’ to 
the global economy  (Shatkin, 1998: 378), into the vanguard of Cambodia’s “development miracle” 
(Madhur, 2013: 1) only fifteen years later. Political stability, under the three decade prime 
ministerial incumbent Hun Sen, teamed with an economy structurally adjusted to be one of the most 
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open in Asia (TRAC, 2013) has seen hitherto unprecedented growth, built on a basis of foreign direct 
investment (Ibid.). 
Skyscrapers, Western tourists, and luxury cars aside, one of the most notable companions of 
Cambodia’s economic growth has been an exponential boom in the price of land across the 
Kingdom, and in Phnom Penh in particular. As a result, many businesses, foreign and domestic alike, 
have been shifted further and further towards the periphery of the city, where they have come to 
take on a degree of self-containment, their employees rarely venturing far from their place of work.  
As the urban outskirts which garment factories and construction sites choose as their homes move 
further and further from the city centre, many  ‘poorer migrants tend to be found towards the 
margins of the city’ (Karen Schelzig, ADB, 15/08/13), within cloistered occupational enclaves. One 
such locale is the garment factory cluster in the Meanchay district of Phnom Penh, to which several 
of the rural study site’s inhabitants had migrated. Another, deserving of greater elucidation, is the 
Cham Jao construction community, past Phnom Penh’s Pochentong international airport along 
national road number four, and a little distance prior to the Extraordinary Chambers in Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), which have been the site of the ongoing Khmer Rouge tribunal. 
Situated in the midst of an expansive industrial park built upon scrub land and surrounded by paddy 
fields, this site is the home of the largest concentration of migrants from Krang Youv commune 
encountered during the course of the study. Furthermore, rather than being scattered throughout a 
large company workforce, the migrants in question appear to have agglomerated to the point that 
they now constitute a single construction shift, a group of workers from the same area, working and 
living together in the city.  
Unlike most migrant workers, this group of Cham Jao migrants do not have the luxury of rented 
rooms, living instead in self-constructed bamboo and palm thatch huts arranged in two neat rows to 
form an ad hoc village arrangement. For those who do not arrive as the guests of somebody with a 
hut already in place, the usual arrangement is to make do with ‘putting up a hammock strung 
between posts in the dining and showering area’ (Karp, 14/07/13) – a block of showers with an 
extended roof and a long bench at the entrance to the Krang Youv community. One such hammock 
dweller explained that ‘I don’t have a house like the others, just a hammock that I string up in the 
kitchen. I make food for myself and do everything for myself as I can’t move my things closer to the 
“houses”. They’re not strong enough to hang my hammock’ (Ret Sonraat, 31/07/13). 
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Under such exposed conditions, in spite of efforts to keep the community close and mutually 
watchful, the fear of crime – from within or without - is never far away, as exemplified by one of the 
residents’ assessment that: 
‘The city is okay for me. It is dangerous though, if I go for a walk at night time, I feel in 
danger. One of the problems is robbers, but also I am afraid to get into bad ways with my 
friends, who might push me to take drugs. Near my rented rooms there used to be a lot of 
teenagers taking drugs a lot. People do this here because generally people follow each 
other, so if they have friends taking drugs they will become addicts themselves (Construction 
Worker, 14/08/13) 
This statement, by a 19 year old construction worker, in many ways encapsulates the perils faced by 
young migrants in particular, many of whom are just as aware of the dangers of temptation as their 
elders. Furthermore, given the community orientated nature of the Cham Jao construction worker 
community, which comprises far more familial linkages and a greater variety of ages than the Sak te 
Bo factory community outlined above, that young people still fear a descent into dishonourable 
behaviour casts the critical comments made by the local residents of the latter community in an 
even more plausible light. 
Nevertheless, despite their concerns regarding a descent into wasteful hedonism, the proportion of 
income expended by migrants to Cham Jao on leisure of any sort is, both self-reportedly and as 
triangulated via the remittances their households report, generally extremely small. Many of those 
interviewed claimed never to spend anything during their free time, other than on the necessities of 
survival. Those who did admit some expenditure in this regard did so on a notably small scale, rarely 
exceeding a ‘walk to the coffee shop at the market, about two or three times per week, spending 
about 1000 riel [$0.25] each time’ (Heng Hein , 31/07/13).  
Elsewhere in Phnom Penh, though, the story is a different one. Those migrants who, through family 
or social connections and, on occasion, an upfront fee of between $200 and $300 dollars, are able to 
secure an informal apprenticeship with one of Cambodia’s lucrative skilled trades are set upon a 
vastly different path to their former schoolmates and peers either in Krang Youv or less desirable 
urban employments. One such route is the acquisition of construction specific skills, such as 
electrical work, painting, or plumbing, from another worker via a shadowing arrangement wherein 
the potential learner solicits agreement from the chieng [literally more/ better, but here denoting a 
specialist] with gifts of money or social invitations. Such opportunities are highly prized, with young 
construction workers often claiming that the ‘best thing about working here is the opportunity to 
follow skilled workers and learn a skill so that I can become one one day’ (Ret Sonraat, 31/07/13).  
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In addition, more formal arrangements may be found in relation to certain roadside business types, 
in particular those necessitating a degree of technological knowledge, such as the phone 
refurbishment and resale shops, and pirated mp3 music stalls which are popular throughout Phnom 
Penh, and particularly in migrant areas. Such businesses entail a degree of startup and running costs 
– ‘about $80 per month for mobile phones and other stock’ (Meas, 16/08/13), but can ultimately be 
the basis of a profitable livelihood. Amongst the wealthier strata of Krang Youv, however, it is work 
as a mechanic which constitutes perhaps the most desirable vocation amongst those who can afford 
to be trained for up to several years with an amenable garage owner. 
Such garage based apprenticeships, encountered in two sites within Phnom Penh and another in the 
crossroad town of Prey Touic in Krang Youv, almost always entail an entry fee, even for those with 
strong, even familial connections to the owner. Those which do not tend to be found in less 
desirable locations, with fewer opportunities to practice during the day: 
‘I paid $300 to be taught this skill. At the first shop [I worked at], I didn’t have to pay 
anything, as the owner was my cousin, but there were very few customers….I left that one 
because I wanted to learn how to fix motorbikes fast, under pressure…This one is close to a 
lot of other shops and near the market.’ (Mom Mom, 10/07/13). 
Beyond the upfront expense which such arrangements entail, though, is the scale of the opportunity 
cost required by the student, who is rarely paid and generally lives in his place of work alongside the 
garage owner. During the minimum two years apprentices are expected to work either for free or for 
a nominal wage generally less than sufficient to buy food, they are permitted almost no freedom and 
generally work at least twelve hour days, ‘from six am to six pm or sometimes later, if there are 
many motorbikes to fix’ (Soret, 25/06/13). 
Despite the daily duration of the work and a lengthy unremunerated period, though, this is a far 
different prospect from the factory and mainstream construction work discussed above, wherein, as 
one garment worker commented, ‘there is no future. If I work…for ten years, I just have ten more 
years ahead of me’ (Powim, 28/06/13). Indeed, arrangements of this sort are much sought after due 
to the scale of the rewards for those who achieve the requisite level of competence. Entry level 
mechanics earn between $150 and $200 per month, but after gaining greater experience and skills, 
become able to solicit business  and deal with customers themselves, in doing so getting access to 
tips offered in exchange for swift service which increase the total wage to a mean $311 per month, 
with one informant reporting a $700 monthly income. 
This level of income, alongside the perceived security offered by the acquisition of skills in the long 
term sets migrants of this type far apart from their unskilled and semi-skilled counterparts. In 
155 
 
contrast to the generalized frugality evidenced in most other occupations, the mechanics 
encountered during the course of the study appear ostentatious in their sociability and the scale of 
their consumption, as evidenced by the following testimonies: 
‘When I come to Phnom Penh, I call my friends in Phnom Penh. When I return home, I call 
my friends at home. I go out with my friends at least every week or two. The cost depends 
on who invited who, so generally I pay for everything, totalling about $50 to $60 each time’ 
(Karp, car mechanic, 21/07/13) 
‘Sometimes we go to the riverside or Ta Khmao [a riverside conurbation to the south of 
Phnom Penh], twice a week after work on various days. We visit friends there, drinking and 
eating something together. It costs about 10k riel [$2.50] per time. Our friends are girls, who 
work as garment workers’ (Mom Mom, 10/07/13) 
When compared with the qualitative data proffered thus far in relation to other migrant 
occupations, it initially appears logical to conceive of garage workers such as these as operating 
upon a rarefied and elevated plane out of reach of the potential livelihoods of most of their fellow 
migrants. However, this is to misconstrue the situation in a way that Mom Mom’s words merely 
begin to hint at. Just as these young men regularly share food and drink with garment workers, so an 
analysis of their social networks reveals a significant occupational diversity, including students, 
factory workers and street vendors in addition to others from their own line of work. 
As such, high earning migrants are not a discrete set within the city. Viewed in terms of basic, or 
total, wage the constituent members of both Karp and Mao’s social networks are notable by their 
heterogeneity. Nevertheless, homophily of a different sort is in evidence. As will be demonstrated in 
the following section, migrants appear not to structure their association so much by urban income, 
but by the specific social and economic endowments and liabilities of their rural households.  
What follows shall seek to elucidate the mechanisms by which the characteristics of rural poverty 
and wealth are transferred to the urban environment via the same social linkages and practices 
which, as demonstrated in chapter five, those households utilise to mitigate their risk. In this regard, 
remittances are key. The vast majority of migrants remit, but the scale and frequency of remittances 
varies greatly depending upon the specific rural livelihoods endowments of the household.  
Furthermore, in accordance with the dynamic model of rural sociability also outlined in chapter five, 
this is not a unidirectional process, but a dynamic one wherein the household’s long and short-term 





6.2 The Role of Rural Assets and Liabilities in the Migrant Experience 
6.2.1 Remittances: An Overview 
In spite of the heterogeneous nature of the Cambodian migration experiences described above, 
certain commonalities emerge from the data as being highly generalised characteristics of migrants. 
Chief amongst these is the propensity to remit, which, it is argued here, may have been underplayed 
within the literature in two interrelated ways. First, the scale of rural-urban remittance flows, both in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of income has yet to be fully appreciated; and second, the role 
played by remittances in reinforcing inequalities, rather than merely bolstering livelihoods, has been 
sparsely touched upon therein.  
In attending to the first of these concerns, table 6.1 presents data on mean remittances 
disaggregated by occupation. Although the percentage varies, it is on average a large one, with 
migrants, taken as a whole remitting an average of 36% of their total monthly income (after 
overtime), a figure which includes the quarter of migrants in the study who do not remit to their 
parental household. Taking only those migrants who do remit, the figure is very close to half of gross 
income. 
                                         Table 6.1. Absolute and relative remittance behaviour of selected occupations (own data) 
Occupation Mean Remittances per Month  ($) Mean Percentage Remitted  
Garment Workers 61.30 49 
Construction Workers 59.38 45 
Market Traders  10.75 6 
Mechanics 20 12.5 
Mean (across whole study) 42 36 
 
As demonstrated in table 6.1 then, certain types of migrant workers remit nearly half of their gross 
salaries after overtime, leaving them roughly $65, or $2 per day remaining for their own subsistence. 
Of this, workers generally report that each of their three meals costs an average 2000 riel ($0.50), 
with their rent – although this varies quite significantly due to the number of workers living in one 
room – amounting to a further ten to fifteen dollars per month on average, almost the entirety of 
what remains. Taking the mean figures alone, then, migrant workers appear to subsist at the limits 
of their income, with almost nothing in reserve in case of illness or other unforeseen expenses. 
Indeed, a lack of personal security resulting from such maximal remittances was a frequent refrain 
during interviews, as evidenced in the following testimony: 
‘I don’t make enough to send money home [easily]. Every month I can send only $70 or $80, 
which isn’t enough for the people back home. It’s never enough because my parents have a 
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debt from paying for my mother’s hospital treatment. She had something wrong with her 
throat and needed an operation to take it out. [I know some people but] we only meet each 
other at the factory every day. I never go anywhere to eat or drink anything because I need 
to save money and don’t want to go anywhere I can spend it. (Virun, 13/08/13) 
Virun’s testimony is emblematic of the second of the concerns to be addressed herein. As he clearly 
explains, the compulsion to remit a large proportion of his salary leaves him with no disposable 
income, thereby preventing him from integrating into the migrant community in a meaningful 
manner. Similarly, Chim, a garment worker from Boeung Thom Poon, Phnom Penh, explained that: 
‘My father is already retired and so doesn’t rent any livestock any more. He has divided all of 
his land between his children and lives only on what they send him. [Now though], it is only 
me sending money because the others are either married with families or studying….As a 
result, I rarely go out because I have to look after three people – my father and two sisters 
[who are studying]. Generally I don’t go anywhere’ (Chim, 22/07/13). 
Although such workers are physically present in the city, they remain conceptually annexed to their 
rural households. As such, their testimony – which are just two amongst a great many – contrasts 
markedly with that of some wealthier migrants, who expect not only a degree of freedom in the city, 
but also the opportunity to invest on their own behalf. As Karp, a car mechanic, outlined, his 
situation is one characterised by financial self determination, familial support and clear prospects for 
the future: 
‘I never send money to my parents because they say there is no need. They have enough 
money. I am saving for two things: getting married and to open a shop of my own. This will 
cost about twenty thousand dollars and with my parents help with half the cost, I will be 
able to do it next year’ (Karp, car mechanic, 21/07/13) 
Similarly, a female non-remitter commented that: 
‘My family at home generally don’t need any money from me, because they have other 
children working too. They rarely ask for anything from me. I save the money I don’t spend 
and now have about two months salary. I’m going to use it to buy jewellery and when I get 
married I will use this money to make more money so that I don’t have to rely on my 
husband’ (Paor, garment worker, 01/08/13) 
Both of these accounts highlight the ability the respective informants possess to save and invest 
their salaries. What is notable, though, is the difference in their urban occupations. Although the 
first of these informants is one of the highest earners in the sample, a car mechanic with a monthly 
salary exceeding $500 after “tips”, the second is a garment worker, earning a basic salary of $75 per 
month and only $115 after overtime. On this basis, the implication is that the wealthiest and most 
secure rural households are not necessarily able to gain access to the highest paid employment, an 
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impression borne out by the quantitative data, which demonstrate no correlation between rural 
household income and urban migrant income. 
Nevertheless, though urban income may diverge, strong correlations are in evidence between urban 
livelihoods and lifestyles, and rural wealth. Despite many of them boasting no greater earning 
capacity than their counterparts from poorer rural households, migrants from wealthier families 
spend, as highlighted by the qualitative data above and below, significantly more on investment and 
savings, and considerably more on leisure whilst resident in the urban space.  Though perhaps 
intuitive, this variance in economic behaviour has wider implications for the social structure of 
migrant communities, demonstrating as it does that migrants whose families depend less (or not at 
all) upon their remittances enjoy economic freedoms sufficient to mark them out as a financial elite 
in spite of the general parity of wages in some industries. 
Such migrants are able to pursue a variety of investment strategies, most commonly either the 
purchase of ‘gold, especially jewellery and rings’ (Sok Mieng, 01/08/13) or short term money lending 
to other migrants, who are not able to subsist on their post-remittance salary until their subsequent 
pay check. However, it is in fact the apparently non-invested consumption spending on leisure which 
may be of greatest benefit to them in terms of bringing both occupational security and opportunity 
in the urban environment. ‘Small  parties in rented rooms with drinks  and food’ (Bun Chi, 21/05/13), 
‘visits to the market about once a month to buy clothes, spending about thirty dollars each time’ 
(Sopi, 25/06/13), day trips to local leisure sites ‘whenever we have a holiday’ (Sopi, 25/06/13), and a 
variety of other social activities are a crucial means of building the social linkages which allow 
migrants to maximise their access to information and, by extension, urban opportunity.  
Without such connections, migrants are forced to attempt to bridge these divides alone when their 
personal or rural household circumstances require a change in working practices, such as the need 
to work on a more flexible basis arising from parental illness, or lack of labour to attend to the family 
crop, or the birth of a child which can make it ‘difficult to work for [a factory]’ (Chraan, 21/07/13). As 
will be dealt with in detail below, although migrants are sometimes able to supersede these issues, 
doing so is likely to be more expensive, lengthy and difficult than for those who possess the requisite 
connections, as well as often resulting in poorer outcomes for the former.  
This, though, is to depict only the broadest of linkages where in fact the character of connections 
between rural and urban Cambodia is a far more intricately structured affair. Migrants from richer 
households do not simply have a “better” migration experience en masse. Their advantages are not 
generalised but the result of a number of specific relationships between elements of the rural asset 
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base and urban behaviour. In accordance with the commitment, outlined in research questions two 
and three, to exploring the livelihoods impact of rural-urban linkages, what follows shall outline both 
the opportunities and constraints these networks offer. 
6.2.2 Remittances, Debt, and Dependency: Linking Urban and Rural Livelihoods 
Within the literature, various commentators on the relationship between migration and inequality 
(e.g. MacKenzie and Rappaport, 2007) have taken their cue from Kuznet’s (1955) classic “inverse u” 
theorem, wherein migration only initially increases inequality, ‘before subsequent migration lowers 
it’ (MacKenzie and Rappaport, 2007: 3). As such, Mackenzie and Rappaport’s (2007), as well as 
Massey et al.’s (1990) classic model is predicated upon the assumption that even though economic 
opportunities may fall initially to elites, the relatively free (compared with economic capital, for 
instance) movement of information in a community then instigates a widening of access thereafter.  
As this process is viewed as essentially frictionless, however, no account is taken of what Wong and 
Salaff (1998: 362) describe as ‘the dark side of network capital’ wherein those afforded privileged 
access safeguard their advantage through sanctions and social conservatism. Whilst such behaviour 
may not result in a permanent entrenchment of access to migration amongst the elite, it does mean, 
as noted in chapter five, that information tends to be shared via the reciprocal arrangements of 
bounded groups, rather than flowing directionlessly through social networks. Viewed thus, an 
analysis of inequality and migration predicts an opposite long term outcome: a ‘u-shaped trajectory 
for inequality’ (Jones, 1998: 9).  
Models such as this highlight the potential scale of the role played by remittances in entrenching 
rural economic and social inequalities. Nevertheless, Jones’s (1998) allusion to their potentially 
negative role is largely isolated within the literature, as a result both of the difficulties inherent in 
conducting research into migration which genuinely bridges the rural-urban divide (e.g. Paerregard, 
1998), and the highly generalised positivistic treatment of remittances within the literature (e.g. 
Sophal, 2009; Jampakly and Kittisuksathi, 2009; Derks, 2008), wherein they are viewed almost 
universally as household assets (albeit ones which are sometimes not optimally utilised)  rather than 
an obligation on the part of the migrants who send them. What is rarely noted is that households in 
many cases utilise them as a means to repay debts undertaken as a result of migration itself, or that 
migration occurs in response to pressing debts derived from health or climate shocks and thereafter 
serves little more than to keep up with interest payments. Those migrants who must service such 
debts lead vastly different lives to those who need not. 
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Indeed, there are few more distant pairings in Cambodia than the young mechanics described 
above, unburdened by remittances or debt, and an ailing domestic worker, beholden to rural debts, 
who ‘no longer [has] the strength to work in a garment factory’ and whose repeated requests for a 
pay rise from $60 per month are ‘always refused’ (Win Bun, 04/07/13). Furthermore, it is in fact 
unnecessary to cross the occupational divide in this way to encounter such difference. The young 
garment worker who ‘always go[es] out every weekend with her friends’ (Lin Da, 30/07/13) in order 
to shop for the latest trends, is a class apart from the one who, approaching middle age and with no 
end in sight, works seven days a week in order to send her aged mother and young children 
everything they will need for the coming month, leaving no option but to pass her few hours of 
leisure ‘staying alone in [her] rented room’ (Win Bun, 02/07/13).  
Though in these latter two cases the salary may be the same, their distinction is categorical. The 
networks which link origin and destination are conveyors not merely of information, or even of 
money, but also of privilege and deprivation. In material terms, this process of de-levelling an 
ostensibly even financial playing field is a two way process. Inverse remittances in the form of rice, 
vegetables, fish, or meat constitute a significant improvement in migrants’ livelihoods, but these are 
not the privilege only of the wealthy. Sending primary produce to the city reduces the drain on a 
migrant’s income caused by their own subsistence needs, thereby freeing a greater proportion to be 
remitted. Aside from the poorest, landless migrants, such “care packages” are common practice 
across all wealth strata. 
Thus, even setting aside the extreme cases of total rural dependence and independence highlighted 
above, migrants’ urban livelihoods remain intimately connected to the resources enjoyed by their 
sender households. Migrants whose families are unable to obtain the requisite income for smooth 
annual consumption possess significant claims on their wages before their own needs have even 
been considered. On an aggregate basis, this results in a significant negative correlation between 
total household income and the percentage of urban wages remitted so that, as demonstrated in 
Figure 6.3, proportional remittances co-vary with rural household income. 
The findings presented in this figure (in conjunction with the lack of a statistical relationship 
between remittance size and household income type when controlling for rural income) suggests 
that, as regards the data gleaned from this study, the role played in determining the size of a 
remittance burden by the composition of a sender household’s livelihoods portfolio is ultimately 
subordinate to that household’s gross yearly earning capacity. Nevertheless, given the strong 
correlation between gross income and income type in rural areas, this does not signify the lack of a 
relationship: the poorest rural households in Krang Youv are predominately involved in fishing 
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related activities, whereas the richest – as will be outlined in greater detail below – tend towards 
large scale owner and rentier agriculture, meaning that a meaningful, if indirect, relationship exists 
between village level livelihoods and migrant remittance burdens.    
Moreover, as highlighted by the case of Sok Tol (12/08/13) – a smallholding garment worker-farmer 
– there is more than merely a financial element to equation. Different livelihoods operate according 
to different patterns throughout the year, generating divergent pressures on the migrant workers 
who provide remittances. Remittances to small holding households may therefore reach an almost 
unmanageable peak at various times of the year, prompting both additional migrations and 
increased remittances. By contrast, migrants from households involved in commercial activities or 
land rental may structure their yearly remittances according to a smoother and more manageable 
remittance flow, but, as exemplified by Lay Sin’s testimony below, face the risk of years of high 
remittances in the event of a ‘failure in business (Lay Sin, 13/08/13).  
 
Figure 6.3 Rural household income as a factor in percentage of salary remitted (own data) 
    
    
As such, what distinguishes those who must endure migration from those for whom it constitutes an 
opportunity to flourish is the intangible, but nevertheless pivotal “baggage” they carry with them 
from the village in the form of the networks they possess, and the specific needs of their household. 
As will be outlined subsequently, the interrelated factors of household remittance dependency and 
the benefits afforded to those embedded within a large and varied social network, above and 




With respect to the former of these constraints, household remittance dependency, the data 
indicate a clear correlation between the ratio of debt to yearly sender household income (hereafter 
termed the household debt burden) and the percentage of migrants’ total salary remitted (hereafter 
termed the migrant remittance burden). This suggests that those households which are forced to 
place themselves in compromising positions with respect to the acquisition of debt are likely also to 
require their migrant workers to endure impoverished working conditions in order to service not 
only debt repayments but also the household’s subsistence needs, as a local vendor to Cham Jao 
construction workers herself highlighted: 
‘People come here due to very bad conditions in their home villages, especially related to 
debt. However, they often have to borrow money to come here in the first place, so after 
sending back repayments they often have nothing left at the end of the month, even to eat’ 
(14/08/13) 
Households such as these are therefore the most likely to demand that the bulk of a migrant’s salary 
be remitted within a few days of the date of payment, leaving the migrant themselves a minimal 
sum, usually facilitating only the barest subsistence and incorporating almost no contingency for ill 
health or ‘for buying anything other than food’ (Am Sang, 31/07/13). Although this arrangement 
does allow for “inverse remittances”, usually in the form of money or food, to be returned to the 
sender in times of need, a combination of time delays and pressing rural financial need means that 
migrants who participate in this arrangement are often forced to resort to high rate borrowing from 
local moneylenders. Often, these lenders are migrants with smaller remittance burdens themselves, 
or ones such as Sopi, the daughter of one of the wealthiest farmers in the rural sample, who have 
been able to secure a job which effectively or actually increases their wage. As she herself explained: 
‘I send home about $100 per month, but it’s no problem because I still have $30 to $50 per 
month to spend on things I need. I also lend some money to other people for interests. 
Usually $5 to $10 at 20% to people who run out of money at the end of the month. I am able 
to spend less than them because my factory provides three free meals a day for people in 
the auto machines section. It’s a good job because you can just watch the machines and 
watch everybody else working’ (Sopi, 25/06/13) 
As such, the manner in which rural households ensure their continued ability to service high debt 
burdens in many cases serves to compound their financial liabilities, as migrants are forced to take 
on personal debt as an indirect means of repaying that owed by their household, usually at higher 
rates than those offered by the financial institutions which appear to have generally superseded 
private moneylenders in rural areas such as Krang Youv. Such a situation is clearly sub-optimal from 
either the household’s or the migrant’s point of view, but, as focus group discussions have 
highlighted, may result from a greater willingness on the part of microfinance institutions to lend 
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against migrant wages, and against garment workers’ wages in particular. As one such informant 
stated, although the absence of collateral is a barrier for some poorer potential borrowers: 
‘If people have a family member in a garment factory, then they will take out a loan and use 
the remittances to pay it back every month. It is very easy to get a microfinance loan if you 
have a family member in a garment factory’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13) 
Thus, the perception of migrant wages being secure and reliable sources of income appears to have 
survived the 2008 economic downturn. Resultantly, the easy accessibility of microfinance debt to 
families with migrants now constitutes a further pressure on migrant workers from poorer 
households. Furthermore, in addition to the strain placed on existing migrant workers, debt appears 
also to be one of the mechanisms by which poorer or more poorly connected households (as noted 
in chapter five these categories are neither co-variant nor mutually exclusive) are able to meet the 
opportunity cost of migration in the absence of the familial or social networks which underpin the 
majority of migration decisions. As Pan Mon explained, however, undertaking migration in the 
absence of such social safety nets runs the risk of ruinous consequences for the household if events 
do not transpire as intended: 
‘Before people decide to migrate, they always borrow money from [the preeminent 
Cambodian bank] ACLEDA for the transportation and to get started. Sometimes this 
becomes a problem if they cannot find a job to repay. For example, one household had to 
sell their land because they couldn’t find work in the city and needed to repay their debt.’ 
(Pan Mon, 28/05/13) 
Whilst migration with so much at stake is often a last resort, it is not, in fact, exposure of rural 
livelihoods to the vagaries of migration and remittance payments which is the unusual factor here. In 
fact, a heavy reliance on remittances is very much the norm, to the extent that across all households 
surveyed in the rural study site containing at least one migrant, remittances accounted for just under 
37% of total income, with several households, usually headed by elderly widows, relying entirely 
upon the receipt of urban wages for survival. Rather, what is unusual about the case raised by Pan 
Mon is not that the household was especially poor, or that it relied too heavily on potential urban 
earnings, but that unlike the vast majority of such ventures, their migration failed. 
Indeed, given the logistical challenges faced by rural villagers and their children seeking to affect a 
move to a place they have likely never seen, in order to locate, secure, and perform a job they have 
usually never done, it emerges as potentially surprising that such a small proportion of such 
endeavours end in a failure to obtain employment. No such cases were identified during the course 
of the quantitative survey, with the data obtained being largely anecdotal and pertaining to the ‘one 
164 
 
or two’ (Focus Group, 08/08/13) households who had thus suffered. Almost all who attempted 
labour migration were therefore able to obtain a job of some description for a period at least. 
This is not, of course, to suggest that the movement of labour is, as propounded implicitly by 
Neoclassical doctrine, a relatively straightforward affair involving supply, demand and little else. On 
the contrary, whether viewed in terms of an inability to service debt, the safety of the household 
members involved, or the need to mitigate ‘very bad conditions in the home village’ (Cham Jao 
Shopkeeper, 14/08/13), the consequences of a failed migration are simply too high to face 
unhedged. As a result, just as the migration process is intimately linked to household resources and 
debt, it is interwoven, too, with as many social resources as are available, in such a way as to 
maximise financial and physical protection against the perils of labour movement to environments 
viewed as ‘fast and loose’ (Karin Schelzig, ADB, 15/08/13) at best, and unambiguously ‘dangerous’ 
(Construction Worker, 14/08/13) at worst. 
As such, the manner in which migrants interact with each other in their urban environments, and the 
social networks they consequently create and reside in, appear to be determined to a large extent 
by their household specific profile of resources and risks. Furthermore, the data indicate that it is not 
only migrant behaviour which adapts to reflect the household, but also household behaviour which 
adapts in accordance with migrancy. This finding allows the model of dynamic pragmatism in social 
systems, outlined in chapter five, to be expanded to encompass both rural and urban areas 
concurrently. Ergo, in pursuit of evidence relating to research questions one and two of this Ph.D., 
what follows shall utilise a selection of statistical and graphical measures to elucidate the dynamic 
relation of these social systems to resources, risk, and rural inequality.  
6.3 The Role of Networks: A Symbiotic System of Exchange 
Labour migration is, all too often, viewed implicitly as something of an osmotic process. The balance 
of motivations, constraints, push factors and pull factors tends to be pored over at a variety of 
scales, but the physical logistics of moving from one place to another for work garners far less 
intimate attention. Thus, information flows, as a factor within economic equations, are sometimes 
mentioned, but sleeping arrangements, pastoral care and transport are, in general, much less so. 
Furthermore, though the arrangements for such quotidian requirements are undertaken via informal 
networks, they are not conducted on an ad hoc basis. Almost every move is meticulously planned in 




In this respect, although cohabitation with a family member is strongly preferred, and lauded by 
those able to do so as freeing them from ‘having to worry about anything’ in the city  (Srey Mom, 
08/07/13), alternatives do exist, for instance in the form of high densities of migrants from the same 
village. The Cham Jao construction community, discussed above, is one such example, but even in 
the midst of much bigger and more centrally urban locales, migrants often comment upon the 
security they gain from small residential agglomerations of this type. As one garment worker, 
resident in Phnom Penh, explained, ‘I feel safe living here [on my own] because all of my neighbours 
in the rented rooms near me are from my home village’ (Poa, 11/07/13).  
Nevertheless, with certain honourable exceptions (see e.g. Derks, 2008, Kuhn, 2003) the importance 
that migrants attach to these networks, the security they offer, or the complex socio-familial 
mechanics of labour movement are rarely considered, in part due to an under appreciation of the 
mechanisms through which the organisation of such matters takes place in the global south. Indeed, 
organisation in these matters takes place not at the level of ‘firms, governments, schools, and similar 
formal, hierarchical structures…[but at that]…of well-bounded clusters of social-relations’ (Tilly, 
1997: 9). The household is one such cluster, but it is overlapped and interlinked with many others, 
from rural savings groups to urban colleagues, friends or roommates, which together come to form 
the highly structured and yet dynamic network within which migration is undertaken and persists. 
As such, what follows aims to build upon the platform established above, which emphasises the role 
played by household asset profiles in determining the character of migration, by investigating the 
additional dimension of the social networks which influence and constrain the process of labour 
movement. In doing so, it will turn first to the analysis of the familial networks within and across 
which migration takes place, before moving to the investigation of social networks, comprising 
friends encountered either in the sender village or in the urban environment. Thus, in accordance 
with the commitment to explore the socially and ecologically embedded nature of migratory 
networks, delineated in research questions one and two of this Ph.D., this section shall be concerned 
with elucidating the role of (rural and urban) social assets in the nature and trajectory of the 
migration process.  
In this regard, the following graphics (tables 6.2 and 6.3) demonstrate two things. First, that 
migrants rely upon a wide variety of people to facilitate labour movement and second, that if the 
data are aggregated into moves achieved via social and familial linkages, then the latter appear to be 
the more widely utilised of the two simplified typologies. Indeed, with familial help – not only from 
the nuclear but also the extended household so as to include uncles, aunts and cousins – being the 
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primary source of assistance in nearly fifty percent of all moves, a sturdy case may be made for 
viewing migratory information as a primarily familial resource. 
                       Table 6.2 Assisters of Migration and their Prevalence (n=50) (own data) 
Primary Source of Information and/ or 
Assistance in Labour Movement 
Percentage of Total 
Uncle/ Aunt 18.6 
Friend from Home Village 18.8 
Friend Met in the City 4.9 
Neighbour in the  City 0.1 
Cousin 9.4 
Brother/ Sister 12.4 
Husband 2.1 
Parent 3.1 
General Information 5.1 
Factory Moved Location 1.1 
Self 24.6 
       
                                          
                                     Table 6.3 Simplified Typology of Migration Assistance (n=50) (own data) 
Primary Source of Information and/ or 
Assistance in Labour Movement (Simplified) 




         
Furthermore, the qualitative data strongly support this conclusion, including as they do numerous 
examples of migrants whose households and extended families contain several migrants, using their 
family members’ assistance as a means to switch between places and occupations. Linkages of this 
sort appear to expedite the process of movement a great deal, as well as reducing the risk involved, 
to the extent that migrants are far freer to pursue alternative earning strategies according not only 
to their households’ but also their own needs and preferences. Additionally, as evidenced by the 
testimony of one such garment worker, generously endowed in terms of her familial network, such 
linkages even extend to facilitating international migration. As she explained: 
‘When I worked in Prey Touic, I received only a low wage, so I decided to follow my sister to 
Thailand where I worked as a[n illegal] farmer, growing corn and other crops. There I 
received a much better wage, but after a year and a half I felt like I had to return as I missed 
my parents and family too much. Once I got back, I decided to work in Andaing…[where]…I 
receive only a medium wage, but live close to my brother and sister and can visit my parents 
on weekends or on holidays’ (Heng – 30/08/13) 
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Moreover, not only does the rural household appear to be an important facilitator of moves, but 
also a significant determinant upon the decision to move itself. This is evident in a number of ways, 
with migrants frequently citing changes in their rural households’ circumstances, especially serious 
illnesses, climate shocks, and failures in business, as prominent factors in their movements. For 
instance, as the garment worker daughter of an elderly widow related: 
‘[I came here because] I have debts to pay for the medical treatment of my father, who has 
now died, as well as my mother, who is currently ill and also requires hospital treatment. In 
total, this amounts to about $60 per month in interest only debt repayments…Any extra 
money I make goes to the home village. For instance, after overtime I may make $200 this 
month, so I will send it all home’ (Rueng Win Si, 02/07/13). 
Aside from medical treatment, failed ventures or investments undertaken by better off households 
are another common motivator of migration, as in the case of Lay Sin, whose family had previously 
owned three hectares of rice land but had to sell it. She attributed this to bad luck and a lack of 
business acumen on the part of her father. In her words: 
‘We had to sell our land because my father failed in business. Previously he raised ducks, 
owning up to a thousand at one point, but they all got sick and died. When he started again, 
the same thing happened, so we had to sell our rice land. After the ducks [and with the 
remaining money from the land sale], we bought a large threshing machine for around $12 
000, but it continually broke down and was expensive to repair. After a while we couldn’t 
afford to keep repairing it and had to sell it for a cheap price…Now we have a debt of $4000, 
so I came here to work and send money home’ (Lay Sin, 13/08/13).    
In spite of the many and varied events which might influence the decision to migrate, however, a 
common theme is that the movements and activities of poorer migrants are far more closely 
determined by the household than their wealthier counterparts. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in 
the shocks which promulgate migratory movement does not prevent such trends from becoming 
visible in the form of clear statistical correlations between the rate and incidence of movement 








Figure 6.4 Household income as a factor in occupational movement (own data) 
                         
                         
Indeed, the data not only suggest a negative correlation between total rural household income and 
number of urban moves, as shown in Figure 6.4, but also between the rate of occupational 
movement and the percentage remitted by migrants, as highlighted below, in Figure 6.5. Taken 
together, these findings suggest, first, that migrants from wealthier households tend to move less 
than their poorer peers and second, that this is likely to be due to the reduced necessity to remit. 
Simply put, then, even lower paid work may be deemed sufficient if a migrant is able to keep their 
entire wage, whereas a heavy remittance burden is likely to result in a protracted search for higher 
wages and/ or more flexible conditions in order to satisfy the needs of both individual and 
household, as one such garment worker explained: 
‘I left the first factory to return home because I got sick. Then I heard about a nearby factory 
opening. However, that factory only opened for seven months each year. Because my family 
was having a difficult time [with her father’s illness] my mother asked me to change to a 
factory where I could work all year. [I did that but] a year later I had to follow my cousin to 
Sak te Bo to another factory because the last one only worked eight hours per day so my 
basic salary was only $50-$60 per month. I needed more money, so I had to come to Sak te 
Bo.’ (Soki, 09/08/13) 
 
As such, just as Ming’s family, described above, were forced in large part by their lack of land to 
continue their involvement in illegal cross border migration, so too are migrants from differently 
endowed households subject also to similar constraints. Indeed, as noted earlier in relation to Sok 
Tol’s hybrid garment worker-farmer livelihood, ownership of a small plot may place even greater 
demands upon migrants and their households. Indeed, migrants from smallholder households often 
face dual pressures: on both their time and the level of their remittances, which relate directly to the 




                                                Figure 6.5 Percentage Remitted as a Factor in Occupational Movement (own data) 
 
                              
Nevertheless, as highlighted both within chapter five and the discussion of remittance behaviour 
above, the analysis of household resources in a purely economic  manner fails to capture the social-
structural linkages between familial and social, as well as rural and urban, in their entirety. Indeed, 
these connections, and the opportunities and obligations they bring, should not, as in social capital 
theory, be viewed as entities in and of themselves. Rather, they are the mediators of, and responses 
to, resources and risk. They emerge in response to the distribution of assets and liabilities in both 
rural and urban areas.  
By way of example, the rate at which migrants move correlates significantly with the percentage of 
salary remitted to the household (Spearman’s = 0.359, p = 0.023). Moreover, it combines with 
household eigenvector centrality to produce a model with an R Square value of 0.496, 
demonstrating statistically that, as indicated by the qualitative data above, access to networks of 
information and the extent to which the sender household remains dependent upon the migrant’s 
urban wages are major factors in the migrant’s urban experience. In the light of the additional 
evidence alluded to above, and presented in detail in chapter five, a convincing perspective may 
therefore be found in the argument that, as with provas dei [labour sharing] and informal lending 
behaviour, network centrality is viewed as a means of mitigating the household’s exposure to the 
risks inherent in a dependency on modern sector remittances. 






                                     Table 6.4 Separate and Combined Effects of Factors Influencing Move Rate (own data) 
Factor R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.513 0.263 0.232 
Percent Remitted 0.281 0.079 0.055 
Model 0.705 0.496 0.451 
 
Indeed, given that, as shown in table 6.4, above, over 70 percent of moves are predicated upon 
information or assistance mediated via informal networks, better access to rural social networks 
emerges as an effective means of obtaining superior knowledge regarding urban employment 
opportunities. In this way, just as rural households who have previously experienced a greater 
degree of crop loss demonstrate a tendency to engage in the sharing of labour and loans, so, in a 
similar manner, do those rural households which are more exposed to the modern sector in the 
sense that it provides a higher proportion of their income, seek to mitigate their risk via engaging in 
the sharing of information. 
                                 Figure 6.6 Annual Household Income as a Factor in Migrant Eigenvector Centrality (own data) 
                   
                  
Of equal significance, this correlation may be found, in inverted form, in the urban sphere, where 
migrants from wealthier households tend to be more central to their urban networks, as evidenced 
by the correlation between their eigenvector scores and their sender household income shown in 
figure 6.6, above. As highlighted in section 2, this is likely to be due to the reduced burden of 
remittance payments foisted upon richer migrants, who are therefore able to use their salaries to 
engage in a greater degree of social activity in the city. 
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Rather than merely improving the experience of migration, though, these social relationships serve a 
vital functional purpose. The linkages they create between individuals in possession of a relatively 
large amount of money, and relatively high levels of education and skills, are an invaluable resource 
in the transmission of opportunity and advantage, both for their constituent members and their 
families. Across networks such as these, apprenticeships are shared, money is invested, and vital 
information ‘about business’ (Jan Narun, 24/06/13), money, and the urban environment, circulated. 
Indeed, as the case of one such migrant demonstrates, the information they carry often serves to 
determine the long term trajectory of a migration: 
‘I came here to study English and Chinese at Pannasastra [university] where I paid $60 for a 
three month course. When I was there, though, I met a friend and fellow student who told 
me about working as a phone renovator. He told me I could learn this skill at the Basae 
Market near Thom Poon lake. I paid $100 and initially I didn’t get any salary, but after three 
years I saved enough to open my own shop this year’ (Meas, 16/07/13). 
From these data, then, a cohesive picture of rural-urban social relations begins to emerge whereby 
migrants from poorer households remit a higher proportion both of their own and their household 
income. In turn, in order to mitigate the risk of their greater exposure to the modern sector, rural 
households seek to cultivate more central network relations within their village. In contrast, 
migrants from wealthier households, whose families are less dependent upon their remittance 
payments tend to expend some of their additional income on developing more beneficial social 
networks in their urban environment, whilst their sender households are generally less central to 
village social networks.  
Otherwise put, sender households associate (and thereby become central to networks) in order to 
mitigate their risk, whereas migrants themselves, given the chance, associate in order to cultivate 
opportunities for future gains, usually in terms of higher level employment opportunities. Although 
participation in either camp occurs in practice along a spectrum rather than in a binary sense, this 
nevertheless in many ways constitutes the fundamental migrant cleavage. Migrants and their 
households may therefore be divided into those for whom the urban space is a long term 
opportunity, requiring the setting down of roots and substantial (economic and social) investment, 
and the many and varied others for whom the duration and type of urban labour is dependent to a 
much greater degree upon the varying requirements of rural household livelihoods.  
For these latter migrants, modern sector labour is an undertaking characterised by a lack of direction 
and often with no end in sight. Obliged by the needs of their household to ‘work every day without 
stopping’ (Powim, 28/06/13), such workers are vital to their family’s livelihoods security, but 
envisage ‘no future’ (Powim, 28/06/13) for themselves. Unlike their wealthier counterparts, they 
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have neither time nor money to integrate into the city, let alone take advantage of, or invest in the 
opportunities it offers to some. In this way, the inequalities of rural life are not mitigated, but 
magnified by the city, which offers a lucrative urban life to the secure, but grinds the vulnerable 
between the three great cogs of climate, debt, and exploitative labour. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The preceding chapter has sought to demonstrate that migration in Cambodia is a highly 
heterogeneous phenomenon, characterised not merely by “insiders and outsiders”, or “elites and 
non-elites”, but by myriad systematic responses to the challenges faced by household livelihoods. As 
such, the migrant experience has been shown to depend more upon the assets and liabilities 
possessed by the rural household than the employment in which migrant workers find themselves.  
Furthermore, just as it emerged as a major factor in the shaping of rural social and livelihoods 
structures in chapter five, risk has been highlighted as a key determinant in the migration process.  
Thus, whilst wealth, and thereby the ability to “absorb” (Lipton, 1980) migratory difficulties is a 
major factor in the migration process, it is far from the only one. Risk may be conceptualized in a 
great many ways, of which wasted financial expenditures in the short term is only one. Added to this 
must be risks which manifest over a longer time horizon, such as a lack of agricultural labour during 
an extended migration, or the greater debt burden which often accompanies a household member’s 
acquisition of employment in the formal or semi-formal sector, thereby raising the stakes of job loss 
considerably, even if the loan in question is productively invested. 
In this regard, the nature and outcomes of migration are strongly predicated upon not only the 
physical, but also the social resources possessed by both household and migrant. Poorer migrants 
move faster, with less (or no) help from less reliable sources, and hence take on considerably more 
risk. Wealthier migrants, by contrast, move more slowly, with assistance from more reliable sources 
and hence into jobs better suited to their own needs and wants, and those of their household. Even 
more notably, their reduced need to remit facilitates the building of new urban linkages which in 
turn further reduce risk, both for themselves, in terms of their ability to retain their current job or 
find a new one, and their household, which is able to allocate labour and capital in the knowledge 
that remittances will continue to be available if necessary.  
Taken together, these discrete advantages amount to more than the sum of their parts. Far beyond 
an improvement in the urban livelihoods of the migrants thus endowed, or the ability to plan for 
more lucrative remittances, resulting from education or training, over a longer time frame, the 
superior apparatus with which better off households and their migrants utilise the city constitutes a 
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durable and persistent mechanism by which inequality is transmitted from the rural to the urban 
environment. Furthermore, in doing so, it serves the additional function of ensuring that the rural 
household is able to maximise its long term modern sector income, minimise its risk and thereby 
entrench the rural power base which remains the basis of its urban advantage. 
Furthermore, beyond financial risks, there exists an additional dimension of social and cultural risks 
to migration. Migrants and their families alike worry about illegitimate pregnancy, drug and alcohol 
use, and crime.  Although, unwanted pregnancy aside, the data here suggest that these dangers are 
more keenly perceived than their prevalence warrants, the lack of margin for error possessed by 
some migrants means that such factors must, nevertheless, be included in any analysis concerning 
the calculus undertaken by migrant households of the risks and rewards of migration. Indeed, taking 
into account these inherent “opportunity costs”,  alongside the benefits and pitfalls derivable from 
migration across a variety of timeframes, a picture of migratory inequality has been constructed 
which is suitable for systematic analysis, above and beyond the blanket conceptions which 
characterise the debate concerning ‘trajectories’ of inequality (e.g. Williams, 2001; Kuznets, 1955)  
As such, this chapter has sought to bring across two key findings concerning the nature of migratory 
linkages in Cambodia. First, it has demonstrated that the networks which facilitate migration 
constitute part of the same social system as the pragmatic networks of livelihoods production and 
risk mitigation detailed in chapter five. Second, it has highlighted the consequences of these linked 
rural-urban systems: network benefits in the village and the city work synergistically with higher 
levels of capital to produce long term advantage for rural elites and long term disadvantage for the 
rural poor. Such findings contribute to answering questions one and two, concerning the function 
and form of migratory networks and their relationship to rural assets and risk. However, question 
three – concerning feedbacks to culture and norms – has thus far been only partially addressed. 











Feedbacks: Risk Response and Inequality in the Production of Cultural Narratives                                
As long ago as the year 2001, barely five years after the first international garment factories had 
begun to transform the landscape of quiet riverside villages such as Sak te Bo, Caroline Hughes 
posed the question as to whether migration and modernity may be splitting Cambodia into a country 
of ‘insiders and outsiders’ (Hughes, 2001: 19). Her concern in this regard was a pertinent one, 
heralding the arrival of divisive inequalities of opportunity long before they became clearly 
apparent. However, though the question remains valid, its binary typology is not. 
Rather than experiencing a simple bifurcation, Cambodia today is being carried upon multiple 
different trajectories simultaneously. The gap between richest and poorest is indeed widening 
rapidly, but it is between and beyond these economic extremes that the bulk of change is occurring. 
In the two decades since the Kingdom opened its doors to the world’s investors, the very meaning of 
labour, wealth, and even gender, have shifted: where once the rich were defined by their land 
ownership, now many rent vast swaths instead; where once foreign lands were the workplace only 
of the elite, they are now also a last resort for the poorest.  
These changes have not, however, been swept in upon a tide of modernity but originate, in large 
part, from within the village itself. Indeed, as this Ph.D. has sought to demonstrate hitherto, those 
social groupings which arise, as shown in chapter five, from pragmatic calculations of assets and risks 
may, as detailed in chapter six, manifest in durable inequalities which extend to the city, rather than 
the obverse. What has yet to be addressed is how the norms which undergird these associative 
networks adapt in response to the new economic stimuli they are exposed to. Thus, in seeking to 
answer research question three of this Ph.D., which is concerned with feedbacks from migration to 
rural culture, this chapter shall explore the importance of norms and attitudes to the persistence 
and development of social structure in Krang Youv. 
7.1 The Internal: Understanding the Rural-Urban Divide 
As noted in chapter five and as demonstrated graphically in figure 5.2, the mean distance between 
respondents’ homes and their farmland differs substantially between the three research sites. Those 
residents of North Ampil who own rice land very rarely have more than a kilometre to travel to tend 
it. Those from South Ampil and Go often travel much further and many residents of Jake village 
habitually journey a further multiple of this when necessary. To appropriate Platteau’s (1991: 27) 
assessment of the great Scott-Popkin debate discussed in chapter two, ‘a technical reason alone’ is 
sufficient to explain this. A greater proportion of the inhabitants of the more southern villages are 
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able to afford vehicles, in particular motorbikes, which allow them easy access to further, more 
fertile, and higher land than they could conveniently access on foot.  
This freedom to travel further goes beyond the merely technical, however. Indeed, as Bourdieu 
(1984) reveals, it is imbued with a deep symbolic significance. That wealthier villagers experience 
less stringent barriers to their movement and therefore have a greater knowledge of affairs beyond 
the village is a source not only of respect but of distinction. Furthermore, the value of this intangible 
asset has been historically increased by its scarcity. As matters long stood, only those few with 
political or economic business external to the village itself would possess such information. Today, 
under the conditions of mass labour migration in which Cambodia currently finds itself, not only the 
volume of travellers but also the distance travelled has increased with widely noted alacrity. 
Nevertheless, as highlighted with reference to Wong and Salaff (1998) in chapter two, intangible, 
socially embedded assets such as these tend to adapt to protect their own value in times of change. 
Thus, although the means to cross great distances may be spread throughout the village relatively 
easily via the profusion of money and migratory information, it is far harder to expand the mental 
horizons of those who undertake these movements. The children of traditional elites are far likelier 
to have had contact with the outside world, either as a result of their parents’ economic or village-
level political engagements, or due simply to their possession of motorized transport. Furthermore, 
they are implicitly aware that their margin for error is much greater than their poorer counterparts. 
A single misjudgement can less easily ruin a wealthy family. 
For these elites, the city is a place not only of opportunity, but of exploration, wherein it is possible 
‘to go to the riverside…visit friends and drink and eat something together’ (Soki, 09/08/13) or to hire 
a motodop for the ‘30km ride to Phnom Sa’aang on holidays’ (Sopi, 25/06/13).The rest, however, are 
to varying degrees bound not only by the financial commitments detailed in chapter six, but also by 
the psychological constraints of poverty. Their heads are almost invariably filled with concerns about 
the dangers of the city and their actions, conservative and generally directed towards an expedient 
return, reflect this. 
For many, furthermore, it is neither theft nor violence that perturbs them, but the corrosive 
influence of urban society. Modernity, drugs and immorality are, many believe, the truly pressing 
concerns, to the extent that some parents forbid their children to have a mobile phone, forgoing the 
chance of communication for months on end in order that they ‘don’t get into bad ways and have 
boyfriends’ (Sin, 28/04/13), for example. Many migrants themselves echo their parents concerns, 
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expressing fear that ‘because some of my friends take drugs it will lead me to drugs too’ 
(Construction Worker, 14/08/13).  
This culture of fear by no means extends to all parties, but it is nevertheless sufficiently widespread 
to influence the character of migrant settlements. Migrants feel vulnerable and consequently desire 
protection from the wider city, rarely or never venturing far from the safety of their rented rooms. 
Furthermore, they feel most comfortable amongst people from their home province, around whom 
‘everything is simple’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13), creating agglomerations of migrants from the same 
village, district or commune, such as that seen in the Cham Jao construction community described in 
Chapter Six. Under such circumstances, migrants essentially inhabit an annex of their rural homes.  
However, despite the perceived danger associated with the urban environment and its inhabitants, 
the safety and security of migrant enclaves is arguably one of their more notable features. Only one 
respondent reported having been a victim of crime during their urban residence and even that 
incident, wherein ‘some people stole my whole salary’ (Pon Tin, 27/06/13) occurred almost ten 
years previously. Amongst all other cases, migrants made only occasional references to feelings of 
insecurity, stating for instance that ‘the city is okay for me. It’s dangerous though. If I go for a walk at 
night time I feel in danger’ (Construction Worker, 14/08/13).  Additionally, a former resident of 
Phnom Penh stated that: 
‘Sak te Bo is better for me because it is more secure. When I worked in Phnom Penh, there were 
many gangsters always fighting near my rented room. They never hurt me or stole anything from 
me, though’ (Pon Tin, 27/06/13). 
As such commentaries indicate, the general lack of crime against migrants is not due entirely to a 
lack of potential criminals. Rather, it is dealt with prophylactically via two key mechanisms: mutual 
vigilance and community amongst neighbours, and the physical and symbolic barriers imposed by 
rented room owners around their own domain. Of this pairing, the first refers to the culture of 
assistance which characterises some migrant enclaves. Their inhabitants frequently allude to the 
help and support they feel they receive from the co-residents of their own and nearby rooms, 
stating for instance that ‘when I’m feeling sick or not working for some reason, my neighbours visit 
me to ask about my situation and to look after me’ (Focus Group, 21/06/13). 
As noted in chapter six, these networks of information and assistance are a key element of 
Cambodia’s migration systems, the elucidation of which is the goal of research aim one of this Ph.D. 
In seeking to more fully embed these networks within the socio-economy of the village, however, as 
called for in research aims two and three, the nature and structure of power in migrant communities 
is arguably even more significant. Within their confines, migrant power structures transposed 
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directly from the village, related to family and age for instance, intermingle with work related 
hierarchies, but it is non-migrants who hold meaningful authority, presiding over an implicit 
separation which moulds migrant attitudes to the city.    
Indeed, the statement offered by an urban deputy village chief, that ‘rented room owners are the 
most important people in the community’ (Deputy Village Chief of Teuk Thla, cited in Parsons, 
Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014: 12), rather than being merely a narrative of delegation refers instead 
to the genuinely patriarchal role played by many rented room owners. As one such owner described: 
‘Some of the people in my rooms have been with me for sixteen years now…The parents [of others] 
ask me to look after them while they work here, so I speak to them and ask them not to spend too 
much of their salary [on themselves]’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13).  
Furthermore, in addition to the largely pastoral role undertaken by rented room owners, their 
domain is protected, also, on a physical level. Many blocks, generally excluding only a selection of 
the cheapest available, are gated and locked by the owner each evening, thereby creating a tangible 
boundary to the “territory” of the patron-like owner, as well as a durable constraint upon the 
behaviour of the inhabitants, who are sometimes afforded no means of unlocking these security 
measures by themselves.  
The combination of this separation – both symbolic and actual – from the wider Phnom Penh 
population, with the strong sense of community which binds blocks of neighbours together at the 
micro-scale, results in low levels of crime amongst migrants, but it also enforces their separation and 
distinction from the wider urban community. Whilst in the city, they are protected, but they are also 
constrained and their experience of urban life, though rich, is foreshortened. Only the wealthiest 
few, as noted in chapter six, are able to engage with a life outside the confines of their enclave and 
their workplace. For the rest, who either ‘stay at home every day’ (Lay Sin, 13/08/13) or, at best, 
‘just talk to each other, sometimes in one room, sometimes in another’ (Srey Chantup, 06/08/13) 
urban life rarely extends beyond the confines of a migrant enclave. 
As such, in conversation with wealthier migrants in particular, it is essential to avoid conflating 
aspirations to urbanity with genuine urban integration. A case in point is that of three sisters, living 
and working amongst a concentration of migrants from Krang Youv, but originally from Kratie 
province in the central northeast of the country. All three run a hair and beauty shop near to the 
Orrusey market, in close proximity to a number of garment factories. Their clothes, hair, and 
makeup are modern, as, to an even greater extent, is their admission of ‘having only boyfriends, but 
no family’ in the city (Beautician, 02/07/13). 
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Nevertheless, despite the modernity of their appearance and habit, they are not urban. As one sister 
explained, ‘we like this business and don’t want to do anything else, so we can’t go home as there 
are very few customers for this sort of work. When we get older, though, we hope to go back as we 
don’t have a home in the city’ (Beautician, 02/07/13). Although an aspiration to return or retire to 
one’s place of birth need not by definition detract from one’s urban status, a lack of urban roots is – 
perhaps surprisingly for a country whose urban population contains only a tiny proportion born in 
cities prior to 1975 – of definitional importance here. 
Indeed, one of the most common phrases used to refer to rural urban migrants by non-migrants is, 
alongside the more literal alternatives of neak jamnak srok [rural-urban migrant], or neak srok 
[country person], is neak srai [rice person] – a term also noted for its prevalence in the diverse 
migrant enclaves of Phnom Penh by Derks (2008). In spite of the proud historical connotations of 
Angkorean dominance and self-sufficiency, built upon paddy rice and referred to endlessly in the 
popular songs happily intoned by urban karaoke-goers, this term is laced with pejorative 
connotations. As a Phnom Penh native confirmed, to be a rice person in the city means a lack not 
only of wealth, but of refinement, so that a clear ‘difference’ may be ascertained between migrants 
who ‘talk all the time about useless things…or money’ and those genuine urbanites who ‘never talk 
like this’ (Cham Jao Shopkeeper, 21/06/13). 
As alluded to above, migrants to the city are generally not so much poorly treated as ignored by 
their urban neighbours, who tend not to interact with them at all unless their business interests rely 
upon it. Even formal authority figures such as urban village chiefs have been noted (by Parsons, 
Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014) as delegating all responsibility for the legions of migrants, who swell 
the population under their jurisdiction to many times its intended size, to the owners of the rented 
rooms who house them. 
In large part, this segregation is based in spatial as much as social factors. Urban migrant enclaves, in 
Phnom Penh in particular, tend to be fairly well defined and are often located in newer or more 
peripheral areas of the city where fewer non-migrants live. Even relatively long standing and well 
developed migrant areas such as Teuk Thla, or Thnaout Chrum – discussed in the previous chapter as 
home to several Krang Youv migrants – though now well within the boundaries of the city, 
comprised largely farmland as recently as the eighties and early nineties. This makes the density of 
“native” urbanites in such areas much lower than might be expected, as well as blurring the lines of 
distinction between migrants and non-migrants yet further. 
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Nevertheless, this distinction is not by any means absolute. Streets are shared at the boundaries 
between migrant locales and the wider city and certain blocks may house students, interns, or young 
teachers, in addition to their migrant majority. In terms of shops and services, though, a notable 
divide appears to exist between those catering to the migrant and “local” populations. Some local 
shopkeepers or pharmacists, even those whose businesses are situated in close proximity to migrant 
enclaves, baulk at questions regarding migrants, professing to ‘not know anything’ about migrants 
because ‘they don’t come here at all’ (Pharmacist, 24/07/13). Given the location of these shops, 
often more or less opposite large blocks of migrants housing, the surprise affected by those 
questioned implies a desire not to be associated with migrants, unless necessary for business 
reasons. 
For a proportion of urban shopkeepers, however, it is, nevertheless, commercially necessary to 
target a largely migrant clientele. Alongside rented room owners, these individuals – or more 
commonly households, as the majority of small customer facing businesses in Cambodia involve at 
least part of a nuclear household in their operation – are the main point of contact between migrant 
and non-migrant urban residents. As such, they constitute a valuable source of information and 
opinion on migrants and migration from an urban perspective, the character of which tends towards 
a degree of denigration, tempered by an understanding of the urban and rural circumstances faced 
by their customers.   
Indeed, even those stallholders who gain up to ‘ninety percent of [their] custom’ from migrants, 
such as the builders’ merchant in Sak te Bo (Shopkeeper and rented room owner, 21/06/13) are 
wont to criticise their customers’ behaviour, complaining that ‘only about one in ten are good’ 
(Shopekeeper and rented room owner, 21/06/13). Similarly, a local shopkeeper in Cham Jao, whose 
business vends exclusively to almost exclusively to migrant construction workers from Krang Youv, 
explained that they can sometimes be untrustworthy, but that this is generally due to their poverty, 
rather than their rurality of itself: 
‘People come here because of very bad conditions in their home villages, especially related to 
debt. However, they often have to borrow money to come here in the first place, so after 
sending back [these extra] repayments they often have no money left at the end of the month, 
even to eat…Already [in the last three months] two people have cheated me by borrowing 
money and escaping. Nevertheless, there are a lot of migrants round here and they are generally 
okay’ (Cham Jao Shopkeeper, 14/08/13). 
Nevertheless, the attitude of city people to the migrants who live amongst and beside them is 
infused with a cultural discourse which extends beyond a suspicion of poverty, desperation, or 
distrust. The deprivation of many migrant backgrounds is often associated with culturally disparaged 
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traits, such as gossip, greed, and an explicit concern with money, which are viewed as not directly 
related to their financial circumstances, but as indicative, also, of a poor character and upbringing 
which sets them apart from their urban neighbours: 
‘The difference between Phnom Penh people and migrants is that migrant people talk a 
lot…behind each others’ backs. My family and I never speak like this’ (Cham Jao Shopkeeper, 
14/08/13). 
As such, non-migrants are often at pains to emphasize their distinction from the newcomers to the 
city. And yet, upon returning home, migrants are often described as behaving ‘differently’, or of 
‘wearing different, more modern clothes’ (Construction Worker, 14/08/13). Reports that migrants 
shun their former friends upon returning are not uncommon and they are often said to ‘act like city 
people’ (Sun Lim, 17/06/13) in their wealth, attire and manner. The contradiction, however, is that 
these “city people” are the same “rice people” who spend their periods of migration at an arms 
length from urban life per se. They exist in a middle ground, having seen something of the urban 
world without having truly been a part of it. 
Thus, any tensions brought back to the villages by returning migrants are not enacted across a 
dividing line as clearly defined as, for instance, rural and urban, traditional and modern, or “inside 
and outside”. Rather, they reflect the cleft cultural environment straddled by migrant workers, 
whose fundamental rurality, though by no means subsumed, is nevertheless subtly altered both by 
their experiences and, to a much greater degree, the difference in their different perspectives within 
the structure of rural power relations. 
Indeed, the changes taking place in rural society must not be viewed merely at a cultural level. 
Alterations to clothing and taste, though clearly visible and commented upon by respondents (e.g. 
Construction Worker, 14/08/13), are superficial in the sense that they are not the driver of change. 
Most villagers visiting their homes in Krang Youv do not return with an immediate feeling of 
superiority, or seek to distance themselves from those who have not yet, or will never, migrate. In 
fact, as the Krang Youv commune chief attested, returns are often characterised ostensibly by 
celebration, generosity and community: 
‘Whenever the migrants come back, they always make a party for everybody in the village. 
They hire speakers and sing and dance together. I think that migrants are very close with the 
whole village’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). 
Furthermore: 
‘I think that the poor also benefit [from migration]. When the migrants go to work and come 
back, they always give money to the poor families related to them. Also, when families have 
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problems, or somebody dies, they always give money for the ceremony and rice for the 
families’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13) 
Behind each of the commune chief’s examples of the closeness and mutual assistance with which 
village life continues to operate, however, the spectre of power relations looms large. Within each 
anecdote of alms bestowed by migrants on those poorer than themselves, lies an implicit 
declaration of directionality, underpinned by the knowledge that such “kindnesses” invariably flow 
downwards within the village social structure. 
However, this changing positionality is far more complex than the subsumption by migrants of non-
migrants given that, as highlighted in chapter six, migration can just as well denote the deepening of 
poverty as the accumulation of wealth. This is especially true for international migration, whose 
peaks and troughs extend far above and below the best and worst in domestic migration. However, 
due to face saving efforts on the part of migrants and their families, this hierarchy is often poorly 
distinguished, casting even debt bonded labour in Thailand and Malaysia in the reflected light of 
migration to their richer, East Asian neighbours. The cultural implications of foreign work (and its 
alternatives) have, in this way, fed back in complex ways to the economic decisions made by 
migrants and their families, serving as new norms to underpin the distribution of household labour.   
7.2 The External: The Wider Context of Migration 
 
As noted above, household wealth is a question not merely of opportunity, but of outlook. Wealthier 
migrants in general have a wider sense of what (and where) is possible and a greater sense of 
personal freedom in response. Nevertheless, it is the intention of this chapter to proffer a 
conception of distance rooted more in place then space. Foreign and domestic agents now routinely 
visit Cambodia’s villages in search of labour, facilitating lengthy international journeys which may be 
highly lucrative for those who can afford to travel, or akin to incarceration for those who expenses 
must be offset against future wages.  
 
Nevertheless, these two typologies of foreign labour are insufficiently distinguished in the minds of 
many potential migrants. The allure of the foreign is continually bolstered both by the visible gains 
made by better off international migrants, in the form of houses, motorbikes, cars and tractors; and 
by the proliferation of advertising campaigns quoting huge salaries for international work. For 
instance, one the best known offers Korean language training in Phnom Penh, followed by a 
guaranteed job in South Korea, reportedly paying “over $1000 per month” (Khmer International 
Radio, 09/08/13), upon completion of the three month programme. No elaboration is offered as 
regards the type of employment into which such courses might facilitate access, but given the 
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predominance of ‘agriculture, fishing and construction’ (Tunon and Rim, 2013: 6) as migrant 
employers in Korea, it seems likely that any employment provided would fall into this category.  
The influence of such schemes has been felt keenly in Krang Youv, where villagers report that ‘now 
some people send their children to study Korean in Phnom Penh so that they are able to work in 
Korea’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13).  For those able to do so, the rewards are significant and often 
ostentatious. As one villager related, ‘by now, some families have got rich as a result of having 
relatives in Korea. They can buy cars, or even trucks with that money’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13).  
Furthermore, for those able to afford the initial educational investment, ‘estimated to be around 
US$950 for the costs of a passport, air ticket, medical examination, pre-departure training, and 
administrative expenses, among others’ (Tunon and Rim, 2013: 6), there is a degree of ‘government 
help’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13) on offer. Although this assistance does not extend beyond 
expediting the process of acquiring documentation, it nevertheless contributes to a sense that 
international migration ‘is different’ from any other type of opportunity (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). 
The evidence on show in the village, together with the perception of ‘very high wages’ (Commune 
Chief, 15/08/13) outside of Cambodia, induces many to undertake poorly understood risks to share 
in the reflected prestige and half imagined salaries of international work. 
 
However, given the high entry costs and complex administration associated with securing work in 
countries, such as China and South Korea, that are viewed as very wealthy, their emergence into the 
consciousness of rural Cambodia, primarily via the media of television and music, has not resulted in 
mass emigration to those particular destinations. Instead, the prestige and mythology of wealth 
surrounding international migration has been transferred to more achievable targets, encouraging 
up to half a million Cambodians (Lim Siv Hong, Asia Foundation, personal correspondence, 19/05/14) 
to cross the border to Thailand and a smaller but nevertheless significant number making the longer 
journey to Malaysia.  
 
In seeking to curb this trend, the government has sought increasingly to make legal alternatives – 
both international and domestic – available to potential migrants who might otherwise rely on the 
illegal services of informal middlemen.  In some places, this strategy seems to have met a degree of 
success. However, the potential “choice” of taking the legal route is equally often discounted on the 
grounds of cost, with the completion of the correct paper work and authorised travel across the 




‘International migration from here is possible both legally and illegally. It depends how much 
you want to pay. Legal migration [to Thailand] costs about $250, whereas illegal migration 
costs only about $25. To do it the illegal way you have to pay your own transport costs, 
though.’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13). 
Indeed, Khleang Rim’s (ILO, 09/08/13) assertion that ‘many migrants move through informal 
networks’ underplays the situation. It is generally accepted that ‘to migrate you must know 
somebody in the local area, like a friend or relative who knows about the local need for workers’ 
(Focus Group, 03/06/13), a prerequisite which underpins at least three quarters of all moves and 
close to one hundred percent of initial moves. As a result, it is not only cheaper but also ‘much 
quicker to go to Thailand illegally [rather than via the formal routes], especially if you have informal 
networks (Khleang Rim, ILO, 09/08/13). The RGC, however, is seeking to combat this: 
‘Government policy is now to encourage people to return or to prevent them from moving 
outside the village by building small garment workshops within villages and communes. A lot of 
people have now returned to work here’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). 
These small, roadside buildings are vastly different from the monolithic, imposingly gated factories 
which characterise the landscape of garment work in Phnom Penh and Sak te Bo. They are single 
story constructions, often partly open in order to circulate the air, and their capacity is rarely more 
than a few dozen workers. Even within villages themselves, they are springing up in increasing 
numbers, changing the landscape of modern sector work and as highlighted also by Rigg (2002; 
2012),  blurring the boundaries between modern and traditional, rural and urban. 
The incursion of the garment industry into the heart of rural Cambodia has not, however, had the 
impact perhaps anticipated by the officials seeking to curb the rising tide of migrants. The relative 
isolation of these rural industries increases transportation costs of both materials and finished 
products, as well as reducing the agglomeration economies which the factories of Sak te Bo or 
Phnom Penh, for instance, enjoy. As a result, the wages they pay are considerably lower than those 
on offer in more well developed centres of garment work, a disadvantage which serves to maintain 
the allure of longer distance labour movement for those able to take it up, as the Krang Youv 
commune chief explained: 
‘[Government policy on labour migration] has not been so effective, however. If they open a 
small shop here [in the village] it is generally good only for an old woman who is too weak to go 
to Phnom Penh. If people have the strength and skills to migrate, then they will go to Phnom 
Penh for a higher salary as the wages here are comparatively low. A construction foreman can 
earn $250 per month there!’  (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). 
Thus, rather than keeping migrants who might otherwise have participated in cross-border or rural-
urban migration in the villages, the arrival of manufacturing opportunities close to home appears, 
according to the commune chief, to have had the effect of expanding the demography of garment 
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work to include those too old, sick, or weak to undertake more lengthy migrations. Whether or not 
this was the intention of the policy, the picture he paints is unambiguously positive: 
‘Nowadays, the poor people who can’t afford to go out to the city to work, work here in the 
local industries, so that nobody is unemployed any more. Even the old people who can’t go 
anywhere can bring some clothes to their homes and make money that way. I know a lady of 
about sixty who does that, making a little money in her free time’ (Commune Chief, 
15/08/13) 
If the commune chief is to be believed, then, rural industry such as this has gone a long way to 
solving  the centuries old problem of rural underemployment in Cambodia by creating opportunities 
for ‘free members of families to…go somewhere and earn money to help the household to farm’ 
(Commune Chief, 15/08/13). Even for landless families, such opportunities facilitate a far better 
living standard than would be available from subsistence on sporadic rural labour alone. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which Krang Youv’s rural garment industry is establishing itself as a 
meaningful economic alternative to its urban counterpart is called into question by the quantitative 
data, which yielded only two factory workers employed within their home commune, both of them 
women in their twenties, out of a total of seventy two rural households surveyed. 
Furthermore, as what follows will seek to highlight, the recent influx of rural factories should not be 
viewed, as the commune chief appears to do, as simply an addition to the existent, largely 
traditional livelihoods base. Over fifteen years of labour migration, occurring in ever increasing 
numbers and becoming increasingly central to rural as well as urban areas, has shifted the balance of 
the rural economy. In response, new cultural attitudes have arisen which have altered the 
perception not only of migratory work, but also non-migratory labour and the absence of 
employment. Thus, in seeking to holistically explore the feedbacks of migration to rural livelihoods, 
as outlined in research question three, what follows shall focus on cultural attitudes towards rural 
non-migrants. 
7.3 The Micro: Crime and Conflict in the Village 
Given the ubiquity with which Cambodia’s rural areas are idealised, in the Western literature and 
Khmer cultural consciousness alike, as the bedrock of ‘a gentle land’ (Vickery, 1984), one of the more 
surprising complaints amongst residents of all three of the villages surveyed was the prevalence of, 
and nuisance created by rural “gangsters” in the community. As a number of residents noted, these 
young men are characterised primarily by violence amongst one another and theft from ordinary 
locals: 
‘In this village, there are many gangsters who are always either fighting each other or gangsters 
from other villages. They fight each other all the time, not killing each other but often getting 
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injured. When there’s a party in the village they don’t come to it with the same purpose as 
everybody else, they only come to fight.’ (Focus Group 09/05/13). 
In addition to violence, though, these young men – not organised criminal gangs as such, but more 
loosely defined groups of youths in their teens and early twenties engaged in anti-social and usually 
illegal behaviour – are prone to frequent and repeated theft of various items. In this regard, their 
favoured targets include pet dogs ‘to be sold in Phnom Penh’ (Focus Group, 09/05/13), motorbikes 
(Srawoon, 08/06/13; Yan Yin, 22/04/13) and fishing equipment (Net, 20/06/13) in particular, which 
‘just go missing in the night’ (Yan Yin, 22/04/13). 
As a small house-front vendor and fisherwoman indicated, certain “hotspots” of gangster activity 
can be identified in the local area, but the problem is endemic, having spread across all of the 
villages surveyed and beyond: 
‘I know that most of the robbers come from the 500 village [poum pram roy – to the north 
east of Northern Ampil], where people regularly gamble and play cards. In that village there 
are a lot of gangsters. Not only do they steal our fishing nets, but they also go out to catch 
dogs, chickens and ducks every night.  
However, it’s not only that village. There are also a few in our village too. Nowadays, there is 
a bit of gangster behaviour in every village. They are free, so they play cards, gamble, play 
pool and drink. They always cause conflicts.’ (Net, 20/06/13) 
In light of the widespread prevalence of reports concerning gangster activity, it is difficult to dispute 
that they are at the very least perceived as a pervasive problem. Neither are they an invisible threat, 
removed from the community. The young men involved in such activity may be seen passing the 
time by playing games such as pool or cards during the day with tattoos of varying prominence on 
their bodies, and even necks in some cases. 
Although tattoos are not uncommon in Cambodia, these designs differ markedly from the traditional 
markings which soldiers, in particular, have long used to ward off evil spirits and bad luck. In contrast 
to the densely structured pointillism of those Angkorean patterns, the more modern designs of the 
rebellious youth of Krang Youv district depict dragons and lions in a manner reminiscent of their East 
Asian counterparts. Furthermore, with the exception of the traditional designs, usually applied for 
spiritual or protective reasons, Cambodians are generally extremely hostile to marking the body in 
this way, making their application a considerable statement. As an urban informant summarised, ‘I 
know that many Westerners like tattoos, but if a Cambodian person gets them, everybody will hate 
him, really hate him.’ (Long, 19/06/13). 
On this basis, it would perhaps be expected that the “gangsters” of 500 village and the surrounding 
areas were social outcasts, but this is not the case. Most of them reportedly remain living in their 
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parental households, and thus linked to the traditional resources and inequalities of the village. As a 
result, anti-social behaviour and rural livelihoods become intertwined both spatially and culturally, 
with gangsters becoming associated with certain places and activities. These, in turn, share in the 
denigration of the gangsters. 
For instance, the 500 village, like North Ampil, which also reports high levels of theft and even 
intimidation (Net, 20/06/13), is poor and dominated by fishing. Both villages have a pool table, used 
for gambling, which is the focal point for young people to gather, and both display high levels of 
public drinking in the day time. Indeed, on any given day it is not uncommon to encounter several 
groups already drunk by midday or even earlier. For many in the poorer villages, this is daily 
behaviour, with the ready availability of cheap, locally produced palm wine, making it ‘just a hobby 
for them’ (Raksmey, 28/06/13). 
Such conduct earns the fishing communities to the north of the commune a degree of infamy in the 
surrounding villages, where it is claimed that they ‘just drink and play cards all day’ and that they are 
lazy and disinterested in farming compared to more southern villages, such as Jake (Pan Mon, 
28/05/13). Net (20/06/13), however, herself from North Ampil, offers a somewhat greater insight in 
stating that this behaviour derives not from laziness as such, but from ‘being free’ of work that 
needs to be done.  
Net’s perspective holds more than a kernel of truth. Rice land holdings amongst the fishing 
communities are lower than elsewhere, commerce scarce and fishing is usually done only in the 
morning to avoid the intense heat of the day. People in these poorer areas do, as a result, have more 
time to spend on leisure than their counterparts better endowed in terms of assets. As is so often 
the case, however, this lack of work is readily interpreted as a distaste for it, with cause and effect 
becoming inextricably intertwined in relation to poverty and anti-social behaviour. In this way, a 
recognition of the poverty of the area does not exonerate those with limited work from the 
character flaws traditionally associated with indolence: 
‘These kind of people [gangsters] don’t migrate because they need to be free and they don’t 
want to live under other people’s pressure. They are difficult people. (Net, 20/06/13) 
Furthermore, just as poverty of rural resources does not excuse inactivity on the part of the poor, 
nor either do limitations on extra-village work. Thus, as Net (20/06/13) sees it, the errant youths of 
the area are simultaneously unwilling and unable to seek work outside the village when none 
presents itself at home: 
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‘Also, most factories don’t want to hire men because men do demonstrations when people 
want to appeal for higher wages. Men are stronger personalities in demonstrations, so this is 
why the factories don’t want to hire them.’ (Net, 20/06/13) 
In the current climate of widespread, opposition party driven, factory worker unrest (see e.g. Phnom 
Penh Post, 03/01/2014) this appears to be a plausible explanation. Whatever the underlying reason, 
though, it is clear that men are significantly disadvantaged in terms of their ability to obtain factory 
work compared with women, for whom there is an ‘increasing demand’ in the garment sector in 
particular (Tunon and Rim, 2013). Furthermore, the high proportion of total labour migration which 
is associated with garment work in Cambodia (Maltoni, 2010) means that the volume of work 
available to men is notably smaller than that for women.  
With these non-migrants, especially those from poorer households, having little to do for much of 
the year and surrounded by unequal but increasing wealth, the emergence of male-dominated theft 
and extortion, noted also in relation to migration in the Indonesian context (Elmhirst, 2007) is in one 
sense unsurprising. Indeed, as Silvey (2001: 41) notes, such behaviour derives from dual cultural 
impulses: in the first place, a strong sense of shame at their ‘defeat’ in the realm of the modern 
sector work force and in the other, an undiminished sense of entitlement rooted in historical gender 
roles.   
Nevertheless, the behaviour of those left behind, whether idle or illegal, contrasts sharply with the 
predominantly female (70%, see table 7.1) migrant cohort, to the extent that women and girls are 
departing from, or remoulding, their traditional social paradigm of domesticity (Brickell and Chant, 
2010), to be seen as increasingly important breadwinners within the household. This is due not only 
to their perceived superiority in terms of remittance payments, but also indirectly, as a consequence 
of the tendency on the part of MFIs to agree loans to those with family members working in the 
factories (Focus Group, 03/06/13). The combination of these factors has come to promote a view, in 
some quarters, that ‘girls are the only ones who can really help the household’ (Poum Pith Lea 
Village Chief, Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014: 16).   
Table 7.1 Data on Remittances by Gender (own data) 
 Male Female 
Percentage of Total Remitters 30.3 69.7 
Mean Remittances per Month ($) 37 45 
Percentage Remitted 35.2 35.5 




The Pith Lea Village Chief’s claim is partly supported by the data, which indicate that (taking only 
those migrants who remit to their sender household) female migrants do indeed remit more on 
average than their male counterparts. Nevertheless, as indicated in table 7.1, the proportion 
remitted is almost exactly the same for both groups. This suggests that there is a degree of truth in 
the position of local microfinance institutions on the matter, but that it is underlain not by the 
widely perceived idea that young men are more likely to waste their money drinking and fighting 
(Shopkeeper and rented room owner, 21/06/13), but by lower wages (when viewed on a monthly or 
yearly, rather than daily basis) derivable from the migrant employments available to the majority of 
men. 
Thanks to pressure from NGOs and the international community, garment workers are some of the 
few migrants with contracts and consequently some of the few with anything approaching job 
security. Their wages may not the highest on offer, but the near certainty of a monthly pay check 
reduces the risk associated with remittance and investment. The work may be ‘exhausting’ (Virun, 
13/08/13), but the returns are at least reliable.  
As such, the narrative of female superiority in buttressing the household economy is not without 
foundation. However, the gendered stereotypes of feminine frugality, enshrined in the traditional 
Khmer doctrinal code for women, the chbap srey [woman’s law], and masculine drunkenness and 
fighting reported by various informants (e.g. Pon Tin, 27/06/13; Shopkeeper and rented room 
owner, 21/06/13) appear to be less important factors in this respect than the pragmatic reality that 
the steady income offered by factory work is more readily available to women.  
That the general feeling reported by migrants upon their return of being ‘more respected now’ and 
‘having more of a say in the household’ (Lin Da, 20/07/13) is therefore also distributed in favour of 
women, may appear at first as something of a boon for rural gender relations. However, as Karin 
Schelzig highlights, it manifests also in long term disadvantage: 
‘School enrolment rates are equal between genders, but drop out rates are far higher for 
girls. Anecdotally, people say they are going to the factories to work. These jobs are seen as 
much more valuable in the medium term than education.’ (Karin Schelzig, ADB, 15/08/13). 
What those statistics demonstrate is that economic opportunities are mediated via a variety of 
cultural perceptions, so that, ultimately, labour is not a neutral but a gendered process’ (Piper, 2004: 
217). Rightly or wrongly, the perception of men as liable to incite unrest disbars most of them from 
entry to certain relatively lucrative employments. As a result, their reduced ability to remit 
compared to women invokes some positive cultural paradigms, i.e. “dutiful daughters” (Derks, 2008) 
and other negative ones, for instance of men being ‘lazy’ and ‘uncaring’ (Srawoon, 08/06/13).  
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In this way, as demonstrated above by Net’s account of gangsters and their motivations, economic 
conditions and cultural narratives become intertwined. As ever, though, wealth, and land in 
particular, remains at the centre of the picture. Thus, in accordance with the core aim of this Ph.D. – 
which runs through all three research questions – to elucidate the dynamic relationship between 
ecology, economy and society in the migration process, what follows will make use of the insights on 
the production of culture gleaned throughout this chapter in order to demonstrate how even in this 
new and varied economic milieu, the ancient economic and cultural predominance of rice continues 
to underscore structured inequality in Krang Youv. 
7.4 The Macro: Economic and Cultural Aspects of Social Change 
As the villagers of Jake highlighted during an extended focus group discussion, the wealth which 
migration has brought to the villages is partly misleading in its appearance. Since migration, as a 
viable and widespread livelihoods strategy, began to take hold in earnest in Krang Youv commune, 
large houses have appeared, high value machinery purchased, and symbols of wealth and urbanity 
such as private toilets constructed (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). The temptation is to view these 
developments as having been swept in from the city on a tide of modern sector remittances, but 
whilst this is true in part, it nevertheless misses the core reality of Cambodia’s rural development: 
that those ‘houses were built with money earned from rice’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13). 
As such, the conspicuous consumption which has changed the face of villages like Jake is not, at its 
heart, the product of successful migrations, but large and successful harvests collected from the 
same acres of high yield, low-risk land which has traditionally defined Cambodia’s rural rich. What 
has changed is that migration now provides funds for investment in additional farming inputs such 
as better seeds, greater mechanisation and, increasingly commonly, land hire from wealthy 
individuals unable, or unwilling, to arrange the necessary labour and machinery to work the fields 
themselves. As one such rental-farmer explained: 
‘I have two plots of my own land, 0.5 hectares of low and 0.3 hectares of high land. Now 
though, I also hire 15 hectares of land to do rice farming. We have been doing it for three 
years already and plan to continue…We do it twice a year and it costs about $8-9000 for 
fertiliser, gasoline and weed killers. We rent it from a neighbour who has a lot of land: nearly 
100 hectares in one place’ (Win Si, 20/05/13) 
As Win Si’s account demonstrates, the investment cost of hiring land on this scale is sizable, available 
only to those with a significant amount of rice land to use as collateral, but the returns are even 
greater. For his family’s investment and labours, Win Si has thus far been rewarded with 1800 75kg 
sacks of rice each year in which he has undertaken this endeavour. Sold in this volume, he is forced 
to accept a discounted price from the usual 1000 riel [0.25 cents] per kilogram, but even at 750 riel 
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[19 cents] per kilo his annual income from farming exceeds $25,000, leaving a profit margin of over 
$16,000. 
Given that the gross income from his own farm land amounts to less than $1000, it becomes 
apparent that the scale of the profit available to those who invest in this way dwarfs almost any 
other available avenue. Income from fishing (including fish used for household consumption) 
generates an average of $1592 per household per year and the majority of migrant occupations 
cannot provide a great deal more. Garment workers, for instance, make an average of $1500 per 
year after over time, of which roughly 49% is remitted to the rural household. Other occupations 
(with a mean of 36% remitted for all occupations excluding garment work) tend to send back less.    
The scale of return from Win Si’s investment is not due only to his nous, however. His ability to 
undertake such lucrative activities is based partly on his ownership of a reasonably sized [0.8Ha] plot 
of rice land, diversified between low and high land, but perhaps to an even greater extent on his 
membership of networks in which others are doing so. As he notes, ‘I am close to so many people in 
the village, but especially the friends who farm rice near to me. We help each other with fertilising 
and lend pumps and ploughs’ (Win Si, 20/05/13). Viewed thus, it seems little coincidence that all of 






























                   Figure 7.1 Number of Reported Land Purchases per Year since 1985 (own data) 
 
 
Furthermore, in the light of the persistent and vital role of rice land amongst the wealthier strata of 
Krang Youv, it comes as no surprise that recent years have seen an increasing rate of transfer and 
consolidation of land in the hands of fewer large scale farmers, as demonstrated in Figure 7.1, which 
shows the number of land purchases reported per year by the survey population. In addition to 
highlighting a general increase in the volume of land transferred over time, the figure also displays 
peaks during some of the worst natural disasters of recent years, 1993, 2005, and 2011, reinforcing 
the linkage between climate shocks and land sale ‘because of crop failure’ (Soravanna, 18/04/13) 
which is also apparent in the qualitative data. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between land sale and the environment is a complex one. 
Transactions are often undertaken between family members, sometimes in response to personal 
requests, with the price of land varying enormously depending on the relationship between buyer 
and seller. It is particularly common, for instance, for land to be transferred between family 
members, one of whom has either grown too old to farm their own land, or has encountered 
financial difficulties. Under these circumstances, the land in question is generally sold at a 
discounted, or even nominal, rate.  
This transfer type has been described on numerous occasions by informants, in conversation with 
whom it emerges that intra-familial purchases are often couched in the language of favour and 
entreaty. Net Yuan, for example, a petty trader and fisherwoman in North Ampil related how when 
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she had no land on which to build a house nearly thirty years ago, her sister had ‘sold me 0.3 
hectares for only fifty riel [just over one cent in today’s money] which was such a low price it was 
really a gift’ (Net Yuan, 20/06/13). Not long afterwards, she was involved in another familial land 
transaction: ‘I used to have 0.25 hectares of rice land but had to sell it to my other sister [to pay for 
medical treatment] 19 years ago when my son got malaria and had stomach problems for a long 
time after. This time I sold it for 900,000 riel [$225]’.  
Arrangements such as Net Yuan’s inward and outward land transfers are a common aspect of village 
life, being frequently utilised by poorer members of extended families including one or more better 
off members either to provide assistance or to ensure a decent price for the goods on sale. However, 
favourable engagements of this sort are by no means limited to those who most need them. For 
instance, the following account was given by the wife of one of the largest landowners in the village, 
whose new two story house, amongst the most sizeable and luxurious in the village system, has 
recently been completed: 
‘I inherited over one hectare from my parents. A little bit of high land and the rest low land, 
but three years ago, I bought another five hectares from my cousin, who sold it because he 
felt was getting too old to farm. It cost 3 million riel [$750] for all five hectares. I didn’t have 
to borrow from a microfinance organisation, just 1 million riel [$250] from my parents and 
the rest I raised from selling pigs and rice, and from my savings’ (Net Mom, 28/06/13). 
In both of these cases, although the deal agreed upon was somewhat more favourable to one of the 
two parties, it was undertaken with the full assent and approval of the other. As a result, Net Yuan 
has been able to avoid large amounts of debt other than what she requires for the maintenance of 
her petty trading business and enjoys a livelihood of reasonable quality and stability in spite of her 
lack of paddy land. Where such transactions must be undertaken via non-familial means, the 
outcomes are rarely as equitable. Few people sell land to non-family except in times of dire need 
and this is well known by potential buyers, who are able to buy at well below market value as a 
result. Pan Yuen, who ‘sold all of my land in 2009 due to my husband’s, as well as my parents’ illness’ 
(Pan Yuen, 28/04/13) is one such example, as is Sruen, who described her situation in greater detail: 
‘When my husband first got stomach cancer, we went to a hospital in Phnom Penh. We only 
had $150 though and the doctor said that scans and monitoring would cost more. We asked 
him to reduce the price, but he refused so we returned to the village. When the disease 
worsened, we sold 0.2 hectares [out of a total of 0.3 Ha] and went to Vietnam and Kampong 
Cham for treatment. By that time it was too late, though’ (Sruen, 29/04/13). 
As Sruen was forced to sell outside the family, the price she received was relatively low and what 
money she raised was expended long before her husband’s death. Her loss, though, was the gain of 
one of those landowners who either by luck, judgement, or a combination of the two, have money 
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available to purchase discounted land when the opportunity arises. Although family illness is a 
frequent cause of sales, consecutive years of crop failure often produce the same result. As 
Soravanna (28/04/13), the current owner of six hectares, explained: ‘I inherited two hectares, but 
bought four more between 1986 and 2003. It came from four or five villagers whose crops had failed 
for two or three years in a row’.  
Natural and somatic shocks are not, however, the only motivations for land sale in Krang Youv. As 
alternatives to paddy farming become available, those farmers whose land is inconveniently spread 
or carries a low yield appear increasingly to be selling to those seeking to acquire it. Krang Youv’s 
largest landowner, Pan Mon (28/05/13), for instance, claims to have accumulated the entirety of his 
35 hectares in this way, ‘from thirty or forty people whose land was too spread out to be convenient 
for them’. Similarly, a second farmer purchased 3 hectares in 1995 ‘from two different villagers, who 
sold their fields because they were too far away from their houses (Pan Nol, 09/05/13). Yet others 
stated that the previous owners of their land ‘had decided to move away from farming’ (Ban Korn, 
23/04/13), or ‘to find work outside of the village instead’ (Moon Heng, 07/05/13).  
As such, the natural ebb and flow of land sale resulting from health and climate shocks appears, in 
recent years, to have been catalysed by the additional factor of alternative income sources. The 
increasing instability of the environment in which paddy cultivation takes place, highlighted in 
chapter five, which induces even the largest farmers to admit that ‘with rice farming, sometimes you 
win and sometimes you lose these days’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13), makes it increasingly unattractive to 
smallholders in comparison with the extra-village income streams provided by migrant labour or 
petty trade.  
Furthermore, the case of Pan Mon, in particular, demonstrates that with a concerted effort, 
opportunistic land acquisitions such as these, undertaken over a sustained period, can lead to an 
exponential expansion as the cash reserves generated by previous purchases are used to fund future 
acquisitions. As landholdings expand, investments in yield improvement become possible. Farmers 
well endowed with land may purchase hand tractors or harvesters, or involve themselves in 
networks ‘where we always share each others machines’ (Win Si, 20/05/13).  
On an even larger scale, at the time of interview, Pan Mon had recently finished the construction of 
an irrigation channel running several kilometres from north to south, and to the west of the three 
study sites. In addition to serving his own land, other nearby farmers are each charged a fee which 
when combined are sufficient to cover the running costs of the entire channel in terms of 
maintenance and electricity. Nevertheless, in spite of the advantages conveyed to the owners of 
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these increasingly concentrated land resources, one production factor, labour, is reportedly 
becoming increasingly scarce. 
Indeed, although the purchase of labour saving machines such as tractors and harvesters hugely 
reduces the need for hired labour, the small and fragmented paddy fields from which large land 
portfolios are composed, usually bordered according to their original ownership by banks of mud 
constructed to retain water, are not in all cases suitable for mechanised farming practices. In such 
cases, the traditional methods of hand picking, planting, and transplanting must be used. However, 
finding workers to do so is increasingly difficult.  
Although the fields of Krang Youv have been tended for centuries by human hands, the same 
modernising forces which facilitate their mass acquisition are also at play in reducing the stock of 
those available to tend them. As the Commune Chief (15/08/13) explained, the pioneers of 
migration were those wealthy enough to afford labour saving devices: 
‘People first started to migrate when they started to get two-wheeled [hand] tractors 
because it allowed them to replace their labour. It meant they didn’t need people to help 
with transplanting and planting and harvesting’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). 
Decades later, the pressure placed on smallholders and the landless by a lack of rural wage labour 
has proved a factor in the volume of migration expanding to the point that even the limited supply 
required by larger landholders is no longer available.  
Beyond the economic shift that this entails, attitudes towards agricultural wage labour appear to 
have transcended its scarcity, manifesting in a burgeoning cultural perception that it is a lowly 
undertaking. Certainly, the relative ‘comfort’ and ‘coolness’ (Lin Da, 30/07/13; Srey Dara, 08/05/13) 
of migrant labour compared with that undertaken in the fields is cited often as a point in its favour, 
but the superiority of wages that can be earned inside is underpinned, by deeper cultural mores . As 
noted by Derks (2008), garment work in particular has a resonance related to the protracted 
ceremony of “going into the shade”, wherein engaged girls spend six months of daytimes indoors 
prior to their wedding in order to lighten their skin. 
Even migrant work undertaken largely outdoors is associated with an inherent social superiority. 
Motorcycle taxi drivers in particular, but also those construction workers whose labour is sufficiently 
light (such as foremen), very commonly grow the nail of their little finger to an ostentatious length of 
one or two centimetres. This, they say, is to ‘show that I don’t work in the fields’ (Vishal, 20/07/13) 
and have therefore graduated to a level above those that do. It may be taken either as a cultural 
irony, or a socioeconomic backlash, that due to the very high proportion of migrants – over 80% 
(Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014) – who contribute agricultural labour to their households 
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during key periods, those who maintain such a feature on a year round basis are likely to be from 
landless households.   
On the rural side, that agricultural wage labour is undertaken in relatively small numbers and then 
only by the poorest villagers is supported by the data, with the survey having encountered only a 
handful of respondents who cite it as an element in their portfolio of incomes. Of these, all were 
considerably older than usual migrant age and the overwhelming majority were female, suggesting 
that involvement in hired farm work is an option amenable only to those unable to take on extra-
village alternatives.   
Indeed, larger landowners report an increasing unwillingness to undertake rural wage labour 
‘because people are embarrassed to be seen working for others in the village’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13). 
As a result, Pan Mon in particular complains that he has had to raise the wages he pays for wage 
labour to unprecedented levels and still cannot fill his quota of labourers on a regular basis: 
‘I myself need a lot of workers to do a large farm. I pay $7 per day plus three meals per day, 
but still many people don’t want to work for me because they are shy and ashamed to work 
for someone else in the same village, so they go elsewhere. It is very difficult to find enough 
workers here. It is difficult even to find workers for mouse catching. Even though the extra 
ten kg of rats would fetch 25k riel [on top of the daily wage he pays] and requires only that a 
trap be set, making the [total] over $10 per day, they still don’t want to try’ (Pan Mon, 
28/05/13). 
Whether this is a phenomenon unique to Jake village is, however, not entirely clear, and given that 
the rates of rural wage labour uptake are considerably higher towards the poorer north of the 
commune, it seems likely that this reticence is related at least in part to the wealth of a given 
community. What is more widespread, however, is the increasing tension between rich and poor, in 
a war of words which appears increasingly to be dividing rural communities. With increasing 
frequency, from the north to the south of the commune, the poor are derided for their indolence by 
the rich in this village, who argue that ‘there are many things you can do to earn money: collecting 
firewood, or fish, helping with farming, but people don’t want to because they are lazy’ (Pan Mon, 
28/05/13). 
In response, those on the receiving end of this elite denigration shoot back, albeit in private or in 
whispers, with equal venom. One such respondent, himself a migrant to a garment factory in Sak te 
Bo, but crucially lacking a sizeable enough income from rice land or other sources for that pay check 
to facilitate even a secure rural livelihood, let alone investment, vented his frustration at the 
divisions he perceived in village society: 
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‘Now the relationship between the rich and the poor is getting further and further apart. 
Now the rich act as if they are bosses, ordering the poor about. Also, there is no negotiating 
with them. If the rich say 15k [$3.75], then the price is 15k.’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13) 
As he continued: 
‘Rich people go outside the village to migrate just the same as poor people, but still there is 
something different. Rich people always migrate together with other rich people, whereas 
poor people just go with other poor people. Then, when they come back, they still stay 
separate.’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13) 
In broad terms, Sok Tol’s sentiments echo those of a construction worker in Cham Jao, who asserted 
that ‘generally the children of rich people just leave the village to study whereas the poor people go 
to work. Also, rich people tend to open their own businesses, such as shops selling all kinds of things 
in the village’ (Construction Worker Interview 14/08/13). Most importantly, though, both highlight 
the manner in which subtle rural inequalities not only result in benefits for, or detriments to, 
migrants in the city, but how those advantages in turn entrench the rural social and economic 
differentials which gave rise to them. As a result, much like the divergent trajectories of labour 
migration described in chapter six, the ever present inequalities of assets in Cambodian rural life are 
being ‘stretched’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13) by the inequalities of opportunity which emerge from them. 
Viewed thus, the issue of debt emerges in an even starker light, accelerating the upwards trajectory 
of those who already have possession of a secure livelihood and hastening the downwards spiral 
into dependency of those who do not. Indeed, of all the changes and developments shifting the 
social landscape of Krang Youv in the 21st century, it is the differentiation in the usage of debt within 
the community which is most widely and readily remarked upon. Like the houses, roads and cars 
which modernity has brought, these divergent paths are clear for all to see: 
‘Microfinance is not good for the village. People replace private debt with microfinance 
debt, but if they don’t have someone in the garment factories and they might lose their 
land. [As a result] there are very few people who do well from microfinance. Only the rich 
are able to take out a loan to expand a business. The poorer people just borrow from 
Microfinance institutions to expand their house and so on.’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13). 
Such comments, like those of the Ampil village chief, who noted that debt was ‘the biggest problem 
in the village’ and ultimately ‘make the poorest poorer and poorer’ (Truen Ngum, 29/04/13), 
demonstrate a strong local appreciation of the different uses and outcomes of debt, and the 
downside of its usage by those who can ill afford to borrow. Above and beyond this appreciation, 
though, the above comments emphasize the holistic manner in which the various modern influences 




As such, each element in the rural livelihoods portfolio leads into and out from another. A general 
awareness within the village that the usage of debt – and the ability to gain from it – depends upon 
landholdings and assets is complemented by a systematic conception of the relationship between 
borrowing and migration. As they see it, migration may be either the subordinate or dominant factor 
in the hierarchy of needs, opportunities and change: 
‘If a family is badly affected by debt, then they will find a member to migrate and work off 
the debt. When it is paid off they will come back, as it is very hard work. Nevertheless, if 
people have a family member in a garment factory, then they will take out a loan and use 
the remittances to pay it back every month. It is very easy to get a microfinance loan if you 
have a family member in a factory’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13) 
As highlighted, furthermore, by the argument that it is ‘money from rice’ that builds the new houses 
and buys the cars that are the icons of modernity in Krang Youv (Focus Group, 03/06/13), it is clear 
that villagers in all three of the study sites recognise the undergirding role of traditional rural assets 
and risk in determining the trajectories of change upon which households find themselves.  Land and 
environmental risk, rather than being marginalised in the village economy remain, therefore, at its 
core. As a result, traditional ideals of thrift, hard work and the avoidance of over reaching one’s 
means or status have a continued relevance for some. 
Traditional Cambodian folk tales are replete with warnings and advice in this respect, highlighting all 
manner of situations wherein deference is the preferable course. For example: 
Khluon teap kom taong dai khley kom chhong aop brava phnum 
Small one, don’t stand up so tall; 
And you with the short arms, 
Don’t try to embrace the mountain. 
[Khmer Proverb warning against the perils of ambition (Fisher-Nguyen, 1994)] 
To these may be added a further axiom, intoned by an elderly inhabitant of Jake village. Having lived 
through all of the key events of Cambodia’s twentieth century history in his eighty years, he saw fit 
to bemoan, above all, the culture of immediacy, overspending, and greed, which he viewed as 
having replaced a more responsible and frugal community character embodied by a proverb from his 
boyhood: 
Tok touic pin bom poong, chong chong konlah k’hait 
One drip in the tube, squeeze, squeeze, all gone 
(Focus Group, 03/06/13) 
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As he explained, proverbs such as this were once universal reference points in Cambodian culture, 
forming part of a set of norms which were mutually applicable to rich and poor alike, allowing Khmer 
people both to ‘subjugate’ foreign lands and ‘work together with’ their neighbours (Village Elder 
Interview, 03/06/13). Today, however, the multiple overlapping aphorisms of traditional Cambodian 
culture are increasingly becoming rods with which to beat the divergent strata of Khmer society. The 
poor are ‘lazy’ (Net, 20/06/13; Pan Mon, 28/05/13); the rich ‘act like bosses’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13); 
migrants are ‘aloof’ (Construction Worker, 14/08/13); and the debt ridden are ‘greedy’ (Village Elder 
Interview, 03/06/13).  
Of course, divisions such as this have always existed in Cambodia, but, as with the increasing 
economic inequality described in chapter six, what once were cracks are rapidly becoming chasms. 
Labour migration may be the catalyst in this respect, but the villages are not being reshaped by 
novel, urban, ideas and ideologies. Rather, an old and adaptable culture is responding to a new 
environment, as an increasing lack of unity forces the inhabitants of Krang Youv commune to define 
themselves not only by what they are, but by what they are not. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Far from the static, unified, image of its folk tales, Cambodia today is a land of numerous 
trajectories. As modernity has encroached ever deeper into its rural heartlands, small differences in 
wealth, assets and risk have been magnified by the new opportunities available to those able to 
seize them. On the other side of the coin, the lower boundaries of poverty and dependency have 
sunk deeper, as the ready availability of debt continues to drive the net assets of the poorest far 
below what was available from traditional moneylenders, and even further away from what they 
might hope to repay. 
The result of such changes is not, however, simply a departure from the traditional agricultural 
livelihoods bases of rice, fish and vegetables, but a revision of their role, distribution, and symbolism. 
Where once the relationship between land and labour formed the basis of rural society, the case 
today is more fragmented. The fruits of progression may in many ways still be measured in sacks of 
rice, but the key to their accumulation lies outside the village. Only the modern sector is able to 
provide the necessary income to both insure against the risks and invest in the expansion of rice 
farming in contemporary climate.  
Identity and the place of individuals within this hierarchy, once tightly defined by assets visible to the 
community (Scott, 1985; 1972), are now cleft in multiple ways. Many of the younger generation are 
no longer wholly rural, but nor either are they meaningfully urban. Male primacy has been partially 
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eroded by the influx of foreign factories, which have also attached a new set of values to rural work. 
In this new environment, agricultural wage labour, once the quotidian bulwark of a durable 
patrimonial society, is now sometimes shunned in favour of risky cross-border migrations.  
However, this is not, ultimately, a question of insiders and outsiders. Everybody now is “inside” the 
process of modernisation, livelihoods fragmentation, and uneven wealth agglomeration. Rather, the 
rumbles of discontent, shunned former friendships and tattooed extortionists, are the hallmarks of a 

























The research set out in this Ph.D. has investigated the nature and functionality of the networks 
which facilitate labour migration in Cambodia. In doing so, it has focussed, in particular, on 
understanding the relationship between migratory networks and the social structures in which both 
migrants and their households are embedded. However, it has sought also to move beyond the 
narrow focus of the social capital literature by embedding these networks firmly within their physical 
and cultural context.  Thus, rather than merely seeking to emphasize the importance of these 
linkages, this thesis has sought to elucidate their emergence and development, as well as the role 
they play in binding capital to culture in Cambodia’s rural and urban areas alike.    
In attempting to draw coherent linkages in this regard, the research presented herein has examined 
the relationship not between social relations and capital, but between social relations and 
livelihoods. Risk has entered the equation, as has debt, to sit alongside income and assets as 
potential influences on community structure. Viewed thus, clear correlations emerge from the data 
between the manner in which households seek to manage their livelihoods and the company they 
most regularly keep. The need to minimise risk and maximise opportunity therefore constitutes a 
constraint on people’s closest relationships, which appear to be grounded in functional groups 
concerned with sharing labour, loans, or information. 
As such, the data strongly suggest the social structures of Cambodian villages as a whole are related 
to the specific asset and liability profiles of the households which compose them. However, they are 
equally clear in demonstrating a secondary role of these functional groupings: social stratification. 
Although individuals enter willingly and productively into sharing arrangements, their ability to do so 
is determined primarily by what they have. The owner of one hectare of rice land would be unwise 
to do provas dei with other farmers holding two, as his labour would not be returned in full. 
Similarly, a farmer with no hand tractor can offer little to a group of those who have; one who raises 
no pigs may have difficulty in gaining access to the rearing knowledge of those who do.  
Furthermore, the stratification which these functional associations perpetuate is not limited to rural 
communities. Though they may be hundreds of miles from their respective villages, the behaviour of 
rural-urban migrants, with regard not only to remittance payments but also to patterns of 
association in the urban space, is intimately related to what their household has and does not have. 
Migrants whose families, as a result of illness or climate, find themselves with high debts or low 
incomes prior to migration, may become stranded in the urban employment, unable to plan a 
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return. By contrast, those whose rural households possess a more secure rural income base are able 
to train, advance, and embed themselves in productive urban social networks. Incorporating these 
extremes and everything in between, Cambodia’s rural inequalities are both mirrored in, and 
magnified by the city. 
The complex realities of rural livelihoods and migrant labour are, in this way, shaping the evolution 
of a social structure no longer, if ever, suited to the dichotomies of rural/ urban, rich/ poor, or 
farmer/ non-farmer, amongst others. Always far more heterogeneous than tends to be 
acknowledged in either the Khmer popular consciousness or the academic literature, this 
enhancement of inequality and difference is creating new cultural narratives to replace the norms 
associated with an isolated rural enclave, rooted in the production of primary produce.  In many 
such locales for instance, intra-village trade, traditionally being ‘akin to a state of war’, was viewed 
with a degree of repugnance (Platteau, 1991: 7).  The incursion of the market has forced this and 
many other norms to adapt to changing circumstance. 
As such, the cultural cornerstones of Khmer society: gender, duty, community and hierarchy, are 
themselves beginning to shift. Where once women, for instance, were confined to their house prior 
to marriage, now many are sent to factories, thereby transmuting the principles of obedience and 
separation to a new and more relevant form. Similarly, as those most able to help with farming, sons 
once held the keys to earning merit and influence within the family. Today their sisters increasingly 
possess that advantage. Where once land was the currency of familial assistance, today it is 
channelled increasingly to an elite whose position is entrenched by well developed bonds the city.  
As this chapter will demonstrate, the findings derived from this thesis make a contribution to three 
interrelated clusters of literature. First, it has built upon previous network theoretic (Borgatti and 
Halgin, 2011; Burt, 2001; Granovetter, 1977) and social capital related work (Bjørnskov & 
Sønderskov, 2013; Portes and Landholt, 2007; Bourdieu, 1984) in establishing a new network 
mapping methodology capable of incorporating income, assets and the effect of the natural 
environment into the analysis of social structure. As such, this aspect of the thesis builds both upon 
recent work on the use of eigenvectors in social network analysis (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2011; 
Bonacich, 2007;) and a longer history of research into mutual insurance (Fafchamps and Gubert, 
2007; Fafchamps, 2005; Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Platteau, 1991; Scott, 1985), with regard to 
which the key finding is that “bonding” linkages – or bonds of affection as they are sometimes called 




Leading on from the findings on network functionality outlined in chapter five, the role of personal 
networks in undergirding social and economic inequality was further explored in relation to labour 
migration and remittances in chapter six. Therein, several findings were outlined regarding the 
relationship between household livelihoods and the livelihoods of urban migrants, with both the 
quantitative and qualitative data highlighting the extent to which urban wellbeing and opportunity 
are shaped by rural advantage. In the sense that they constitute a new national case study of 
“inequality transportation”, these findings contribute both to the existing household literature 
(Locke et al. 2013; Tacoli and Mabala, 2010; Resurreccion, 2005, Silvey, 2001) and the growing body 
of literature on remittances and inequality (Betroli and Marchetta, 2014; Lindley, 2009; Jones, 1998). 
Moreover, by highlighting the crucial role played by rural and urban bonding networks in 
transporting inequality, an underexplored dimension has been developed within these literatures. 
The final set of findings, outlined in chapter seven, relate to the manner in which labour migration is 
shifting rural cultural norms in Cambodia. The results presented therein constitute a response to the 
call by Hughes (2001) and Colletta and Cullen (2000) to explore further the specific cultural changes 
underway in response to economic development and labour migration in the Kingdom, as well as 
contributing to and replenishing the high quality but sparse ethnographic literature (e.g. Bylander, 
2013; Ledgerwood, 2007; Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002; Hinton, 1998a, 1998b). Additionally, 
however, it has sought to draw out more clearly the specific linkages between migration and social 
change in a similar manner to that undertaken by Elmhirst (2007) in the Indonesian context. These 
developments, as well as their implications for answering the research questions set out in this 
thesis, will be discussed in greater detail below. 
8.1 Function 
Following the collapse of the Structural Functionalist edifice in the 1970s, the language of 
functionality regarding social systems, communities, or groups, had all but disappeared. The seminal 
works of Foucault (1995), Bourdieu (1984) and others have convincingly put forward the case that 
society is not the integrated, rational, obelisk of the mid-twentieth century, but a collage of 
perspective, power, and inequality. More often than not, it has been shown, the structures and sub-
structures of society work less like a machine and more like a “field” upon which competition is 
played out (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Aside from an abortive re-examination of functionalism in the light of post-structural developments 
during the early 1990s (see e.g. Alexander and Colomy, 1991; Kincaid, 1990), one of the ways in 
which this recognition has re-emerged in the literature in recent years has been within the social 
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capital literature. Nevertheless, this new wave of interest in the functionality of social systems 
admitted little debt to its theoretical forebears in network theory (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973) 
and sociology (Simmel, e.g. 1971). Instead, it constructed its own parentage, with Putnam (2001) 
and Farr (2004) tracing unbroken threads from their own work, via the celebrated American thinkers 
Dewey (1904) and Hanifan (1916), to Adam Smith. 
By short-circuiting its own theoretical heritage in this way, social capital theory was able to 
obfuscate, for a time, its latently functionalist character. Later, though, under the spotlight of fierce, 
post-millennial criticism (e.g. Fine 2001, 2003, 2010; Radcliffe, 2004), this perceived shortcoming has 
become one of the most effective sticks with which to beat the theory and its adherents. 
Nevertheless, as Bjornskov and Sonderskov (2010) pertinently highlight, it is not social capital’s 
concern with function which is the problem, but the lack of examination with which it is undertaken 
therein. Questions such as functional how and for whom have generally been left unasked and 
unanswered in the recent literature, but nevertheless occupy a central position within the research 
questions of this thesis. 
The first of these questions was addressed in chapter five of this Ph.D., which sought to elucidate 
why social networks operate as they do in Cambodia and the extent to which they are related to the 
functional requirements of the household, such as the need to mitigate environmental risk or share 
labour. Therein, the data gleaned from Krang Youv highlights that the relationship between wealth 
and social linkages, which lies at the core of social capital theory, is indeed a significant one, but that 
this is not a bi-variate relationship. The various network structures in evidence within Krang Youv do 
not determine the wealth of those who reside within them in any simple sense. Nor are these social 
constructions autopoietic, or determined exclusively by cultural norms. Rather, as suggested also by 
Bankoff (2007), they appear to arise in response to both opportunity and (perceived and actual) risk.  
Indeed, both communities and households which have historically experienced a higher level of crop 
loss as a result of natural disasters are considerably more likely to participate in certain types of 
social groups, in particular those related to labour and credit sharing arrangements. Engagement in 
social activity of this sort is inherently functional: it serves in the first instance to pool risk to some 
extent between members and in the second to smooth consumption related to unpredictable 
income. Neither should there be any controversy in describing it as such. When the function itself is 
specific, i.e., “minimising agricultural risk” as opposed to the rather more general state of 
“wellbeing” implicitly favoured by much of the social capital literature, the how and for whom lead 
naturally from it. 
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Nevertheless, the purpose of chapter five was not merely to emphasize that groups in Cambodia 
perform functions. Although this point has fallen somewhat from favour within the Geographic and 
Sociological literature, it has nevertheless retained a discernable presence, in the work, for instance 
of Platteau and Abraham (2002), Fafchamps (1992; 2005), and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007). 
Rather, the aim herein has been to move beyond a discrete awareness of function, towards an 
appreciation of its role in contributing to the structure of communities. In particular, the various 
methodological innovations employed herein, including the embedded network mapping 
methodology outlined in chapter three, have been constructed with a view to embedding social 
structures within their environmental and geographic context, so as to draw specific, rather than 
merely heuristic linkages between risk, assets, and association. 
The results suggest, in accordance with Cote and Nightingale (2011) and Constanza et al. (2007), 
amongst others, that functional social responses to the biophysical environment made at a 
household level are some of the key building blocks of communities and sub-communities. The 
decision to share labour with a neighbour in order to mutually reduce risk, or to attach oneself to an 
influential member of the community in order to maximise access to information about the city are 
not discrete actions. Rather, they are mediated and intertwined with cultural norms of interaction to 
produce a communal social structure, forged from the shifting assets and liabilities of its members. 
In the 21st century, however, this system appears to be changing. As the cultural and economic 
influences of modernity have gradually extended into rural Cambodia, the motivations for collective 
action have necessarily diversified to reflect their influence.  Just as networks and cooperative action 
appear malleable according to the changing profile of environmental risk faced by the household, so 
too does this principle extend to the risk faced by households dependent on migrant remittances. 
However, unlike their counterparts seeking to mitigate their losses from possible crop failure, whose 
behaviour tends towards engagement in small groups offering mutual assistance, households whose 
income depends on the city are, as demonstrated in chapter five, more likely to associate with high 
status individuals, whose knowledge and connections offer the insurance of information in times of 
need.  
As with labour sharing groups, these arrangements fulfil both a primary and a latent role, on the one 
hand facilitating access to a degree of information for those who depend upon rural wages and on 
the other, re-moulding the aggregate structure of social relations in response to this new imperative. 
Indeed, this study has provided empirical – albeit cross sectional – evidence of the social structural 
changes hypothesised by Colletta and Cullen (2000) in response to migration. Specifically, the small, 
horizontal groupings characteristic of labour sharing may be in the process of being replaced with 
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wider networks incorporating key nodes whose access to urban information marks them out. 
Nevertheless, as Platteau and Abraham (2002) note elsewhere, this loosening of the relationship 
between society and rice is not likely to see traditional, land-based, elites cast aside. Rather, as 
Chapter 6 and 7 sought to show, the covariance and fungibility of social and physical wealth offers 
traditional elites ample opportunity to entrench and enhance their position in the face of such 
change. 
8.2 Form 
Where migrants to Cambodia’s urban centres are afforded consideration, it is almost invariably en 
masse and primarily with reference to the paucity of their living standards. Garment and 
construction workers, it is often argued, are exploitatively underpaid (e.g. Nishigaya, 2002) and 
subject to injurious health risks in many cases (Phnom Penh Post, 2012). The relative homogeneity of 
wages offered by modern sector employers underpins this perspective, encouraging commentators 
to analyze migrant labour in Cambodia at the firm, or even industry level.  
The theoretical and methodological positions employed herein have sought to challenge this 
assumption. Just as Cambodia’s rural villages contain a wider variety of livelihoods than even local 
administrators, such as the Krang Youv commune chief (15/08/13), tend to appreciate, or admit, so 
too is the Kingdom’s migrant population a highly diversified and complex arena. Migrants to rural 
factory clusters such as Sak te Bo and Andaing are likely to meet a quite different experience from 
those who arrive in Phnom Penh. Similarly, the lives of construction and garment workers are often 
poles apart.  
Nevertheless, although broad occupational and rural-urban boundaries delineate notable 
differences, they also mask those which are most significant. The real heterogeneities exist within 
Phnom Penh, within Sak te Bo, and within their factories and construction sites, rather than between 
them. Each migrant carries with them a portfolio of advantage and obligation which moulds their 
time in the city. They may have connections, they may not. They may have money, they may not. 
They may have large debts, they may not. They may bear the burden of crippling remittance 
payments, or like some of their wealthier counterparts, they may not. In this way, each migrant 
carries the indelible stamp of their household situation with them for the duration of their time 
away from home. 
These mechanisms, by which rural inequalities are transferred so effectively to new and sometimes 
distant arenas, are clearly visible to the literature, but, with the exception of Lindlay (2009), have 
rarely been considered in exactly this light. Commitment to the household, mutual visitations and 
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remittances are viewed as instruments of rural development (Tacoli, 2003; 2010, Deschingkar and 
Grimm, 2005) and “safety nets” (e.g. Silvey and Elmhirst, 2003; Smith, 1998) throughout the Global 
South. In Cambodia specifically, they are credited with playing a ‘remarkable role’ in ameliorating 
the effects of the global economic downturn (CDRI, 2012), at which time, despite the garment sector 
alone being forced to absorb a loss of over 53, 000 jobs between 2008 and 2009 (Arnold, 2013: 3), 
the anticipated livelihoods crisis did not materialise (CDRI, 2012). Employment returned to pre-crash 
levels by the beginning of 2012 (Arnold, 2013: 3). 
These persistent linkages, through which money, information and assistance flow, are indeed worthy 
of the praise they receive. Many households or communities who may otherwise have faced 
destitution are now able to rely upon regular remittances. With reliance, however, comes inevitable 
obligation and this corollary is all too rarely considered. The simple observation that poorer 
households are forced to make heavier financial demands upon their migrant members begins 
merely to hint at how two equivalent salaries may be differently spent by migrants from divergent 
rural circumstances. Once this line of enquiry is opened, moreover, a whole array of knowledge on 
remittances may be turned upon its head: significant financial flows become crippling burdens and 
transmitters of inequality; much smaller ones may denote long term advantage and investment. 
In addition, that rural-urban linkages are conveyers not only of money, but also of information (see, 
e.g. Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Levitt, 1998) is a stylized fact and one well supported by the 
evidence herein. Nevertheless, how divergent qualities and quantities of information may affect the 
migrants who receive it is a question generally un-raised. This thesis has therefore sought to 
complement the largely econometric literature (e.g. Betroli and Marchetta, 2014; Jones, 1998) – 
again, excluding Lindley (2009) and other ethnographic studies such as Derks (2008) who tackle the 
topic indirectly – with a network perspective highlighting the inter-relationship between financial 
and informational constraints. As demonstrated herein, rural household wealth means the 
difference between a stable job with a chance of progression, and a nomadic, indeterminate search 
for employment which can reconcile the needs of household and migrant. Lower remittances occupy 
a synergistic role in this respect, allowing greater freedom to socialise in the urban space and 
thereby to build the networks which lead to safety, security and long term advancement. As a result, 
the evidence here points to a direct correlation between rural wealth (measured either in terms of 
assets or income) and social integration within the migrant environment.  
As such, in answering research question two of this thesis, which sought to explore what role rural 
household resources have in determining the formation and effectiveness of migratory networks, 
this chapter has presented a range of quantitative and qualitative evidence to demonstrate the 
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significance of this relationship. As shown therein, the difference between those migrants who have 
the resources to build such networks and those who do not, is one not of degree, but of kind. For 
those whose remittances are the only, or the primary, source of income for their household, there is 
often no end in sight to an isolated urban life, bereft of all but the smallest self-indulgences. For 
others, migration may be only a short episode of their lives, used as a means of saving money, 
acquiring skills, or of beginning a new life away from the fields. Each of these paths diversifies 
migrant livelihoods further, accelerating the acquisition conditions of the elites, whilst tightening the 
bondage of the poorest to their debts, their obligations, and the factory floor. 
8.3 Feedbacks 
 
The final research question guiding this thesis has been whether or not the process of migration is 
feeding back into the systems and social structures which support it, altering norms and shifting 
roles in the light of changing circumstances. In this regard, the answer was unequivocal: Cambodia 
today is a land changing in multiple ways. The historical checks and balances on the power of capital 
and labour are, as noted within the Malaysia of previous decades by Scott, (1985; 1972), being 
progressively dismantled by the ability of rural elites to acquire labour saving machines, or to invest 
beyond the village in trade or the pursuit of modern sector wages. In place of the old certainties of 
rural labour sale, debt – led at first, and still justified by microfinance, but now to some extent 
superseded by the private banking behemoth ACLEDA – has stepped in, smoothing the consumption 
of the poorer at the same time as it bolsters the investment power of the richer.  
 
The incursion of ACLEDA into the depth of Cambodia’s rural areas serves as a formalisation of the 
duality of debt use therein. Where previously richer and poorer alike were reliant on microfinance, 
today it is usually the preserve of those who intend to utilise their borrowings for subsistence, 
consumption, or repair. Those planning to invest tend to favour the larger loans available from 
private banking, knowing that the higher interest rates will be mitigated by profits and swift 
repayment. 
 
This pattern of division is not, furthermore, limited to debt. Migration, once the preserve of the elite 
and referred to by Colletta and Cullen (2000) as a key source of cultural capital rooted in traditional 
esteem for those with knowledge of the outside world, has now itself been sub-divided into strata of 
unequal merit, each affecting its own “distinction” (Bourdieu, 1984) upon its bearers. Knowledge of 
and work in the city no longer stands atop the ladder of prestige within Cambodian villages, having 
been supplanted by access to more lucrative international opportunities. Even work abroad, though, 
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has its own hierarchy, with China and South Korea now the preserve of the wealthiest villagers, 
whereas the poor must make do with riskier and less lucrative trips to Thailand or Malaysia, often on 
an illegal basis.  
 
These alternative modes of migration are each associated with divergent, and often discordant, 
cultural narratives which reinforce the inequality of wages. Although almost all remitting migrants 
are dutiful, for instance, those whose remittances may be used in the purchase of a motorbike or 
improve the family home are viewed from outside the household as more so. Similarly, those who 
are able to boast of entertainments enjoyed in the city or abroad, generally as a result of a reduced 
need to remit, enjoy a higher status than their colleagues who have seen only their workplace and 
the walls of their rented room. Where previously wealth meant lighter work and less worry, now it 
increasingly means experience of things not only inaccessible, but unknowable to the less wealthy. 
 
However, although it has been something of a refrain throughout this Ph.D. to emphasize the 
continued advantage of traditional elites, this is not intended to suggest that nothing has 
meaningfully changed. This new landscape of wealth, income, debt and poverty in evidence in rural 
Cambodia has not installed itself, unaltered amidst the old social realities. Rather, as the bases of 
wealth have shifted, so too have the bases of prestige and denigration. Employments and activities 
which were once the privilege only of the better off have now been overlaid by a degree of nuance 
as access to them widens: certain jobs within a factory are more sought after; it is better to be a 
chieng [specialist worker] than a kamakor samañ [ordinary worker]. This process, underlain by the 
nexus of pragmatism and traditional cultural mores has caused fundamental roles of both people 
and assets within society to be re-evaluated.  
 
Moreover, this thesis supports for the Cambodian case the view proffered elsewhere by Rao and 
Hossain (2012), Resurreccion (2005) and Silvey (2001) amongst others, that even the nature of 
gender relations has been caught up in this process of change, as the preference on the part of 
garment factories for female workers has bolstered their role in rural society, affording them a 
greater degree of influence in household and community matters alike. As Kabeer (1997: 263) has 
hypothesised, this is likely to reflect the changing relative strength of household members’ 
respective ‘fallback positions’. However, the network dimension of the work undertaken herein, and 
its concomitant implications for inequality transmission, facilitates the additional insight that 
households possessing different levels of rural wealth may experience divergent changes in the 
structure of their internal relations. 
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Moreover, in accordance with Elmhirst’s (2007) work in Indonesia, it has been shown that as the star 
of women rises, another inevitably falls. The emerging discourse of family duty, linked increasingly 
closely to migration, has served also to create a culture of denigration surrounding male non-
migrants.  For some, the response to these changing circumstances has been open conflict: anti-
social behaviour and organised delinquency. For others it has manifested in breaking with the past, 
via a refusal to take up the rural wage labour which supported their fathers and forefathers. For all, 
the meaning of wealth, honour and success have shifted. 
 
The overarching goal of this Ph.D. has been to make explicit some of the mechanisms by which these 
cultural changes, long hypothesised (by e.g. Hughes, 2001; Colletta and Cullen, 2000), come to 
manifest themselves in Cambodia’s rural heartlands and urban fringes. The picture that has emerged 
has been one of flexibility and pragmatism on the one hand, and persistence and strength on the 
other.  The key social norms of hierarchy, obligation and mutual assistance have become the fixed 
reference points around which rural society adapts to a rapidly changing environment. Even as the 
incursion of the market sees patrons and clients selected and discarded, distorting and 
disaggregating rural hierarchies, the language of patronage and community remains, at base, the 
same. 
 
8.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
In relation to its goal of elucidating the processes which link assets, liabilities and social practice, the 
research undertaken during the course of this Ph.D. has uncovered a number of promising avenues 
of further enquiry. Some of these relate to aspects of Cambodia’s socio-economic environment 
which were not focussed upon by this study, but which have nevertheless emerged as playing an 
unexpectedly significant role. Others have emerged as a result of the new opportunities offered by 
the methodologies tested herein.  
 
Of the first group, the role of debt in the socio-economy of contemporary Cambodia appears to have 
been somewhat underestimated both during the planning stages of this study and the literature 
more widely. On the somewhat rare occasions that household debt is mentioned (Bylander, 2014; Ir 
et al., 2012; Damme et al., 2004), it tends only to be done in relation to other, primary factors, such 
as health, migration, or climate shocks. Whilst this study has shown that these are indeed important 
reasons for the acquisition of debt, they are not the only, or even the major ones. Indeed, village-
wide generalizations are unhelpful here. Households belonging to different wealth strata exhibit 
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notably different behaviour in terms of the size of loans acquired, the type and source of loans 
undertaken, and the uses to which the debt in question is put. 
 
Furthermore, as this study has sought to show using the limited data collected on debt by a 
methodology not set up specifically to capture it, borrowing and lending money is not external to 
the social relations of a village. Even formal debt, a relatively recent arrival to Cambodia in its 
current incarnation and scale, plays a divisive role in the structure of rural society by allowing 
wealthier households to invest and multiply their incomes, whilst poorer ones borrow to subsist, 
thereby reducing their future incomes with interest payments. Informal debt is equally important, 
with small loans being one of the mechanisms by which groups are formed and bonded. In this 
respect, the literature is notably thin, with Phlong’s (2009) doctoral thesis perhaps the only in depth 
study of the linkages between formal and informal debt. It is therefore recommended that research 
be undertaken to extend this literature on debt systems and to better understand its role in social 
change. 
 
The prevalence of informal lending is, however, only one of many types of social relations 
characteristic of Cambodian villages. Pye (1999), for instance, discerned at least 19 organisations and 
traditional practices which had survived the Khmer Rouge era intact, all of which may be worthy of 
investigation in terms of their relationship with risk, inequality, social change and the wider 
biophysical environment. Following Bjornskov and Sonderskov’s (2010) and Fischer’s calls for a more 
nuanced and disaggregated approach to social capital research, this study focussed primarily upon 
what is described in the social capital lexicon as bonding linkages and found notable correlations 
with risk and wealth, as well as evidence of a flexibility which, with some exceptions (e.g. 
Ledgerwood, 2007; Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002), tends to be underplayed within the literature. 
The investigation of other modes of association, such as the pagoda association or the coffee shop, 
may produce results of the same or even greater relevance to the network theoretic and social 
capital literature. 
 
Additionally, a fruitful area for further investigation may be found simply in widening the scope with 
which the network mapping methodology employed herein is administered. This study began 
sampling from three independent points in close proximity and found notable differences in the 
structure of the communities delineated via the mapping of bonding linkages. Although these 
different structures appear to be related to various factors, including gross community income, or 
market integration, the geographic scope of this sample is insufficient to state with confidence 
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whether those factors which appear most influential in Krang Youv remain the key agents of social 
change in other parts of the country. 
 
Further research should therefore aim towards answering these issues with a greater degree of 
certainty. In particular, it is recommended that embedded network mapping of this type be 
extended to areas with a variety of different income portfolios in order to discern the differences 
resulting from the volume of migration and the extent of non-farm activity, for instance. In addition, 
the role of risk in shaping social relations has been shown to be notable. However, obtaining 
detailed information on long term changes to the environment and the specific social responses to 
these was one of the biggest challenges in this research, which was ultimately forced to rely on 
percentage crop losses and recall based methodologies.  In order to supercede such problems, it is 
recommended that future work be linked to existent longitudinal studies of local disaster liability. 
This, in conjunction with a greater variety of environmental risk profiles, spread across a number of 
sites, would help to clarify the manner in which the type and level of risk to which households are 
exposed determines the patterns of association they practise at a community level. 
 
One of the significant findings of this thesis was that the corollary to these types of social 
interaction, which though not directed towards the pursuit of community benefit nevertheless play a 
vital role in bolstering the cohesion of the village, is the prevalence of anti-social groups, described 
as “gangsters” by the inhabitants of Krang Youv. These sub-cultural groups, characterised, in 
particular, by their engagement with inter-gang violence and theft, as well as extortion in some 
cases, have been only recently noted within the literature. Following Elmhirst’s (2007) exposition of 
migration-gangster linkages in Indonesia, Czymoniewicz-Klippel (2011) is one of the very few authors 
to highlight the phenomenon of rural gangsters in Cambodia and provides a useful account from a 
sociological perspective. However, the relationship between socio-economic and cultural changes 
deriving from migration and economic development remains underexplored. Future research would 
benefit from the pursuit of further insights into the “dark side” of these and other social processes. 
 
Relatedly, a final field of enquiry would concern behaviour in migrant enclaves which runs counter to 
traditional norms. In particular, the sexual impropriety described by various informants in Sak te Bo, 
which raises further questions about the nature of Cambodian gender relations, appears worthy of 
further investigation. Evidence from this study suggests that many migrants enter into romantic 
relationships of various sorts during their migration, a rare and culturally illicit phenomenon in rural 
villages. Given the growing number of inter-village and inter-provincial marriages resulting from 
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labour migration in Cambodia (Yakura, 2012), the idea that migrant communities in Cambodia may 
therefore constitute zones of relative freedom and escape from rural or parental norms, as 
postulated by Kuhn in Bangladesh (2003), deserves investigation.  
 
Indeed, in this regard the literature remains thin. Although Derks (2008) has investigated cultural 
deviations in migrant communities to some extent, her study, published some six years ago, chooses 
to focus exclusively on women, where attention to the changing behaviour of both men and women 
might provide further insight into women’s relational role in this new type of Cambodian 
community. Given that changing masculinities in relation to economic development ‘have come 
under less scrutiny’ than their female corollaries (Elmhirst, 2007: 225), whether women are the 
drivers of new attitudes towards sexual and gender relations requires investigation, as does the 
question of the role of this change in the wider processes of Cambodia’s socio-economic 
development, within which they are ‘imbricated’ (Chant, 1998: 6). 
 
Effective examples of this sort of work have already emerged from countries other than Cambodia, 
as part of the literature related to the household,   gender and multi-local livelihoods in particular. 
Rao and Hossain (2012), (Elmhirst, 2008), Thieme (2008), Jolly and Reeves (2005), Resurreccion 
(2005), and Piper (2008) have all utilised a gender lens to analyse social changes arising from 
migration in a manner which might be used to build upon the more holistic approach adopted here. 
Their findings in this regard have informed the theoretical background to this thesis. However, the 
detailed analyses they offer could not be matched herein, due to the need to maintain a broad 
scope of enquiry incorporating environmental risk, economic change and social network behaviour. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of inevitable limitations to this approach, the broad based analysis undertaken 
here has produced a valuable set of tools for further development. Further research into the nexus 
of migration, economic development and changing social structures may therefore prove useful in 
developing transferable frameworks and methodologies suitable for usage in other national 
contexts. Should these tools be constructed in an inductive and research led manner, then they may 
go some way also, to retaining academic interest in the nexus of economic and social processes 
which has been, for authors such as Bourdieu (1984) the key meaning of the term social capital. If 
this is to be satisfactorily achieved, however, it must be undertaken in an entirely different spirit to 
much of the work which has thus far preceded it. Rather than a totalizing framework, smaller, tightly 
focussed, contextually embedded studies constitute the best available means of progression.  
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Indeed, it has been a consistent theme throughout the course of this Ph.D.  to emphasise the need 
for an holistic and embedded view of the many processes, structures and norms which underpin the 
structure of society in Cambodia. Not only women and men, but risk and inequality; gender and 
remittances; gangsters and land sale, have proved fruitful pairings for concurrent investigation. As 
such, this thesis has sought to draw together those divergent aspects of social practice which have 
tended to be isolated from each other within the literature, and thereby to explore the nature of 
their interaction. In doing so, Cambodian labour migration has been shown to exist as a sub-system 
nestled amongst multiple others, pertaining to farming and face; status and survival. “Modernity”, as 
with any external influence, is mediated and transformed by this multi-faceted and evolving 
structure, so that any meaningful separation of the pragmatic and cultural aspects of Cambodian 21st 
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Appendix A: List of all Interviews and Focus Groups Quoted within this Ph.D. 
1. Focus Groups 
Number Date Description 
1 09/05/13 Focus Group with North Ampil 
villagers 
2 03/06/13 Focus Group with Jake village 
elders  
3 21/06/13 Focus Group with three 
garment workers working in 
Sak te Bo 
4 08/08/13 Focus Group with South Ampil 
villagers 
 
2. Individual Interviews 
Date Name Sex Description 
08/04/13 Chuen Male Fisherman in North Ampil village 
18/04/13 Kaw Win Male Medium to large scale farmer and tractor driver in South 
Ampil 
19/04/13 Port Male Medium farmer in Go village 
22/04/13 Yan Yin Male Landless fisherman in North Ampil village 
23/04/13 Ban Korn Female Small scale farmer in North Ampil village 
25/04/13 Yen Tac Male Fisherman in North Ampil 
27/04/13 Li Li Female Landless widow in South Ampil village 
27/04/13 Soravanna Male Wealthy farmland owner in Jake village 
28/04/13 Sin Female Landless fisherwoman in North Ampil 
29/04/13 Truen Ngum Female Ampil village chief and medium scale farmer 
29/04/13 Yen Mom Male Wealthy farmland owner in South Ampil 
29/04/13 Sruen Female Landless widow in North Ampil 
30/04/13 Pan Yuen Female Medium scale landowner in South Ampil 
04/05/13 Pan Nol Male Wealthy famer in Jake village 
06/05/13 Chuen Hing Male Roadside petty trader and medium scale farmer, South 
Ampil village 
07/05/13 Theari Female Sweet dessert seller at a roadside stall in South Ampil 
07/05/13 Moon Heng Male Medium scale farmer from Go village 
08/05/13 Jan Suen Female Small scale farmer in South Ampil 
08/05/13 Srey Dara Female Garment worker from South Ampil, working in Sak te Bo 
09/05/13 Song Lyn Female Small scale farmer in South Ampil 
15/05/13 Soon Lom Male Medium scale land owner and in South Ampil village 
18/05/13 Khorum Female Landless widow in North Ampil village 
19/05/13 Wat Yarm Male Medium scale farmer and Go village chief 
20/05/13 Win Si Male Large scale land renter and farmer from Jake village 
23/05/13 Yarm Pan Male Medium scale farmer and roadside shop owner 
24/05/13 Jan Win Si Male Wealthy farmer in Jake village   
27/05/13 Tic Hong Male Wealthy farmer in Jake village 
28/05/13 Pan Mon Male Wealthy land owner in Jake village 
29/05/13 Mooen Chun Male Medium sized farm land owner in Jake village 
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01/06/13 Pon Tow Male Wealthy farmer in Go village 
03/06/13 Kim Long Male Landless fisherman in North Ampil village 
03/06/13 Wun Tee Male Small scale farmer in Jake village 
05/06/13 Sang Tai Female Landless widow in Go village 
06/06/13 Ming Female Landless wife of cyclo driver in Go village 
06/06/13 Ton Truen Male Small scale farmer in North Ampil and former migrant to 
Thailand 
06/06/13 Sirun Ji Male Vegetable grower and middleman, Go village 
08/06/13 Srawoon Male Medium scale farmer in Jake village  
13/06/13 Ton Truen 
Savoon 
Male Small scale farmer in Jake village 
14/06/13 Bo Simlai Male Petty trader and battery charger in North Ampil Village 
16/06/13 Run Tooks Male Landless fisherman in North Ampil village 
17/06/13 Sun Lim Male Landless fisherman in North Ampil village 
18/06/13 Net Took Female Very small scale land owner and tailor in South Ampil 
19/06/13 Long Male Phnom Penh based translator and research assistant 




Male Owner of a roadside construction materials shop in Sak te 
Bo 
21/06/13 Rented room 
owner 
Male Owner of a small block of rooms in Sak te Bo 
23/06/13 Pheap Son Male Disabled fisherman in North Ampil 
24/06/13 Jan Narun Male Mechanic from Jake village, working in Battambang 
25/06/13 Sopi Female Young garment worker from Jake village, working in Sak te 
Bo 
25/06/13 Soret Male Mechanic from Jake village, working in Prey Touic village, 
Kandal 
27/06/13 Srey Mier Female Young garment worker from Jake village, working in Sak te 
Bo  
27/06/13 Pon Tin Male Tuk Tuk driver and former garment worker from Kandal 
28/06/13 Powim Male Tuk Tuk driver and former garment worker working in Sak 
te Bo 
28/06/13 Net Mom Female Wealthy farmer’s (Mom’s) wife in South Ampil village 
28/06/13 Raksmey Male Research assistant from Phnom Penh 
02/07/13 Rueng Win Si Male Garment worker from North Ampil, working in Svay Rolum 
02/07/13 Beautician Female Working with two sisters at the Orussey market  
04/07/13 Win Bun Female Household cleaner working in Thanout Chrum 
08/07/13 Make up and 
Accessories 
vendor 
Female Mobile street vendor in Sak te Bo 
08/07/13 Pharmacist Female Pharmacist wife of a doctor in Sak te Bo 
08/07/13 Srey Mom Female Garment worker from South Ampil, working near Orrussey 
market 
10/07/13 Mom Mom Male Mechanic from South Ampil, working in Boueng Trabek 
11/07/13 Poa, Female Garment worker working in Prey Touic, 20km from her 
home in South Ampil 
14/07/13 Karp Male Young mechanic from Kandal working in Boung Trabek 
18/07/13 Srey Ro Female Young garment worker from Sa’ang, working in Sak te Bo 
20/07/13 Vishal Male Young motodop from Kandal, working in Phnom Penh 
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21/07/13 Chraan Female Middle aged food seller from South Ampil, working in 
Thnaout Chrum 
22/07/13 Chim Female Garment worker from South Ampil, working in Sak te Bo 
24/07/13 Pharmacist Female Works with two sisters at Orussey Market 
30/07/13 Heng Female Young garment worker from Go working in Sak te Bo 
30/07/13 Lin Da Female Young garment worker from South Ampil, working in Ta 
Khmao 
31/07/13 Ret Sonraat Male Construction worker from Krang Youv working in Cham Jao 
31/07/13 Heng Hein Male Construction worker from Krang Youv, working in Cham Jao 
31/07/13 Am Sang Male Construction worker from South Ampil, working in Cham 
Jao 
01/08/13 Paor Female Market trader from South Ampil, working in Kampong Speu 
06/08/13 Srey Chantup Female Construction worker from North Ampil, working in Kampog 
Speu 
09/08/13 An Songsi Female Young garment worker from Krang Youv, working in Sak te 
Bo 
09/08/13 Soki Female Market based food seller from South Ampil, working in 
Boueng Trabek 
09/08/13 Khleang Rim Male Triangle Project leader at the ILO Phnom Penh office 
12/08/13 Sok Tol Male Very small scale farmer and garment worker in Sak te Bo 
13/08/13 Virun Male Young garment worker from North Ampil, working in Sak te 
Bo 
13/08/13 Lay Sin Female Young garment worker from Prey Veng, working in Sak te 
Bo 
14/08/13 Vendor to 
construction 
workers 




Male From Krang You, working in Cham Jao 
15/08/13 Commune 
Chief 
Male Chief of Krang Youv commune 
15/08/13 Dr. Karen 
Schelzig 
Female Senior Sector Specialist at ADB Cambodia branch 
16/08/13 Meas Nee Male Stall holder repairing and selling mobile phones at Boeung 
Trabek market 
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If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King's College London using the 
details below for further advice and information: Professor Raymond 
Bryant, Department of Geography, King’s College London 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened 
to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: ___________________________________________ 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:________________ 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from the 
Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide 




 I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data up to the point of publication [OR insert date if stated on Information 
Sheet]. 
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 











agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet 
about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 




DELETE IF NOT APPROPRIATE 
Investigator’s Statement: 
I __________________________________________ 
Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed research to the participant. 













General Delivery Questionnaire (Quantitative) 
 
Section One: General Information 
 
Household Location Code  
Wealth Demographic 
(Self) 





Name Age Occupation (+ 








       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
Section Two: Assets and Debts 
 
Asset Type Number (or size) Date Obtained Cost (Rate for Debts) 
Livestock 
    
    
    
Land 
    
    
Farming Equipment 
    
    
    
Other Household Items 
    
     
Savings 
    
    
Debts 
    
    




Income Source  Annual Yield  Trend Reason Usage 
     
     






Section Three: Livelihoods 
 
Occupation 
Jan Feb March April May June July August Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Household Member Code  
            
Household Member Code  
            
Household Member Code  
            
Household Member Code  
            
Household Member Code  
            
Household Member Code  
            
 
Section Four: Social Networks 
 
Name  Relationship to Self GPS Code How Known Frequency of Meetings 
Close Friends 
     
     
     
     
     
Attendance at Weddings and other Celebrations 
     
     
     
     
Loans Given 
     
     
Loans Received 
     
     
Provas Dei (Agricultural Labour Sharing) 
     
     
     
Assistance with Migration 
     
     











Date Type Duration Intensity Damage and Losses 
     
     
     
     








Individuals Assisting Assistance Given Map 
Code 
      
      
      
      
      
 
Section Six: Risk Mapping 
 
Please indicate your perception of the following as a percentage 
 
Event Likelihood Detriment to Household Potential Assistance 
Flood    
Drought   
Storm   
Crop Failure   
Serious Injury   
 
Section Seven: Migration 
 
Member Code Remittances Remittance 
Spending 
Reverse Flows 
Money Food Other 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 





General Delivery Questionnaire (Qualitative) 
 
 
Networks and Groups 
 
What groups or organisations are there here? 
 
Who has ksai and knorng and who doesn’t? What does it do for them? 
 
What do your connections help you do? Are you well connected? 
 




What kinds of people are more powerful here? 
 
Who are the most powerful individuals in the village? 
 
Since people started migrating, are the powerful people still the same as before? Who has more power 




Who (and where) are the poorest people in the village? Who are the richest?  
 
Do you feel like there is a big difference between rich and poor here? Has this changed due to migration? 
 
Has the distribution of land and other resources changed here? 
 
What do the rich do to look after the poor? 
 
The Natural Environment 
 
What are the most important natural resources to you as a household? 
 




What risks concern you most? 
 
If your household suffered a natural disaster, who would help you? 
 




How has migration, or lack of it, affected you as a household? 
 
What effect has migration had on this village generally? 
 
Who do you think has benefitted most from migration? 
 




What proverbs or advice have helped you to live your life here? 
 










1. Land Holdings 
 





Land Location Code: 
 
2. Income Summary 
 
























Name  Occupation Date of Migration Location 
    
    
    
    
    
 
5. Shock History 
 
Date  Type Damaged Sustained 
   
   










Migrant’s Name  






















Has your wage ever been increased during your time working here? 








Co-inhabitants of Rented Room 
Name + 
Relationship  









       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       










Name Occupation Relationship GPS Code 
    
    
    
    
    
 
 













Date Location of Migration Helper Relationship Location of Helper 
     
     
     


























Village Economics (For Delivery to Secondary Migrants Only) 
 
Please list your Rural Household’s Assets 
Asset Type Number (or size) Date Obtained 
Livestock 
   
   
   
Land 
   
   
Farming Equipment 
   
   
   
Debts 
   
   
   
 
